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1.0  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   
 
 
1.1  SEA STRIKE INITIATIVES 
 
Fleet Battle Experiment KILO (FBE-K) contained two primary Sea Strike initiatives:   
Initiative # 1:  Refinement of Commander Seventh Fleet Joint Fires Network Concept of 
Operations (C7F JFN CONOPS) and Commander, Seventh Fleet / USS BLUR RIDGE Time 
Sensitive Targeting Standard Operating Procedures (C7F TST SOP).   
Initiative #2:  Establishment and examination of requirements for utilization of a 
Distributed Maritime Sensor and Fires network that integrates a Coalition engagement node 
within that network.    
 
In addition to CONOPS evaluation, a major component of Initiative #1 was for NWDC and C7F 
to examine and document theater support requirements inherent to standing up a Joint Fires 
Network (JFN) architecture in a forwarded deployed theater.  JFN was to be tested in support of 
JTF TST operations.  Initiative #2 was to test both the coalition information filter within the 
maritime engagement grid and processes for Coalition participation in TST.   
 
 
1.2 OVERVIEW  
 
FBE-K was conducted in conjunction with the USPACOM exercise TANDEM THRUST 03 
(TT03), which consisted of two segments, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a Field Training 
Exercise (FTX).  The centerpiece of this effort was the C7F flagship, USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-
19).  C7F (as designated by COMPACFLT) has the requirement to use the flagship as a 
deployable host for the Joint Forces Commander, and designated Component Commanders and 
staffs in theater.  C7F was embarked in LCC-19 as the CJTF with an embarked JFACC element 
to plan and execute OPLAN(s) and contingency operations.   
 
The Sea Strike initiatives focused on the command and control (C2) processes centered at the 
Joint forces Commander and Component Commander levels.  The principal TST C2 elements 
were JFACC Afloat and the JFMCC XP Cell.  Coalition command was located on the virtual 
ANZAC and it coordinated with the XP cell.   
 
TST processes were to be supported by C7F’s employment of the Joint Fires Network (JFN) 
suite installed aboard BLUE RIDGE.  It included Joint Services Imagery Processing System-
Navy (JSIPS-N), Precision Targeting Workstation (PTW), and the recently installed Army Deep 
Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) and Tactical Exploitation System-Navy (TES-N).  
TES-N was in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and ADOCS terminals were in the JIC, the 
Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) used by the JFACC, and XP cells.  TST processes to 
be tested were allocation/reallocation of weapons and sensors, target assignments, and fire-




Considerable difficulties in fulfilling Sea Fire Initiative objectives were experienced during 
experiment execution due to reduced JFACC manning and equipment problems.  Because of 
this, the experiment and exercise became decoupled, with the exercise proceeding as planned but 
with little or no support from JFN or the experiment personnel.  The results reported here are 
from what was accomplished by the experiment as essentially a separate entity.   
 
There was not an approved C7F JFN CONOPS or C7F TST SOP available to test during the 
experiment.  NWDC provided draft documents based partly on the PACAF Draft TST SOP and 
NFN TACMEMO.  Because of equipment problems, lack of operator training on the new 
systems, and little operator familiarity with TST SOPs and/or TTPs, no TST CONOPS or SOP 
evaluation could be performed.  Rather, the experiment served to introduce the SOPs and TTPs 
to Fleet personnel.  Development of C7F TST SOP requires development of operational (N3) 
procedures and coordination with Fleet staff.   
  
 
1.3 FIRES INITIATIVES PRINCIPAL FINDINGS  
 
Findings obtained for the Fires Initiatives are qualitative rather than quantitative, and cover 
broad aspects of TST processes rather than specifics.  Training on some of the component 
systems was conducted and Fleet personnel acceptance of the systems and the possibilities they 
present for improved operations was documented.  Possible TST process improvements were 
obtained rather than a determination of what process and system combinations do and do not 
work. 
 
Substantial specific information was obtained on hardware system performance.  FBE-Kilo 
introduced the use of JFN, including TES-N, to Seventh Fleet personnel.  Definitive 
recommendations for needed system and process improvements before JFN can achieve the 
needed level of performance for TST have been identified.     
 
1.3.1 System Improvements  
FBE-K produced a significant number of recommendations for system improvement.  A number 
of these had already been identified in previous experiments.  No further operational 
experimentation should be conducted with JFN without first making these improvements.   
 
Tactical Exploitation System – Navy   TES-N has a number of powerful tools (some of which 
are unique to TES-N) that potentially could be of great use to naval forces involved in TST.  
FBE-K reconfirmed that TES-N remains a very complex and developmentally immature system, 
with extremely limited interfaces to other C4I systems that are critical to TST.   Major advances 
are needed for:  Interface with ADOCS or other TST Command and Control system; Interface 
with GCCS-M; Interface to PTW and any external target folder applications; Handling of ISR 
video and platform/sensor telemetry; SCI COMINT analysis tools and SCI-to-GENSER 
connectivity via ISSE Guard 
 
ADOCS as the TST Command and Control System  TST C2 system requirements should look 
beyond the extensive typing input-output approach in ADOCS and its matrix displays for TST 
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coordination status.  Many of the C2 processes in ADOCS are complicated, difficult to define 
unambiguously, challenging to train, and highly dependent on internet chat and voice 
elaboration.   
ADOCS is an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), but the challenges 
evident in FBE-K raise the question if the ADOCS approach is the right concept to be applied to 
Joint Time Sensitive Targeting.  Because of the time-sensitivity of the targets and because it is at 
the tactical level of war, some of the functionality built into air defense command and control 
systems, such as AEGIS or AWACS should be examined for applicability to ground TSTs.  If 
ADOCS is to be used, the improvements listed below are needed.   
 
The ADOCS Managers exhibit inconsistencies and latencies that at times inhibit and 
occasionally defeat the TST engagement process.  Problems observed include:  Missions appear 
in some ADOCS workstations but not others.  The coordination block status can be different at 
different ADOCS workstations.  The mission status (e.g. fired or not fired) may be different in 
the Mission Coordination: Fires and JTST Managers.  Mission status as determined from the 
Mission History may not agree with the status in the Mission Coordination: Fires display.  Some 
events are missing from the Mission Histories.  Troubleshooting and fixing these inconsistencies 
is required.  
 
A TST C2 System needs functionality for automatically and unambiguously keeping track of 
targets that move, re-position, and change status.  ADOCS needs functionality added for such 
targets, i.e., dynamic target position information rather than static data fields.  Concurrently, 
functionality is needed for automatic updating and alerting of decision makers and engagers.  
Functionality is also needed for other critical changes in target status, such as missiles 
transitioning from stowed to erected positions.  This may require dynamic updating of target 
description, and certainly needs automatic updating and alerting of decision makers and target 
engagers.   
 
Several Human-System-Interaction (HSI) improvements are needed.  Means are needed for 
target prioritization, pending task notification, standardized critical task color-coding.  These 
may appear to be trivial matters, but the current situation is such that HSI plays a significant role 
in hindering TST processes and lengthening the timeline.  Color-coding isn’t merely a training or 
doctrine issue.  Because it is being used for coordination of time-critical tasks, the colors or 
symbols used should be engineered to be much more intuitive than they are.  Ideally, as intuitive 
as real traffic lights so that people will respond predictably, and quickly. 
 
1.3.2  Fires TTP 
Frequent and serious departures from the Fires TTP were partly due to player confusion or 
misunderstanding regarding procedures and partly caused by ADOCS displays latencies and 
inconsistencies.  Observed departures in ADOCS coordination block actions included: required 
TTP actions were not being taken, actions taken but not by the responsible node, actions taken 
that are undefined by the TTP (hence meaningless), and actions executed in the wrong sequence. 





1.4 COALITION INITITIVE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
 
The two processes in place for multilevel and multinational security of information transfer were 
Radiant Mercury Gold (RMG) for automated message transfer and a manual screening process 
for chat (e-mail-like) messages.  Situations where these measures actually inhibited proper 
information flow were inherent in the design of the network.  ADOCS coordination messages 
were not recognized by RMG and there was an inherent delay caused by having chat messages 
manually reviewed for security before being passed.   
 
It was not possible to assess the adequacy of security procedures and whether they enabled or 
hindered Joint and Coalition planning because there was no distributed planning cell with 
exclusive responsibility for developing, reviewing, distributing, and modifying daily planning. 
Discrepancies were observed between timing information in the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) 
and the weapon-target pairing assistance provided by experimental ADOCS on the U.S. side.  
These problems were never resolved, so cases where Coalition participants were included in 
planning processes could not yield conclusive information.  
 
1.4.1 Coalition Fires TTP  
 The most significant issue encountered by Coalition was the absence of a clearly defined, 
tactical level, step-by-step, C2 process for coordination of fires.  Creation of a step-by-step 
process for fires coordination part way through the FTX was too late and discussion was focused 
on understanding processes rather than on improving it.  Operator confusion at ANZAC and at 
the Coalition Cell was high, which lead to lengthy chat and VoIP communications for 
clarification.   
The lack of SOPs for the fires coordination process, together with the continued presence and 
efforts to resolve ADOCS integration issues essentially undermined all unit and higher-level 
training. The result was Coalition team on-going confusion in the fires coordination process.   
 
1.4.2 ADOCS and RMG Rule Sets and Interface  
RMG bridged the security boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN and SECRET 
AUSCANUKUS releasable networks.  GCCS-M COP was transmitted effectively across RMG.   
 
Due to budget and time constraints for RMG accreditation, a previously approved rule set was 
used.  It did not use the latest message format used in ADOCS so that exchange prototype 
messages generated by ADOCS could not be recognized by RMG.  Thus, not all of the data sent 
through RMG from SECRET US NOFORN ADOCS was transferred to the Coalition network.   
 
The RMG/ANZAC ADOCS interface had problems.  Coordination block problems resulted in 
ANZAC transmitting, by IRC, to the BLUE RIDGE desired coordination block actions that were 
then inserted in the ANZ coordination block by a BLUE RIDGE ADOCS operator.  No ANZAC 
GISRC target nominations were found in the ADOCS FBE net servers; reason unknown.   
 
 
1.4.3 Chat, Voice Over IP, and Sneaker-Net 
Radiant Mercury Guard was used to filter and transfer structured messages.  To exchange 
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unstructured messages (Chat, e-mail, VoIP, web pages) between U.S. and Coalition systems, a 
human-in-the-loop ‘air gap’ (Sneaker-Net) was utilized.  Information from U.S. was reviewed 
and relevant information for Coalition was transferred across the boundary.  Transcribing 
messages between the XP cell on BLUE RIDGE and the ANZAC command team in Fern Hill 
led to some ambiguity in communication.  The air gap introduced latencies of about seven 
minutes and was manpower intensive.  An automated filter (e.g. ISSE Guard) is required. 
 
VoIP was of high quality after network issues were resolved.  It was effectively utilized for 
technical troubleshooting and demonstrated a potential for use for tactical coordination.   
 
 
1.5 ORGANIZATION  
 
Time Critical Targeting Functionality Afloat   TCTF is a USAF program that outlines C2 
requirements and systems for conducting TCT operations.  The X-Ray Papa cell was an excellent 
test case for familiarizing the Fleet with the TCTF concept.  The USN needs to refine this 
concept to support joint and maritime forces for a JFC Afloat configuration.  The TCTF Afloat 
concept should be a starting point for future Sea Strike initiatives. 
 
X-Ray Papa and Maritime Component Time Sensitive Targeting   The X-Ray Papa cell 
identified a time sensitive targeting gap at the maritime component level that needs to be 
addressed. JFMCC’s conduct of broad scale TST operations that are integrated with other 
components is beyond the traditional role of the Bravo Papa.  A staff function at the operational 
level (JFMCC) that supports TST prosecution is required.  This effort should be integrated with 
the TCTF effort described above to help identify maritime TST command and control 
requirements of the future. 
 
 
1.6 COP ISSUES  
 
A true “Common” Operational Picture is non-existent.  In FBE-K, a COP was not maintained to 
a level required to support ISR and JFN in support of TST.  Different pictures always existed in 
GCCS-M, ADOCS, and TES-N.   
 
In spite of this, some COP goals were achieved; by the end of FTX, all of the simulated Blue ISR 
assets active in M&S were simultaneously displayed on BLUE RIDGE’s GCCS-M COP with 
appropriate labels (e.g., two ISR UUVs, two Predator UAVs, one U-2).  This was the first time 
that this has happened in an FBE.   
 
Exchange of TST information between TES-N and GCCS-M remains a problem.   
 
TST location output to COP   The TST nomination analyst used TES-N’s interface to GCCS-M 
to input the target into the COP as a track to assist in tracking the TST while waiting for it to be 
engaged.  This procedure only worked for two days at the same rudimentary and sub-optimal 
level at which it was working for MC02/FBE-J (the new TES-N version 5.0 provided no 
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improvement).  For the remainder of FBE-K it was functionally inoperative.   
 
GCCS-M COP Tracks into TES-N ITD   It was also planned that GCCS-M, COP tracks be sent 
from GCCS-M to TES-N.  The objective was to provide a richer context of contacts, tracks, Blue 
ISR asset locations, etc., in TES-N for the analysts trying to find/fix TSTs.  TES-N’s incoming 
“Message and Data Log” showed a good number of incoming tracks from GCCS-M, but those 
tracks did not parse into the TES-N ITD.  When GCCS-M tracks coming into TES-N were able 
to be brought up on the ITD it did not display any track labels.  (GCCS-M tracks in TES-N’s 
ITD appeared in their proper locations but the symbols do not have any labels associated with 
them (e.g., no track names), making them all but functionally useless to the TST team.)   
 
 
1.7 TECHNOLOGY  
 
FBE-K revealed a number of equipment problems.  System performance and compatibility issues 
are hindering obtaining operational benefits that should be realized from some of the new 
systems.  Recommendations contained in this report will have an impact on hardware system 
program management, if implemented.  Some of these issues are long standing and should be 
addressed before further experimentation with these systems is carried out.  Details are contained 
throughout the report, particularly in Sections 6.8, 6.9, 6.11, and Appendices C and E.   
 
Shipboard System Specifications   USS BLUE RIDGE has a 10 mb switch backbone that is 
connected via 155 mb links.  This, along with inconsistent network card setting hindered 
ADOCS use.  Standard, shipboard LAN configurations that support ADOCS need to be 
established for switch, link, and network card settings on these machines.  Hardware limitations 
may require platforms to set up multi-server configurations to reduce the effect of less modern 
network backbones.  ISNS ADOCS standards should be set prior to install and configured 
accordingly. 
 
ADOCS Changes   Many recommended changes to ADOCS were compiled during FBE-K.  
These are for providing adequate support to TST within currently existing C2 capability 
requirements.  New processes that are being experimented with will undoubtedly introduce 
additional requirements.  Improvements are needed to enhance situational awareness, e.g., target 
status and alerting for required actions.  Hot links are needed to provide easy access to important 
background information such as ROE, TST priorities, and target folders.   
 
JFN interaction with ADOCS   ATI.ATR target nomination to JFN was incomplete and not 
usable.  This problem was identified over 2 years ago, still exists, and needs to be fixed.  
Detailed ADOCS–JFN testing should be completed in the lab and needed modifications made 
rather than waiting for another experiment. 
 
The TST nomination analyst used TES-N to create a target nomination message (in USMTF 
“ATI.ATR” format), and sent that nomination message (via SMTP) to the ADOCS server on 
BLUE RIDGE, and to the TST Target Folder server at NWDC.  Considerable effort was required 
to get all systems interoperating correctly: TES-N LAN, ship’s LAN/Exchange server, FBE-K 
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WAN and Exchange servers, and ADOCS mail server.  Once set up properly the process worked 
well.  
 
Inconsistencies existed in how target nominations were handled by ADOCS and how they were 
showing up in the TST Target Folder server.  The fault was in both TES-N and ADOCS, with 
inconsistencies in target line usage.  ADOCS turned around an ATI.ATR with fields out of order 
and truncated.    
 
Images related to target nominations to PTW for aim-point refinement   Images (e.g., video 
“chips” showing the TST) were to be attached to outgoing target nominations, and the 
nomination sent simultaneously to ADOCS, the TST Target Folder, and PTW.  The version of 
PTW used on BLUE RIDGE could not receive and parse ATI.ATR messages (i.e., did not have 
the DTMS software used in MC02/FBE-J).  TES-N does not allow images to be attached to 
outgoing ATI.ATRs.     
 
 
1.8  Equipment Casualty Modes   
 
A TST C2 System needs to have reliable alternative modes of operation and more graceful 
degradation than is currently available with open-architecture LANs and internet-style networks. 
Most legacy combat systems have casualty modes and some have several levels of casualty 
modes.  The down-time and network problems encountered in FBE-K may not be atypical of 
what might occur in the real world with leading edge technologies, pushing the envelope, built 
on open-architecture machines and networks. 
 
 
1.9 Pre-Experiment Testing and Go/No-Go Decision  
 
Some of the difficulties encountered in FBE-K were known prior to the experiment.  Equipment 
problems were uncovered when tests were run on-site immediately before embarkation.  The 
question arises as to whether an experiment should be conducted under these circumstances.  An 
FBE naturally build up a momentum toward execution that is almost irresistible.  There is no 
process to decide whether or not to execute an experiment or to scale it back to a level that can 
be achieved.  Two recommendations are germane to this issue.  First, establish a time at least six 
weeks prior to an experiment by which all equipment to be used is tested and demonstrated to 
operate adequately to meet experiment goals.  If that level is not achieved, the equipment cannot 
be fielded.  Second, establish a process for periodic review of experiment status.  At each review, 
demonstration that sufficient progress has been achieved to warrant continuing must be made or 


















 2.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
The following italicized descriptions are taken directly from the Navy Warfare Development 
Command (NWDC) FBE KILO Experiment Plan.  
 
Fleet Battle Experiment K (FBE K) will be conducted in the spring of 2003, the 11th experiment 
in the FBE series.  It will be conducted in conjunction with the USPACOM tier 1 level exercise, 
Tandem Thrust 03 (TT03). TT03 is comprised of two events, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) 
and a Field Training Exercise (FTX); FBE K will participate in both events.  
 
As part of FBE K, many of the Experiment’s initiatives will focus on the command and control 
(C2) processes centered at the joint force level.   A primary goal is to apply the concepts of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) to the processes used to support a Joint Task Force (JTF) staff 
and a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) while they are embarked aboard a 
Joint Fires Network (JFN) equipped command platform (USS BLUE RIDGE LCC-19).   FBE K 
will concentrate on the allocation / reallocation of both weapons and sensors, target assignment, 
and fire mission deconfliction in support of the JFACC execution of Time Sensitive Targeting 
(TST) operations at the joint force and component level.   FBE K will use a common set of 
automated tools and common system architecture aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE that enables 
effective TST C2 and joint task force coordination. This flexible Joint Fires Initiative C2 
architecture is designed to increase the speed and tempo at which the JTF as a whole can 
conduct TST operations.  
 
In support of these goals, there were two Sea Strike Initiatives, which we have named "TST 
Processes" and "Coalition" for the purposes of this report.  The Initiative Statements for each in 
the Experiment Plan are: 
 
TST Processes Initiative.  Refinement Of Commander, Seventh Fleet Joint Fires Network 
Concept of Operations (C7F JFN CONOPS) and Commander, Seventh Fleet / USS BLUE 
RIDGE Time Sensitive Targeting Standing Operating Procedures (C7F TST SOP).  
 
Coalition Initiative:  Establishment and examination of requirements for utilization of a 
Distributed Maritime Sensor and Fires network that integrates a coalition engagement node 
within that network.    
 
In October 2002 the C7F Flagship, USS BLUE RIDGE, received a TES-N installation.  Upon 
installation completion, the JFN Program Office developed a draft Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) tailored to C7F needs.  That draft CONOPS was not adapted by C7F.  Instead, C7F 
desired to develop procedures based on the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) Afloat, Time-Critical-Targeting (TCT) Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP).  C7F requested NWDC assistance in exercising JFN aboard Blue Ridge and 




The emphasis during the TT03 FTX was on collaboration and coordination between CJTF ISR 
Operations and multiple components, and on tools to speed coordination and enable common 
situation awareness of TST status.  Specifically,  
 Emphasize collaboration/coordination between CJTF/JFACC/JFMCC TST elements 
 Exercise Army Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) network between CJTF 
and multiple components   
 
 
2.1  FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE  
  
The purpose of the Field Training Exercise (FTX) is to train a U.S. Pacific Command Joint Task 
Force (JTF) under Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet operating as the Commander of the JTF. This 
was done within the structure and scenarios of Tandem Thrust 03.  The exercise scenario was 
defense of a fictitious island nation Guppie against an aggressor island nation Piranha.  The 
scenario was complicated by the presence of military forces from the fictitious nation of Orca, 
which was sympathetic to Piranha but not overtly engaged in aggressive action.   
 
U.S. Joint Task Force tasking included: 
 Secure SLOCs/ALOCs within the Joint Operating Area 
 Forcible entry.  Re-take friendly territory seized by aggressor nation 
 Conduct Humanitarian assistance operations 
 Fortify/defend friendly nation(s) 
 Establish bases for future combat operations against aggressor 
 Eliminate aggressor’s ability to threaten region 
 
The command structure for the exercise was: 
 CJTF – COMSEVENTHFLT embarked USS BLUE RIDGE  
 JFMCC – CTF 70 embarked USS CARL VINSON 
 Theater ASWC – CTF 74 Yokosuka Japan 
 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) Commander – embarked USS ESSEX 
 JFACC – PACAF O-6 embarked USS BLUE RIDGE   
   - JFACC TST Cell O-4 embarked USS BLUE RIDGE 
 JSOTF – SOCPAC O-6 COMNAVFORMARIANAS Guam 
 JFLCC – embarked USS BLUE RIDGE 
 
There were extensive live forces participating in the overall TT03 FTX.  However, the live 
forces did not participate in the Fires Initiative of FBE-K, and so they are not listed in this report. 
 
 
2.2 TST PROCESSES INITIATIVE 
 
The purpose of the Fires Initiative was primarily to determine the support to TST that can be 
provided by JFN.  The TES-N portion of JFN resided within and was utilized by the Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC).  ADOCS was to be used for the engagement COP primarily in the 




Initiative number one’s primary goal is to support C7F in refining and validating its C7F JFN 
CONOPS / C7F TST SOP.  This initiative will attempt to (to the maximum extent possible) 
define JFN support to operations in the three roles that it will be employed by C7F.  The roles 
are as an embarked CJTF with other supported staff(s) embarked, as an embarked 
JFMCC/NAVFOR, and as the Fleet JFN/JFN supporting deployed RTCs and RTC Lites. 
 
Additional benefits of this initiative include providing material to update the JFACC (Afloat) 
PACAF CONOPS, define personnel and training requirements for X-INT fusion to the Target 
Data Base, and examination of JFN impact on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process.  Another 
important objective is to assess the adequacy of USS BLUE RIDGE’s legacy communications to 
support JFN. 
 
All of the stimulus necessary to examine the CONOPS/SOP will be by simulation.  There are no 
live events during the CPX.  During the CPX, JWFC will provide the majority of the simulation, 
as they are tasked by CPF to support the CPX primary goal of certifying C7F as a CJTF.  NWDC 
will provide some UAV and cross-INT simulation for direct stimulation of the JFN suite aboard 
USS BLUE RIDGE.  The JWFC simulation quality may constrain NWDC’s ability to validate 
the C7F JFN CONOPS.   A C7F constraint is that during the CPX all participants will use legacy 
communications / systems only.  Any work not completed during the CPX will continue into the 
TT03 FTX as required.   
 
Key participants include the entire CJTF command structure and Component Commanders.  
JFACC participation is essential to meet the majority of objectives in addition to supporting 
examination of USAF ISR Manager (ISRM) to JFN operations. 
 
The following lists JFN equipment that was installed on the Blue Ridge and its purpose.   
 
Application Purpose 
Gale Lite On a TES MFWS applied to ELINT analysis. 
TES-N Nomination of TSTs.  Sensor management. 
JSIPS-N/PTW Georefinement of TST positions 
GCCS-M COP, track management. Track exchange with TES-N. 
Ku-band SATCOM network Support FBE network 
MUSE/AFSERS Simulated imagery and video for Predator, U-2 and Global Hawk 
JSAF In the CPX, supported imagery generation for MUSE/AFSERS.  
In FTX,  JSAF was the stimulator for the full exercise. 
JTLS CPX  stimulator 
ADOCS Cross Component TST collaboration and TST target management 
IRC/IWS Collaboration 
IPL  Central imagery repository 
Electronic Target Folder Repository for all TST data. 
. 




Analytical questions that support C7F JFN CONOPS / C7F TST SOP examination include: 
 
Question 1:  How do the limitations of the current wideband architecture (systems and networks) 
that supports sensor control, ISR fusion, and national imagery reach back aboard LCC-19 when 
JTF and JFACC (Forward/Afloat) staffs are embarked, affect the functionality/capability 
inherent to the installed JFN suite? 
 
Question 2:  What contributions are made by C7F JFN CONOPS and the underlying SOP, 
interfaces, and multi-database information displays, to situational awareness of the embarked 
(aboard a JFN equipped LCC) warfighter at the Operational level? 
 
Question 3:  Does the C7F JFN CONOPS and the underlying SOP provide sufficient guidance to 
use the additional JFN functionality /capability to enable time sensitive targeting operations? 
 
Question 4:  Does the C7F JFN CONOPS and the underlying SOP reveal necessary changes to 
systems, architectures, and information flow processes required to exploit the added capability of 
an afloat JFN (supporting the JTF staff and a JFACC forward) and an ISR-M supporting the 
JFACC Main? 
 
Question 5:  Does the C7F JFN CONOPS and the underlying SOP support use of JFN 
functionality/capability aboard the LCC to affect the responsiveness and reliability of ISR 
command and control with the JFACC (Forward/Afloat) as the coordinating agency? 
 
 
2.3   COALITION INITIATIVE 
 
The second initiative focuses on the examination of a distributed, maritime sensor and fires 
network that integrates a coalition engagement node within that network.  This network will be 
overseen by a Experimental (XP) Strike Warfare Commander’s XP Cell.  This XP Commander, 
as directed by the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), will interact as the 
maritime support segment to the JTF TST operations during the FTX.  This XP Cell will be 
embarked aboard USS Blue Ridge.  The goal is to examine interface and process requirements 
that support maritime participation in JTF level TST operations in a coalition, distributed 
environment. 
 
The initiative will exercise dynamic management of a tiered, multi-INT sensor architecture 
within the experimental architecture to support both the TST operational requirements. NWDC 
will achieve this by building on past FBE experimentation in ISR Operations to get the right 
“ISR feeds/data/info” to allow an enhancement in the  “fusing” of sensor information to support 
the AP cell and its assigned combatants.  This initiative will occur only during the FTX phase of 
TT03. 
 
NWDC will establish a Coalition Fires C2 grid interface with NFN through use of a fires C2 
tool, the Army Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS).  Temporary installations of 
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ADOCS workstations in the Commander, Seventh Fleet’s Flagship, USS Blue Ridge and in a 
series of virtual combatants that will comprise the maritime engagement nodes.  These nodes are 
the virtual DDX at Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, the E-2Xv at the Naval 
Warfare Development Command in Newport, Rhode Island, and the virtual ANZAC at the 
Defense Science and Technology Organization laboratory at Fern Hill, Australia. 
 
By working through the C7F Joint Intelligence Center and the JFACC Afloat TST cell, NWDC 
will examine the information flow and other engagement processes that are required in 
establishing a coalition engagement grid within a larger coalition force structure 
 
The addition of Global ISR Capability (GISRC) to the maritime firing units provides future ISR 
capability and will enable the firing units to monitor simulated UAV’s in a Call for Fire spotting 
role and in a strike support role.   
 
Stimulus will be primarily from the NWDC simulation federation.  This federation and the 
associated stimulus it provides, along with a simulated Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicle (MR UUV) deployed from a virtual SSN at NUWC, will contribute to overall 
ISR stimulation effort for the FBE.   
 
An example of the examined future weapons capability comes in the form of a virtual DD(X) 
configured with the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), an future ballistic land attack 
missile and Tactical Tomahawk surface launched cruise missile.  Targeted date for potential 
capabilities is the 2007-2010 timeframe. 
 
 
2.3.1 Coalition Initiative Questions  
 
Analytical questions that support establishment and examination of requirements for utilization 
of a Distributed Maritime Sensor and Fires network that integrates a coalition engagement node 
within that network examination include: 
 Question 1:  What instances demonstrate the current security processes and multilevel 
security technologies enable or inhibit the “seamless” transfer of warfighting information 
between joint and coalition forces? 
 
Question 2:  Do the current security processes and technologies support distributed 
collaborative planning between joint and coalition forces? 
 
Question 3:  Does the addition of a “dedicated” level of command and control (XP Cell) 
enhance or detract from the ability of the JOA TST agent (JFACC) to utilize JFMCC assets in 
the prosecution of a JTF level TST campaign? 
 
Question 4:  Does the example in this event, of a networked maritime engagement 
platform, produce a capability to dynamically command and control non-organic ISR and strike 




3.0  RECONSTRUCTION 
 
3.1 IMPACTS ON THE EXPERIMENT 
 
Circumstances significantly affected the ability to obtain the desired data for this Initiative.    
• A TST process was not in place at the start of the FTX. 
• The FBE-K Fires events and organization was almost entirely disconnected operationally 
from the Tandem Thrust 2003 FTX in which Commander Seventh Fleet was conducting 
live training events.    
• Almost all the personnel involved in the Fires Initiative were augmentees new to the 
equipment, TST process as it was, and environment. 
• There were numerous equipment and information failures.  
The following describes the impact of these circumstances on the ability to meet initiative 
objectives.  Also provided is a listing of the daily TST events from the MSEL.   
 
Events impacting the experiment began before it began.  More than a month prior to FBE-K the 
proposed JFN/TST CONOPS was rejected by Commander Seventh Fleet and it was decided to 
use the PACAF TST SOP as a basis.  This SOP is not written for a JFACC Afloat with the CJTF 
so is not entirely appropriate for this initiative's objectives.  Conversely, it can also be said that 
the preparation for the FBE Fires initiative was not entirely appropriate for 
COMSEVENTHFLT’s objectives.  The result was that, rather than CONOPS evaluation and/or 
validation, the experiment shifted to a focus on observing and evaluating activities in order to 
formulate workable procedures.   
 
Part of the FBE-K Fires Initiative involved an experimental Navy Strike Warfare Commander, 
called Xray Papa, to play a key role in TST under the JFMCC.  By design, Xray Papa would 
have been embarked in the aircraft carrier with the JFMCC, but due to uncertainty surrounding 
carrier deployments related to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was 
infeasible to install the equipment necessary to set up Xray Papa aboard the carrier.  Therefore 
Xray Papa was embarked aboard Blue Ridge.  The actual JFMCC for Tandem Thrust 03 was 
embarked in the carrier Vinson, and was engaged in the live exercises of the FTX, but not the 
simulated Fires events of the FBE.  For the purposes of TST command and control in ADOCS, 
e-mail, and chat, Xray Papa aboard Blue Ridge simulated being the JFMCC.  
 
Before the experiment it was also learned that the Air Force would not man a JFACC Afloat as 
planned, partly due to policy and partly due to demands of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  A JFACC 
was established at Hickam Air Force Base during the CPX, and was closed down during the 
FTX. A group of three Air Force officers from Hickam were embarked aboard Blue Ridge 
during the FTX to act as a JFACC TST Cell in Hickam would.  There was also an FTX live-fly 
cell set up in the Joint Air Operations Center aboard Blue Ridge, but they didn’t participate in 
the simulated FBE Fires initiative events.  For the purposes of TST command and control in 
ADOCS, e-mail, and chat, the JFACC TST Cell simulated actions of a larger JFACC Air 




The Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) flagship, USS Essex was outfitted with a JFN Remote 
Terminal Capability (RTC).  However, neither the embarked ESG Commander nor Special 
Operations Commander participated in the FBE Fires initiative events.  For the purposes of TST 
command and control in ADOCS, e-mail, and chat, Xray Papa aboard Blue Ridge simulated 
being the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and the Joint Special Operations 
Task Force Commander.  
 
The combination of a lack of CONOPS to test, lack of connection between the fires initiative and 
actual component commanders and live events, artificial manning of essential command and 
control nodes, limited participation actual Seventh Fleet personnel, limited training of 
augmentees and equipment difficulties resulted in limited data from which conclusions could be 
drawn.  Even so, data was obtained that throws light on training needs and on the use of JFN for 
TST by the Fleet.   
 
 
3.1.1 Manning Impacts  
 
Reliance on Augmentees:  Almost all the personnel involved in the Fires Initiative were 
augmentees new to the equipment, TST process as it was, and environment.  Every ADOCS 
watchstation in the FTX was manned by an augmentee.  The TST Targeting Officer in the JIC 
and all but two of the officers in the Xray Papa cell were reservists.  Plus there were three Air 
Force officers from Hickam, and two operators on temporary duty from NWDC.  The training on 
ADOCS started when they embarked aboard Blue Ridge a few days before the commencement 
of the FTX, and the experience they gained left with them when they debarked the last day.  The 
Seventh Fleet staff was primarily engaged in the live exercises of the FTX as well as monitoring 
real-world concerns.  The C7F Battle Watch was not involved in the FBE Fires events. 
- Impact: Much of the FTX was a learning experience for the augmentees.  
 
Artificial Component Commanders:  All actual Tandem Thrust FTX Component Commanders 
were engaged in live FTX exercises and not engaged in the FBE Fires initiative.   All 
Component Commander roles for TST were played by Xray Papa and JFACC TST Cell 
augmentees, co-located aboard Blue Ridge. 
- Impact:  The process did not exercise realistic coordination between battle watch staffs. 
 For example, realistic deconfliction wasn’t conducted, and most procedural issues could be 
resolved easily by face-to-face discussion.   
 
 
3.1.2 Training Impacts  
 
TES-N Operator Experience Level:  Although reported as problematic during the CPX, the TES-
N operators were entirely up to the task of using the multi-function workstations for the FTX 
TST events.  This was due in part to experience gained during the CPX, plus additional training 
by the JFN Mobile Training Team.  But there was another training deficiency that was apparent 
during FTX when TES-N had a greater role in a tactical sensor-to-shooter process.  The 
intelligence specialists in the JIC are trained to develop and produce intelligence products at the 
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operational level of war.  During the FTX, they were put into the unaccustomed position of 
tactical level evaluation of information and tasking of ISR assets in real time.  Their previous 
training and experience didn’t prepare them to have the sense of urgency needed for tactical 
operations for TSTs.      
- Impact: Data collected on the processing times for information with JFN within the Blue Ridge 
JIC are not likely to be characteristic of processing times for operators trained and experienced 
in tactical operations. 
 
Simulation Limitations:  The simulation imagery had blurry gray background and very distinct, 
clear black, clip-art targets of interest.  The very distinct clip-art targets, that were identical to 
clipart in the very concise “recognition guide” trivialized the TST requirement for Positive ID 
(PID) of targets.  (i.e., whenever a distinct black spot was noticed, it was by definition a 
positively ID’d target).  Collateral Damage Estimates (CDE) for targets was trivialized because 
all targets were clearly situated in wide-open spaces.  Simulation imagery lacked meta-data 
needed by IS imagery analysts for developing accurate aimpoints.  Visual aimpoint estimation, 
without distinct high-resolution reference points, and without sophisticated machine-aided 
imagery registration was not useful for precision aimpoints.  Most images lacked precision 
elevation data.  Lack of reality in the simulation had a strong effect on training.   
- Impact: Command and control processes for geo-refinement of precision aimpoints and 
mensuration, which has been a critical element of previous FBE fires experimentation, was 
essentially eliminated from FBE-K.  Analysis using JFN for positive ID and collateral damage 
estimation, which were critical elements of TST processes in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were also 
essentially eliminated.   
 
 
3.1.3 Systems / Data Impacts 
 
ADOCS ran poorly on existing computers on Blue Ridge classified LAN:  Operators reported 
that they experienced delays of several minutes between mouse clicks and computer responses. 
- Impact:  Time-sensitive actions could not be accomplished in a timely manner. 
Procedures and training were negatively affected. 
 
No Receipt of COMINT In SCI TES-N:  C7F does not currently use the SCI side of TES-N for 
COMINT analysis. 
- Impact:  This meant that any COMINT injects, intended to be used as part of for cross-
INT analysis by the JFN Team had to be provided by hardcopy or e-mail, and considered off-
line.  
 
TES-N Interface with GCCS-M Functionally Limited:  The TES-N manual input to GCCS-M 
COP worked one day during the FTX training, but not for injecting any TST tracks during the 
remainder of the FTX.   
 - Impact:  TST nominations were never “pushed” to the COP, important to the “Track” 
step of the TST process, to enhancing the commander’s situational awareness, and to the 




TES-N Could Not Attach Images to TST Nominations:  The Target Nomination application in 
TES-N did not provide for the attachment of accompanying images / image “chips” (a shortfall 
identified during FBE-J that was reportedly to be rectified by FBE-K).  
 - Impact:  During MSEL Events, TST-related images were manually moved (FTP) to 
PTW, with the nominating Analyst providing verbal cueing to the PTW operator as to which 
Target Block Number related to which image.  The PTW analyst then changed the image 
filename appropriately (much easier to do in PTW than TES-N), and saved the re-named image 
to a shared network drive.  The JIC Targeting Officer then drafted a SIPRNET email (in MS 
Outlook), and attached the appropriate image(s) from the shared network drive, and sent the 
email to the NWDC TST Target Folder Server for ingest.   
 
   
3.1.4 Equipment Status Matrix  
 







COMINT (via SI 
bcast) ELINT (via TDDS)
ELINT (from TES-N 
Gale into ITD) IMINT (via JCA) 
FRI 25 
APR  
Trying to get C7F CTR 
to script and send via 
SI bcast back to 
herself on TES-N 
TNMC will not accept 
injects from JSAF or 
ISR UUV (workaround 
via ASSET) 
New CTT, needs 
training, but first had 
account issues 
Used to transfer sim 
"PHOTINT" from ISR 
UUV in NITF format. 
SAT 26 
APR  
Still configuring SCI 
side of TES-N to recv 
NRTD SMTP feed 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 
GALE being input to 
Cross-INT, displayed 
on ITD 




No further progress 
(unable to examine 
further) 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 
GALE being input to 
Cross-INT, displayed 
on ITD 




No further progress 
(unable to examine 
further) 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 
GALE could not be 
displayed on ITD 
Successfully pulled 
from JCA to BLR IPL, 
used by analysts in 
PTW and TES-N 
TUE 29 
APR  
No further progress 
(unable to examine 
further) 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 




from JCA to BLR IPL, 
used by analysts in 
PTW and TES-N 
WED 30 
APR  
No further progress 
(unable to examine 
further) 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 






No further progress 
(unable to examine 
further) 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 
GALE being input to 
Cross-INT, displayed 
on ITD 
Not used in todays 
Events 
FRI 02  
MAY  
No further progress 
(unable to examine 
further) 
Using ASSET 
workaround to send 
LOBs; not showing up 
in TES-N GALE 
Non-LOB ELINT 
coming to TES-N 










U-2 Imagery (fm 
AFSERS TENCAP) 
U-2 Telemetry (fm 
AFSERS TENCAP)
Video (from AFSERS 
MUSE) 




Not explicitly used in todays 
Event, but tested good 
Not explicitly used in 
todays Event, but 
tested good 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced, used for target 
noms 




Not used in todays Events, 
but tested good 
Not used in todays 
Events, but tested 
good 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced 
DPPDB loaded, some 




U-2 was "flying" but not 
coming through to TES-N 
EMPS 
U-2 was "flying" but not 
coming through to 
TES-N EMPS 
Video rec'd, but unable to 
save chips to DBO (TES-N 
database problems) 
(Unable to examine) 
MON 28 
APR  
"Low res" rec'd in Screener 
(but can't be chipped), "hi 
res" in DBO (but  res still 
poor) 
Telemetry being rec'd, 
but got EMPS error, 
"Sensor not found." 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced, FTP'd to PTW 
Used DPPDB to do 
visual point transfer, 




"Low res" rec'd in Screener 
(but can't be chipped), "hi 
res" in DBO (but  res still 
poor) 
Telemetry being rec'd, 
but got EMPS error, 
"Sensor not found." 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced, FTP'd to PTW 
Used DPPDB to do 
visual point transfer, 




"Low res" rec'd in Screener 
(but can't be chipped), "hi 
res" in DBO (but  res still 
poor) 
Telemetry being rec'd, 
but got EMPS error, 
"Sensor not found." 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced, FTP'd to PTW 
(video freezes on one 
workstation) 
Not used in todays 
Events 
THU 01 
MAY  Not used not tried 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced, FTP'd to PTW 
Used DPPDB to visually 
estimate aimpoint 
FRI 02  
MAY  Not used not tried 
Video rec'd, chips 
produced, FTP'd to PTW 
Sim National Image used 













Target nom to 
ADOCS 






GCCS-M COP Tracks 
into TES-N ITD 
FRI 25 
APR  
Data integrity still 
needs testing.  
Outgoing queue inop 
for one day of OSD 
testing 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; work 
around uses Outlook, 
PTW, shared drive] 
Finally got it to work to 
same level as FBE-J 
Has been inoperable for 









(ATI.ATRs) stuck in 
outgoing message 
queue 
Not used in todays 
Events, because no 
TST noms could be 
done 
Some tracks coming into 
Msg & Data log again, but 




TST nom.s would not 
save in database, 
could not be sent out 
TST nom.s would not 
save in database, 
could not be sent out
Manual Contacts 
would not save in 
database, could not be 
sent out 
Tracks could not come in, 




TST nom.s would not 
save in database, 
could not be sent out 
TST nom.s would not 
save in database, 
could not be sent out
Manual Contacts 
would not save in 
database, could not be 
sent out 
GCCS-M tracks coming 
into Msg & Data log again, 





successful.  Data 
integrity needs 
controlled testing. 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; work 
around uses Outlook, 
PTW, shared drive] 
Attempted, but no 
indications of success
Successfully pulled up 




Data integrity tested.  
Evidence points to 
ADOCS as culprit. 
Data integrity tested.  
ATI.ATR messages 
unaltered in Target 
Folders 
No indications of 
success 
Successfully pulled up 
tracks on ITD, but with no 
labeling 
THU 01 
MAY  Successful 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; work 
around uses Outlook, 
PTW, shared drive] 
Attempted, but no 
indications of success
Successfully pulled up 
tracks on ITD, but with no 
labeling 
FRI 02  
MAY  Successful 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; work 
around uses Outlook, 
PTW, shared drive] 
Attempted, but no 
indications of success
Successfully pulled up 









DIOP to ISRM 
(CPX), ESSEX RTC 
(FTX) 
File Xfer to ISRM 
(CPX),  RTC / RTC 
Lites (FTX) 
U-2 Msn Plan (to 
AFSERS TENCAP)
Cross-INT replication 




Told by FSRs that sim 
data from AFSERS 
cannot be DIOP'd (to 
ESSEX RTC) 
Successful to ESSEX 
RTC; no exercise 
data to DDX and 
vSSN RTC Lites 
ISC Hutton (PEO IWS 





Tape of live SYERS 
mission "played" in 
TES-N, DIOP'd to 
ESSEX 
Successful to ESSEX 
RTC; no exercise 
data to DDX and 
vSSN RTC Lites 
Plan updated by ISC 
Hutton successfully 
ingested, used 
ESSEX RTC reportedly 




DIOP'ing tape to 
ESSEX may have 
contributed to TES-N 
non-receipt of sim U-2 
Successful to ESSEX 
RTC; no exercise 
data to DDX and 
vSSN RTC Lites 
Same plan used  
ESSEX RTC "pulling" 
poss contributed to TES-
N database crash 
MON 28 
APR  
Cut ESSEX transfers 
way back (not much to 
transfer due to dbase 
prob.s) 
Cut ESSEX transfers 
way back; DDX 
beginning to receive
Same plan used, but 
telemetry not feeding 
TES-N (EMPS could 
not "find" sensor) 
Could not replicate 
anything due to corrupted 
files in Cross-INT filter / 
databases 
TUE 29 
APR  Not attempted 
DDX RTC Lite 
receiving all exercise 
data; not so vSSN 
Same plan used, but 
telemetry not feeding 
TES-N (EMPS could 
not "find" sensor) 
Not attempted 
WED 30 
APR  Not attempted 
DDX and NUWC RTC 
Lites both rec'ving 
exercise data. 
Tried ad hoc tasking, 
but telemetry still not 




All Essex RTC 
operators aboard Blue 
Ridge 
not pushed today not tried  Not attempted 
FRI 02  
MAY  
All Essex RTC 
operators aboard Blue 
Ridge 












via ISSE Guard 
FRI 25 
APR  
Not attempted; FSR 
working to set up 




Not attempted; trying 
to establish SMTP 
feed of SCI NRTD 
data from SSES 
SUN 27 
APR  
Not attempted; SMTP 
feed of SCI NRTD 
















Tol d by MTT that 
special techs had to 
come set up ISSE 
Guard 
THU 01 
MAY  Not attempted 
FRI 02  
MAY  Not attempted 
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3.2 EXPERIMENT PLANNED EVENTS 
 
The following are sanitized extractions from the Master Scenario Event List.  These events were 
designed to provide stimulation to Joint Fires Network (JFN) analysts and operators.  The events 
were designed to start slowly and build in complexity to help "players" gradually learn and 
understand the analytical processes and information flows required to use JFN to support Joint 
Task Force (JTF) level operations such as Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).   The events are 
designed to stimulate the JFN operators to perform the following operations: 
Find and Fix - cross-int analysis to detect, precisely locate, and positively identify TSTs; 
Track - enter the TSTs into the Common Operating Picture (COP); 
Target - derive aimpoint coordinates and nominate the TST for engagement; 
Engage and Assess - monitor the engagement, and conduct preliminary Bomb Hit 
Assessment / Battle Damage Assessment (BHA/BDA); 
Re-Task - support ISR collection plan adjustment during execution; 
Re-Engage - support re-engagement of TST as required. 
 
These objectives were gradually introduced, with an initial schedule:  
 25-27 Apr:  Objectives 1-3 only [Find & Fix, Track, Target]. 
 28, 29 Apr:  Objectives 1-4 [add Engage & Assess]. 
 30 Apr - 2 May:  Objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage]. 
 
The events are laid out by day, with: Event number; target(s) and general location; event start 
time; ISR data types/sources.  A synopsis of the intent of each event is provided, as well as 
"Smart Notes" (where needed) to indicate specific details needed for the conduct of that event.  
The following are the planned events by day.  The next subsection will describe differences 
between planned and executed events.  All are Guam days.   
 
25 APR - objectives 1-3 [Find, Fix, Track, & Target] 
Event FBE FIRES 25-1: Surfaced sub activity  
ISR UUV COMINT 
ISR UUV ELINT/ESM 
ISR UUV EO IMINT. 
SYNOPSIS:  ISR UUV on station; SIGINT/IMINT cross-correlation.  Goal is to have TES-N 
operators cross-correlate ISR UUV-derived COMINT, ELINT and IMINT/PHOTINT to 
determine sub is underway, and then pass that as track data over to COP for GCCS-M 
correlation with E2-C derived surface track/link data.  
 
Event FBE FIRES 25-2: Artillery battery on Tinian 
COMINT 
ELINT 
EO UAV video 
SYNOPSIS:  continue polishing Find, Fix, Track and Target procedures, this time requiring 
multiple aimpoints to cover the multiple targets. 
 
26 APR - objectives 1-3 [Find, Fix, Track, & Target] 
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Event FBE FIRES 26-1: Ground artillery units on Tinian  
COMINT 
UAV EO video 
U-2 SAR imagery 
SYNOPSIS:  to run through basic flow for Find, Fix, Track, and Target steps, adding in U-2 
retasking. 
      




EO UAV video 
EO U-2 still imagery 
SYNOPSIS: vSUB and ISR UUV.   
 
27 APR - objectives 1-3 [Find, Fix, Track, & Target] 
Event FBE FIRES 27-1:  Ground force C2 node near Tinian airfield 
COMINT 
open source/HUMINT 
EO U-2 still imagery 
EO UAV video 
SYNOPSIS:  continue polishing procedures, adding in open source/HUMINT reporting to the 
mix.   
 
Event FBE FIRES 27-2: Artillery battery on Tinian  
ISR UUV COMINT 
ESM  
EO UAV video 
SAR still imagery using JCA 
SYNOPSIS:  continue polishing procedures, this time using UUV as COMINT/ESM source, and 
JCA for receipt of still SAR imagery of target area to verify object locations seen in video, etc.   
 
Event FBE FIRES 27-3: UUV Counter-detection 
SYNOPSIS: ISR UUV detects threat emitter (ASW aircraft radar), requiring it to go "sinker".   
 
28 APR - objectives 1-4 [add Engage & Assess]  
Event FBE FIRES 28-1:  SA-6 on Saipan 
COMINT 
ELINT several radars 
UAV EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  same as previous events in the Find, Fix, Track, and Target steps, but adding 
Engagement, and Assessment (initial BHA/BDA). 
 
Event FBE FIRES 28-2: CDCM on Saipan 




U-2 EO imagery 
SYNOPSIS:  UUV ESM/ELINT tipper.  SOF confirm activity, think it may be a decoy, but can't 
tell due to revetments and/or stand-off range.  No UAV available due to maintenance.  EMPS 
operator will need to dynamically re-task U-2 to get rapid "overhead" imagery. 
 
29 APR - objectives 1-4 [add Engage & Assess] 
Event 29-1: SA-15 on Saipan 
ELINT (three transmissions from three locations -- "looks" and moves) 
P-3 AIP EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  Making "tracking" element more complex by trying to follow mobile SAM's.  Also 
introducing complication of C2 of multi-mission (ISR and others)-capable platforms such as P-3 
AIP.  P-3 AIP gets "lit up" and shot at by SA-15 but is out of range, so missile misses; SA-15 is 
engaged; P-3 AIP video enables BHA/BDA by JFN operator.   
SMART NOTES: P-3(AIP) must be tasked in ATO for ASW or MARPAT near SAIPAN with 
track/orbit/operating area just out of SA-15 max range 
 





UAV EO video 
and Event 29-2b: a different CDCM on Saipan 
UUV COMINT btwn HQ and CDCM unit 
UAV EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  conduct two TST events SIMULTANEOUSLY.  Analysts will have to recognize 
multiple targets exist; ISR Ops will need to adjudicate use of video sensor to PID and conduct 
BHA/BDA.   
SMART NOTES: 
(1) COMINT should indicate same HQ, but two different and widely-separated firing 
units; 
(2) Involves only one radar site, supporting both firing units; 
(3) BHA should show initial engagement missed one of the firing units. 
(4) Geometries of target locations (i.e., CDCM firing unit sites), radar location, and UUV 
operating box must be carefully considered. 
 
30 APR - objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage] 
Event 30-1: SCUD on FDM 
COMINT between HQ and SCUD battery 
EO video 
U-2 SAR imagery 
SYNOPSIS:  Re-task of U-2 due to weather (similar to Event 26-1), with engagement and 




(1) WEATHER: EO video must show fog/obscuration 
(2) U-2(SAR) must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not 
yet tasked to collect against that site 
(3) U-2 mission plan/collection plan must be built and loaded into EMPS 
 
Event 30-2:  SCUD on Saipan 
COMINT between HQ and SCUD battery 
EO video (obscured by clouds/ground fog) 
U-2 SAR imagery 
SYNOPSIS:  Another U-2 re-task due to weather (similar to Event 30-1), with re-engagement 
added.     
SMART NOTES: 
(1) WEATHER: EO video must show fog/obscuration 
(2) U-2(SAR) must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not 
yet tasked to collect against that site 
(3) U-2 mission plan/collection plan must be built and loaded into EMPS 
(4) Need COMINT "BDA" inject 
(5) Need U-2(SAR) image of "crater" with TEL a few hundred yards away 
 
Event FBE FIRES 30-3:  Off-board threat detection  
SYNOPSIS: threat emitter (e.g., ASW aircraft radar?) detected off-board of ISR UUV, requiring 
signal to ISR UUV for it to go "sinker".  
 
1 MAY - objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage] 
Event 1-1:  Ground force C2 node on Saipan 
COMINT 
ELINT 
JCA U-2(EO) still imagery 
UAV EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  presence of multiple vehicles and antennae will require multiple aimpoints.  JCA 
U-2(EO) imagery will assist.  Weather requires UAV also.    
 
Event 1-2:  SA-6 on FDM 
ELINT 
UAV EO video 
U-2(EO) still imagery 
and Event 1-3: SCUD on FDM 
COMINT between HQ and SCUD battery 
UAV EO video 
U-2(EO) imagery 
SYNOPSIS:  Simultaneous pop-up of two targets.  SA-6 will complicate engagement matters 
(e.g., precludes shooting SCUD with TACAIR until it is rendered in-op).  Weather cleared.    
 
2 MAY - objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage] 
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Event 2-1: SCUD on FDM 
COMINT between HQ and SCUD battery 
EO video 
U-2(SAR) imagery 
SYNOPSIS: (re-run of Event 30-1) Re-task of U-2 due to weather. Note SA-6 on FDM (in Event 
2-4) will complicate situation.  
SMART NOTES: 
(1) WEATHER: EO video must show fog/obscuration 
(2) U-2(SAR) must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not 
yet tasked to collect against that site 
(3) U-2 mission plan/collection plan must be built and loaded into EMPS 
 
Event 2-2:  SCUD on Saipan 
COMINT between HQ and SCUD battery 
EO video (obscured by clouds/ground fog) 
U-2(SAR) imagery 
SYNOPSIS: (re-run of Event 30-2). Another U-2 re-task due to weather (similar to Event 1-1), 
with re-engagement added. 
SMART NOTES: 
(1) WEATHER: EO video must show fog/obscuration 
(2) U-2(SAR) must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not 
yet tasked to collect against that site 
(3) U-2 mission plan/collection plan must be built and loaded into EMPS 
(4) Need COMINT "BDA" inject 
(5) Need U-2(SAR) image of "crater" with TEL a few hundred yards away 
 




JCA EO imagery 
SYNOPSIS:  Re-run of Event 1-1, with adjustments to make sense in context of other 
simultaneous Events of this day.    
 
Event 2-4:  SA-6 on FDM 
ELINT 
UAV EO video 
U-2(SAR) still imagery 
SYNOPSIS: Re-run of Event 1-2, but this time with same weather obscuration as in Event 2-1, 
requiring U-2(SAR) imagery for PID and targeting quality imagery. 
SMART NOTES: 
(1) WEATHER: EO video must show fog/obscuration 
(2) U-2(SAR) must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not yet 





3.2.1 Modifications to Planned Events  
 
During the experiment, there were modifications in event details and also wholesale 
modifications to accommodate to operator training and expertise.  The following lists those 
modifications.  
 
4/25 The day was devoted to training augmentees aboard Blue Ridge, including reservists and 
temporary duty personnel on ADOCS.  
 
4/26 Event 26-1 did not occur due to problems with simulation feeds.  Participants engaged in 
process discussions about how to use ADOCS.  Event 26-2 feeds into JFN occurred as planned.  
TST processing was hindered by internal communications difficulties. 
 
4/27 Event feeds into JFN occurred as planned.  Target nominations could not be made from 
TES-N due to problems with TES-N database.  Nominations were manually entered from JIC 
ADOCS. 
 
4/28 Events were not conducted due to continued problems with TES-N database.  Fires 
participants conducted meetings to develop/refine TST-ADOCS procedures.  Major focus was 
on defining color-coding conventions for ADOCS TST and Fires Managers.  
 
4/29 - 5/02 Events run as planned. 
 
 
3.3 DAILY CONTEXT SUMMARY  
 
The following are summaries of the important context for each day.  This context frames each 
day's events and provides some insight into cause-and-effect for that day's results.  
 
4/26 Due to all the impacts on the experiment described above, TST processes did not go 
smoothly during the first FBE exercise day from 0700-1500 local.  However, the difficulties and 
the co-location of most of the players aboard Blue Ridge prompted a very productive wrap-up 
meeting in which important insights arose.     
 A simple question from one of the participants evolved into a very productive discussion 
about TST process.   Up until this discussion, the people with previous experience FBE Fires, 
JFN, and ADOCS experience couldn’t prescribe TST processes that hadn’t been approved by 
C7F.  Instead, much was being left for the augmentees to discover and define a process that (in 
theory) would work aboart the C7F flagship.  That wasn’t happening.  Hardware and software 
weren’t functioning as intended and all the FTX augmentees really didn’t know enough to figure 
out what it was they were supposed to do.  
 Furthermore, when one of the people with previous FBE Fires experience sketched a 
block diagram on a whiteboard to try to clarify the ADOCS processes, everyone nodded except 
the C7F Fires lead.  Basically he said that the process and roles of JFMCC and JFACC as 
sketched were not what C7F wanted.  The fundamental issue, that hadn’t been well understood, 
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and was the reason that there wasn’t an approved CONOPS going into the FBE, was that as a 
Joint Task Force Commander, C7F wanted to use his supporting Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander to be in charge of TSTs.  C7F did not want his physical location afloat to dictate a 
JFMCC-centric TST process. 
 During the next hour, an executable process emerged that had the concurrence of C7F, 
the JFACC TST personnel and the Navy people in the Xray Papa cell.  A contentious change to 
the pre-planning for FBE Fires was that all Navy Strike aircraft (all of which were simulated FA-
18s) and their airborne command and control post, the virtual experimental E-2 were apportioned 
to the JFACC -- leaving the Navy Strike Warfare Commander, Xray Papa with no Strike aircraft. 
 The only FBE-K Strike assets that Xray Papa (on behalf of the JFMCC) still owned were the 
vDDX and the vAnzac.    
 
4/27 TES-N problems plagued events.  Both JFN MSELs were executed, but TES-N couldn’t 
make nominations, couldn’t pass targets to GCCS-M, and couldn’t chip images to PTW which 
would have enabled the operators in the JIC to save images to a local hard-drive for e-mail 
dissemination.  With can-do spirit the JIC people did work-arounds and manually nominated 
targets thru their ADOCS.   
ADOCS operators reported that ADOCS was almost fatally slow between when the 
operator clicked the mouse and when the computer responded.  Delays were on the order of 2-4 
minutes.  This apparently had to do with the ADOCS being run on the ship’s existing Secret 
LAN on existing PCs.   
 Another process evolution occurred this day during the end-of-day post-mortem 
concerning “Collection Management.”  It had been assumed that the CJTF Collection Manager 
was in the JIC, but the consensus was to push CM back to JFACC (“back” in the sense that it 
would go to JFACC Rear if they were there).  For FTX, it would actually be done by one of the 
Air Force officers in the JFACC TST cell in Blue Ridge, pretending he is the Collection 
Manager in the JFACC AOC.    
 
4/28 TES-N problems continued.  TES-N still couldn’t make nominations or pass targets to 
GCCS-M.  The ability to chip images to PTW for saving on a shared-drive was restored.  The 
JIC continued to manually nominate targets in ADOCS, and they instituted an “exercise-
exercise-exercise” intelligence report to disseminate via e-mail. TST process development 
focused on standardization and common understanding of ADOCS block color-coding.   
 
4/29 Systems, TES-N and ADOCS, worked.  Target nominations were made from TES-N.  
The TST process flowed.   
Undisciplined Chat usage for UAV coordination lead to two UAVs being sent to the 
same point to look for the same target at one time (instance of the need for tactical Chat 
procedures). 
 
4/30 The ADOCS-based TST command and control procedures worked out since the start of 
FTX were working smoothly this date.  People had a pretty good common understanding of what 
color blocks meant what, and who was responsible for various actions. 
 
5/01 The exercise day was delayed in JIC due to problems with the ship’s Secret LAN.  
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Accordingly, there was no ADOCS, no chat, no SIPRNET e-mail, etc. until problems were 
resolved.  
 
5/02 Mostly routine MSEL injects and processing.  One particular sequence was noteworthy:   
Background: Two SCUD TELs (with stowed missiles) were found with TES-N, nominated into 
ADOCS, and processed for engagement.  An engagement was conducted and BHA requested.  
There was no indication of hits anywhere near the target.  Everything was pretty routine up to 
here, then got interesting.  The UAV then saw the TELs relocate a very short distance and erect 
their missiles for launch.  The command and control processing then became confused.  The 
immediate choices available were to consider the TELs in their new position erected for launch 
as new TSTs, or consider them re-strikes of targets already on the Joint TST list.  Superficially, 
this can be considered as merely a TTP or SOP issue.  But either choice has some disadvantages. 
 This points to some issues about how ADOCS functions, and suggests some other functionality 
is needed for the prosecution of TSTs using ADOCS.  This is discussed further in the following 
section on consequences.   
 
Coalition Daily Context: 
4/27   ADOCS terminals in JFMCC/XP cell were attached to the network at 10 Mb/s.  This 
resulted in very slow performance which was compounded by operators repeating keyboard and 
mouse functions since there was no visual feedback similar to a MS Windows hourglass symbol 
indicating that the computer had accepted the command.  
ADOCS times were one hour behind Guam time due to network program overriding local 
computer time and automatically setting ADOCS clocks to Yokuska time.  
GCCS-M was displaying multiple tracks due to a problem with real world nodes not 
properly using full UIDs in processing of tracks (thus having no way to correlate the same track 
reported from multiple sources.  
 
4/28   ADOCS time problem continued and was not corrected for the rest of the experiment.  
 
4/29   There were occasional ADOCS server lockups.  The ADOCS remarks field for each target 
was of limited size, and not enough information could be passed about the target in some cases.  
 
5/1   Target Weapon Pairing (TWP) is not working correctly.  An operator would bring up a 
weapon list for a target, and the availability time of the weapon would not always overlap with 
the time window of the target.  The explanation we received from ADOCS techs was that there 




3.4 SUMMARY CONTEXT CONSEQUENCES:   
 
The main impact created by the above noted difficulties, with regard to meeting this initiative's 
objectives, was that JFN was operated in an artificial environment.  Procedures were not what is 
or will be used for TST, hence evaluation of these procedures to determine JFN's contribution 




Many critical elements of the TST process were artificial: 
 Cross component coordination and deconfliction 
 Inter-platform communications 
 Positive ID 
 Collateral Damage Estimate 
 Aimpoint Geo-refinement 
 Collection Management 
  
TES-N operator training conducted during the CPX leading up to the FTX was apparently 
successful in getting the JIC imagery analysts comfortable and competent at their multi-function 






4.0  ANALYSIS APPROACH 
 
Here we describe  
• decomposition of the two initiatives that make up the Fires portion of FBE-Kilo, 
• C2 structure tested,  
• analysis methodology, data, and tools, and 
• CONOPS and TTP. 
This forms the basis for understanding the data and processes used to reach the Report's 
conclusions.  Actually, for the reason stated in the next paragraph and reasons found in the body 
of this report, this section contains only a rudimentary description of what was to be done from 
the experiment.   
 
The reader will note that this section is somewhat skimpy.  This is because there is little data to 
analyze from this experiment.  Rather than analyze data and information to produce quantitative 
and qualitative results about processes and systems, the analysis has reverted mainly to 
identifying what went wrong and recommendations for future improvements.   
  
 
4.1 INITIATIVES DECOMPOSITION  
 
Basic initiatives decomposition is given by the questions presented earlier.  Here we further 
decompose by correlating questions with the data needed to address them.  
 
4.1.1 TST Processes Initiative Decomposition 
 
Four questions have been presented above for this initiative.  The first deals with: 
• how the particular FTX architecture affects the functioning of the JFN suite. 
The next four questions deal with TST CONOPS or SOP with regard to: 
• CONOPS/SOP adequacy.  
• Interaction between CONOPS/SOP and systems. 
In order to address these issues, it is necessary to determine how well the various sub-processes 
within TST are functioning and what support is being provided by JFN to carry out those 
processes.  It is further necessary to determine how the processes are addressed in pertinent 
CONOPS and SOPs.   
 
The decomposition needed is to break down the TST process into identifiable processes.  The 










Further breakdown that shows sub-processes and the organizations/people that perform them is 
required.  This is done for a complete, fully functional, JFN suite in Appendix E.  It is done for 
the particular configuration that was used for FTX in the following Section 4.2.    
 
 
4.1.2 Coalition Initiative Decomposition 
 
Rather than decompose the Coalition Initiative, its relationship to data is best expressed by a 
simple question: 
 Are the information presented in the U.S. COP and the Coalition COP the same? 
The data needed for this evaluation is track information on either side of the Radiant Mercury 
filter.   
 
 
4.2 EXERCISE TST STRUCTURE  
 




It was planned to support the TST process with the following distribution of functions and 
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4.2.1 Experiment TST Structure Executed  
 
The above diagrams show the structure for the FTX exercise.  Due to the various difficulties 
noted earlier in this report, the structure for the FBE-K experiment was not the same.  The 














The process used for managing sensors for information collection was non-standard, partly 
influenced by sensors being simulated.  The Collection Manager in the JIC interacted directly 
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much of the time.  The ISR Manager attempted to coordinate with the JIC Collection Manager, 
but through e-mail and Chat.  In order to have a more streamlined process, it was arranged to 
have the Video Analyst communicate directly with the Sensor Controller.  
 
The XP Cell played an active role, but with a large degree of artificiality.  People played the 
roles of JFMCC, JFLCC, etc., in order to have their staff input represented.  There was no real 
JFMCC coordination (recall that this was the experiment, not the exercise).  XP interactions with 
the JAOC was largely work-arounds to have a functioning process for the experiment, not to 
represent realistically real-world operations.   
 
 
4.3 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND TOOLS 
 
Former FBE Fires initiatives have placed most of their emphasis on the TST timeline.  How 
rapidly the detect-to-engage cycle could be performed was of primary interest.  That is not the 
case in this experiment, so timelines will receive only cursory attention.  As noted above, interest 
her is on how well sub-processes, or tasks, can be performed.   
 
Task performance assessment is normally done in four ways: 
• Participant surveys. 
• Expert observers monitoring nodes in the process. 
• Determination of task performance times.  
• Determination of task performance capacities.   
The first two are subjective and the last two are quantitative, providing statistics, best 
performance, and correlations between situation and performance (case studies).   
 
Because of the various difficulties encountered in FBE-K, the last two assessment methods could 
not provide useful results.  Times and capacities were strongly influenced by the need to develop 
and use work-arounds.  Thus, results produced would be indicative of processes that had little to 
do with the initiative.  An even greater difficulty is that processes and tasks were often 
interrupted by equipment failures or the need to compensate on-the-fly for missing information.   
 
The survey tools used are presented in Appendix F.  Summaries and interpretation of survey 
results are in the Results section.  
 
 
4.4 DATA STRUCTURE  
 
The table below outlines the essential TST event data that ideally should have been collected 
from the various Fires systems, and those that actually were collected, in FBE-K.  The gap 
between what was desired and realized is substantial.  Measures that would go far toward 
removing such discrepancies in future experimentation include: 
• A requirement for system participation in an experiment is the system incorporation of 
tools that would log, identify and timestamp all significant operator actions.   
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• Data logging in a format that is easily manipulated for post experiment analysis. 
• Pre-experiment integration testing include the validation of the data logging applications 
as an objective.  
The data that would be captured by such logging tools are necessary for: an objective analysis of 
the engagement process, the assessment of the contribution of individual systems to the 
engagement process and the evaluation of the performance of individual operators. 
 
Another essential aspect of objective data collection is the time synchronization of all participant 
systems.  The data from FBE-K show that the IRC and ADOCS time stamps were several 
minutes out of synchronization. 
 
Required and Realized TST Engagement Event Data from FBE-K 
 
Event System Collected 
in FBE-K?
Comments 
Target sensing JSAF N For simulated sensings 
Target detection GISRC, TES-N N Track creation 
Target nomination (start) GISRC, TES-N N  
Target nomination 
(complete) 
GISRC, TES-N N  
Nomination transmitted GISRC, TES-N N  
Nomination rec’d  ADOCS Y Rec’d time in Mission History and on 
Targeting tab often disagree. 
Nomination rec’d PTW N  
Weapon-Target Pairing ADOCS Y  
Request georefinement ADOCS N Georefinement not a factor in FBE-K 
Start georefinement PTW N  
Complete georefinement PTW N  
Georefinement result 
transmitted 
PTW N  
Georefinement result 
received  
ADOCS N  
Coordination block 
actions 
ADOCS Y Many events. Inconsistencies in 
many cases in the ADOCS data 
TLAM route request ADOCS N  
TLAM route request 
received 
RPM N  
Initiate route 
computation 
RPM Y  
Route computation 
complete  
RPM Y  
Transmit route RPM Y  
Route received  ADOCS N  
Fire When Ready (WRD)  ADOCS Y  
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Fire command ADOCS, JSAF Y/N SNN did not log Fire events 
Impact JSAF Y Gaps in the data 




4.5 CONOPS AND TTP EMPLOYED  
 
Neither CONOPS nor SOP were available for TST processes that matched the C2 processes for 
FBE-K.  It was decided to use, as much as was practical, the draft PACAF AOC SOP.  The 
pertinent section of that document to this experiment is Annex F to Chapter 6, Time-Critical 
Targeting Team.    A description of actions performed by the ISR Section and Attack Operations 
and a summary of the essential elements of the process follows. 
 
 
4.5.1  ISR Section 
 
The principal role of the ISR Section during TCT operations was to lead the Find, Fix, Track, 
and Assess functions of the F2T2EA kill chain.  Figure 3 provides a Information Flow diagram 
of the ISR Section observed during TT03. Key functions of ISR Section observed during TT03 
include: 
• Conducted Predictive Battle Space Analysis (PBA) for TCT based on Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) conducted for deliberate planning/ATO generation.   
[Note:  PBA was notional during the exercise. Discussions between TCT ISR Section at 
AOC and JTF ISR staff on BLUE RIDGE was limited during the CPX]  
• Conducted dynamic sensor re-tasking for those assets not under direct collection 
management authority of the TCT team. 
[Note:  TT03 process required ISR Section to request sensor re-tasking through the JECG 
and USS BLUE RIDGE. In real world, the SIDO would have capability/authority to 
reposition sensors to Find/Fix TST.  If JFACC were afloat then ISR Section would have 
reach-back capability to support dynamic sensor re-tasking]. 
• Tracked ISR data and provide TST nomination to the TCT Chief for valuation 
• Coordinated with external agencies to fully integrate all possible ISR capabilities in support 
of TCT (ELINT, COMINT, HUMINT, IMINT) 
• Ensured track quality and geo-location support desired weapons options and address any ID 
conflicts 
• Tracked TST’s throughout TST “life-cycle” and maintain situational awareness on all active 
TST’s.  
[Note:  Intelligence information regarding TST’s was shared between the BLUE RIDGE 
TES-N and AOC ISR-M.] 
• Provided support to Attack Operations Section during target pairing function against a 
particular TST (e.g. Collateral Damage Assessment (CDA), Refined Mensuration) [Note: In 
reality the AOC (TST Authority) ISR Section would conduct CDA and target mensuration 
prior to forwarding TST nomination to Attack Operations, however, during TT03 CPX, CDA 
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was requested from the JECG and target mensuration was sometimes conducted on USS 
BLUE RIDGE before sending imagery from TES-N to ISR-M (AOC) for TST engagement] 
• Compared nominated TST to daily ATO target list  
• Coordinated Phase II BDA 
[Note: SIDO did not have control of ISR assets during the exercise.  During TT03, all BDA 
requirements were coordinated through the Joint Experiment Control Group (JECG) and ISR 
Cell on USS BLUE RIDGE] 
 
 
4.5.2  Attack Operations Section 
 
The principal role of the Attack Operations Section during TCT operations was to lead the target 
and engage function of the F2T2EA kill chain.  During TT03, the Deputy CCO was tasked as the 
Attack Operations Chief with responsibility of coordinating support required to successfully 
attack nominated TST with AOC personnel (Airspace Management, IO, Tanker Cell, JAG, Joint 
liaisons, etc.).  Figure 4 provides a Information Flow diagram of the Attack Operations Section 
observed during TT03.  Key functions of Attack Operations Section observed during TT03 
include: 
• Received the approved TST nominations from the TCT Chief and coordinated with the ISR 
Section (Targets) to develop a list of available assets capable of attacking the target. 
• Coordinated with AOC liaison elements (Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), 
MARLO, NALE, SOLE, for availability of alternative attack options for TST 
engagement/attack.  [Note:  MARLO or SOLE representatives did not participate] 
• Coordinated with IO Cell for potential non-kinetic kill solutions. [Note:  This was not 
observed during TT03 but step was identified during discussions with TCT Chief and Attack 
Operations Chief] 
• Provided TCT Chief with a prioritized attack asset list and package options for TST. 
• Provided TCT Chief with JAG perspective on TST’s prior to requesting final approval from 
JFACC for engagement. 
 
 
4.5.3  TCT Process Summary 
 
1. Based on Commander’s Guidance, ISR assets will be resourced on ATO.  Emerging 
targets (ELINT, COMINT, HUMINT, IMINT, etc.) commence TCT process. 
2. Ensure TST Targeting Matrix and ROE is available at JIC (BLR), JAOC TST Cell (BLR) 
and AOC TCT Cell (Hickam) 
3. As tippers (sensor cues) flow in from a variety of sources, the ISR Section (SIDO) 
prioritizes which targets are potentially valid TST’s.  The SIDO enters potential targets 
on the ‘Emerging Target List’ and requests the track data manager to create a JTIDS 3.5 
track if a JSTARS unit has not already created.  The track data manager in the ISR 
Section will work with the Joint Stars Work Station (JSWS) operator to ensure tracks are 
created, updated, and dropped as appropriate.  
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[NOTE:  During TT03, AOC TST Cell (Hickam) received initial target nominations from 
the ship and acknowledged receipt to the JAOC TST Cell (BLR) via IWS Chat, SIPRnet 
email or Voice Comm] 
4. Targets not categorized as TST’s will be forwarded to the Senior Offensive Duty Officer 
(SODO) for potential retasking of current ATO assets to accommodate, or processed 
back through Combat Plans for inclusion in subsequent ATO’s. 
5. SIDO directs TCT personnel (targets and current situation) to conduct a Predictive 
Battlespace Analysis (PBA) based on sensor cue(s).  PBA could be considered a more 
refined IPB of the specific TST location.  Collateral damage assessment is conducted to 
ensure TST engagement will not violate Commander’s Guidance or ROE. 
6. SIDO directs Collections Manager to modify collection plans, as required to cross-
correlate initial sensor contact.  SIDO must coordinate with TCT Chief and CCO prior to 
re-tasking sensors on current ATO. 
7. SIDO evaluates sensor data collected. If target is a TST identified on Joint Integrated 
Prioritized Target List (JIPTL), the SIDO will nominate the target to the dynamic target 
list. 
8. After a target is nominated to the dynamic target list, the TCT Chief will assign the target 
a team in the Attack Operations Section.  
[NOTE:  Real world operations typically include three attack coordination teams to 
handle multiple high priority TST’s simultaneously.  CCO and TCT Chief will adjust the 
number of teams as required by the operational tempo.  Instead of creating teams with 
stovepipe focus (geographic areas or specific target sets), each team should be able to 
flex to any geographic area/target set as directed by the SIDO and TCT Chief] 
9. The attack coordination team is responsible for friendly deconfliction, coordination with 
SOLE/BCD/MARLO for attack options, asset nomination based on threat, weather, 
response time, weapons effect, airspace deconfliction, Positive Identification (PID), 
Rules of Engagement (ROE), and point mensuration, as required. 
10. The attack coordinator works closely with the Targeteer (ISR Section) to ensure 
mensuration and collateral damage assessment is conducted and current; then completes 
an electronic checklist for the attack as posted on the shared view of selected chat room 
application.  When data form is complete, the attack coordinator presents the attack plan 
to the TCT Chief for approval.  The TCT Chief will review and present recommendations 
to the CCO, AOC, and JFACC. 
11. In parallel to the attack option development, the SIDO coordinates with Collections 
Manager and Current Situation to identify ISR resources required for a Phase II BDA and 
plans BDA mission(s), if required. The primary BDA will be conducted and verified by 
platforms conducting the strike (Phase I).  However, if Phase I BDA is unsuccessful, the 
SIDO will provide recommended approach to dynamically retask assets to conduct Phase 
II BDA. 
12. Once the TST strike package is approved by the JFACC, the TCT Chief directs the C2 
duty officer to pass the tasking via SATCOM TCT net to the C2 package Commander in 
the aircraft. 
 [Note:  All approved strike packages were forwarded through JECG during TT03 CPX] 
13. The attack coordinator ensures the strike package/target information is forwarded to the 
appropriate duty officer (track data manager) to pass up to the attack aircraft. 
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 [Note:  Assumes that weapon target pairing is Air Force strike aircraft.] 
14. The track data manager sends a 9.0 tasking message to the aircraft and works with the 
surface track coordinator and the JSWS operator to ensure the track is  updated with 
accurate coordinates and elevation. 
15. The C2 Commander on Aircraft will conduct Phase 1 BDA and pass information to the 
C2 Duty Officer who informs TCT Chief of the results.   
16. The TCT Chief coordinates with the SIDO, CCO and JFACC to decide if Phase II BDA 


















5.0  RESULTS 
 
As was stated in the Reconstruction section, FTX results were strongly influenced by equipment 
and manning issues.  This makes it difficult to provide any results concerning TST processes.  
Thus, the focus here is not only on answering initiative questions by also includes a significant 
amount concerning equipment and experimentation improvements.   
 
 
5.1 COALITION INITIATIVE RESULTS  
 
5.1.1 Coalition Results Details and Summary  
 
The following table presents the FTX MSEL targets used to compare US and Coalition ADOCS 
mission histories.  Mission histories are created in ADOCS, which lists the steps taken to 
prosecute a target.  They are listed by time and give an historical view of when an event, such as 
the firing of munitions, happened.  The targets were chosen based on description and location 
stated in the MSEL.  Exact coordinates and times were not given.      
 
The table compares data from Blue Ridge, Coalition and ANZAC with data from Newport.  Data 
was not recorded for Newport on April 29, 2003.  Coalition data was not recorded on April 30, 
2003.  And there was no data from ANZAC from April 28 to May 1, 2003.  Blue Ridge data was 
used to compare with Coalition data on April 29, 2003 in lieu of the unrecorded Newport data.  
Blue Ridge and Newport ADOCS are central to the other ADOCS involved in the experiment 
and are assumed to have the same data.  Targeting coordinates, discussed in the table, were 
retrieved from the Fire Mission menu in ADOCS for the specific target.   
 
Target Mission History Comparison with Newport (NPT) ADOCS 
MSEL Target Blue Ridge (BLR) Coalition ANZAC 
28-1 AB0021 
Mission history 
similar to NPT, 
except for an extra 
line in BLR 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate is the same as NPT, 
located on water.  Coordinate was 
later changed in NPT, but did not 
update in Coalition ADOCS. Same 
acquisition time. 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 AB0022 Mission history same as NPT 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 AB0023 Mission history same as NPT 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data.  




 AB0024 Target not in BLR data 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate was changed in NPT, 
looks like the same location on map 
between Coalition and Newport. 
Same acquisition time.    
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  AB0027 
Mission history 
similar to NPT, 
except for two lines 
in BLR 
Restrike of Target # AB0024. No 
mission history 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
29-1 TB0039 No data collected from Newport 
Target not in Coalition, using BLR 
data to compare 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  TB0040 No data collected from Newport 
Target not in Coalition, using BLR 
data to compare 




No data collected 
from Newport 
Target not in Coalition, using BLR 
data to compare 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 AB5007 No data collected from Newport 
Target not in Coalition, using BLR 
data to compare 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 AB5012 No data collected from Newport 
Target not in Coalition, using BLR 
data to compare 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 AB5013 No data collected from Newport 
Target not in Coalition, using BLR 
data to compare 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 TB0042 No data collected from Newport 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate same as BLR data. NLT 
time not updated 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  GE0149 No data collected from Newport 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as BLR 
data. 




details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No data from Coalition No data collected from ANZAC 
30-2 AB5037 
Mission history 
similar to NPT, 
except missing two 
entries from BLR. 
Entries same times,  
out of order between 
NPT and BLR  





details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No data from Coalition No data collected from ANZAC 
  TB0053 
Mission history 
details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No data from Coalition No data collected from ANZAC 
1-1 GE0164 Mission history same as NPT 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  TB0059 
Mission history 
details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
1-2 AB5072 Mission history same as NPT Target not in Coalition data 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
 AB5073 Mission history sameas NPT Target not in Coalition data 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  AB5074 
Mission history 
similar to NPT, 
except for an extra 
line in BLR 
Target not in Coalition data No data collected from ANZAC 
1-3 GX0312 
Mission history 
similar to NPT, 
except for extra 
entries in BLR 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 




similar to NPT, 
except for an extra 
line in BLR 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  GX0316 Mission history same as NPT 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 




details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 




details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 






similar to NPT, 
except for two lines 
in BLR 
No mission history. Targeting 
information in Coalition has more 
detail that in NPT mission history.  
This may be part of another 
mission, GX0338 based on similar 
time frame and coordinates. 
No data collected 
from ANZAC 
  TB0065 
Mission history 
details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
No mission history. NPT mission 
history has limited information.  
Cannot compare coordinates and 
time with Coalition targeting 
information. 




similar to NPT, 
except for the order 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 
Target not in 
ANZAC data. 
 AB5089 No mission history 
No mission history. NPT has no 
mission history to compare to 
Coalition.  This is a restrike of 
TB0063. 
Target not in 
ANZAC data. 
 TB0063 Target not in BLR 
No mission history. Targeting 
coordinate and time same as NPT 
data. 
No mission history
  TB0064 
Mission history 
details in BLR is not 
all in NPT ADOCS 
Target not in Coalition data Target not in ANZAC data. 
2-3  AA0370 
Mission history 
similar to NPT, 
except for an extra 
line in BLR 
Detailed mission history in 
Coalition. NPT mission history is 
limited to status changes. 
Detailed mission 
history in ANZAC.
  AA0373 
Same as NPT, BLR 
mission history is 
limited to 2 status 
changes. 
Detailed mission history in 
Coalition. NPT mission history is 




Comparing Newport target mission histories with Blue Ridge’s mission histories shows that 
there are differences between the two US ADOCS.  Some mission histories for the same target 
between Newport and Blue Ridge were similar except for one or two lines.  At other times, such 
as target TB0065, not all information is shared between the two systems.  However, the 
information that is shared is the same. 




Comparing the same Coalition targets to US targets shows that complete mission histories is not 
exchanged between US and Coalition ADOCS.  Most of the targets did not have any mission 
histories in Coalition.  It was not until MSEL 2-3, targets AA0370 and AA0373, that Coalition 
had mission histories; but only a few lines of over 20 lines in Coalition were exchanged with the 
US ADOCS for both targets. 
 
Tabulation of Mission History (MH) Comparison 
  Blue Ridge
Coalitio
n ANZAC 
 Different MH compared to 
NPT 17 21 3 
 No Targets 2 10 3 
 No Data 8* 4 29 
 MH similar to NPT 8 0 0 
 Total MSEL Targets 35 35 35 
  * No data from Newport to compare with Blue Ridge data. 
 
Missing targets and mission histories may be attributed to Radiant Mercury Guard (RMG).  
Radiant Mercury Guard acted as a filter of information exchanged between US and Coalition.   
However, there are other issues that could affect the data.  Based on the descriptions of problems 
observed, there are several possible reasons that discrepancies could exist in the ADOCS data 
according to Gary O'Neilin of General Dynamics: 
1. Network problems may have occurred, though this is the most unlikely one because of 
the way ADOCS Communication Server works.  When the connection between two ADOCS 
nodes is broken, the sending nodes queue up all messages going out to the node that is down.  
When the connection is re-established all the messages to include the messages that may have 
been sent during disconnection are resent. 
2.  Not all locations see every mission.  It is dependent upon the way the architecture is 
set up.  In most FBE architecture there is one ship that sees all missions that are going to be 
fired; in this case it was the Blue Ridge.  The E2X, DDX, Coalition and ANZAC were to my 
knowledge shooters; this means they only see missions that are pushed to them by the Blue 
Ridge or missions that are detected by their organic sensors.  There is no reason for every 
shooter to see every mission and most commanders don't want to see things that they have no 
control over.  It just clutters up their picture and muddles their mission. 
3.  The resetting of the databases could be a cause of the problem if network connections 
were dropped prior to all the messages being sent to the proper location for backup.   
4.  There has been a problem detected with mission history in the newer versions of 
ADOCS, but confirming it in the version that was used in the FBE-world has not been done.  
The problem appears to cause additional lines of text from one node as well as shows the mission 
history in various orders between nodes even when using the same viewing type such as Time. 
In closing since I was not present at FBE it is very hard to determine the exact cause of 
loss of data, but in previous FBEs I have done, the above items have been some of the things that 




Despite missing targets and incomplete mission histories from the ADOCS data, vANZAC COP 
was adequate to support engagement.  Based on observations made by Dr. Darren Sutton in the 
Coalition cell, vANZAC was aware of all surface and ground targets within ADOCS.  Their 
awareness was also made possible through chat and GCCS-M.   
 
The reasons for missing targets and incomplete mission histories have not been identified; they 
may have been caused by network problems and multiple instances of ADOCS down times as 
stated in section 5.1.2.  RMG may also have contributed to the missing data.    
 
To prevent future data problems ensure that network problems and ADOCS issues are corrected. 
 Future data collection should be coordinated between the users of ADOCS using agreed upon 
format.  These actions would facilitate proper analysis of the fires processes.  
 
5.1.2  Coalition Participants Fires Observations 
 
The following are the observations of CMDR Cunningham, RAN and CDR Davis, USNR 
 
Tuesday, April 29, Observations 
1. According to Coalitions Fires in NPT, if VANZAC edits ANZ tab (Missions 
Coordination Manager) it fires the mission.  They aren’t editing the ANZ tab. 
2. FDR Block (Missions Coordination Manager) stayed yellow on BLR ADOCS side.  
Coalition Fires side of ADOCS after weapons release was showing green.  Target was 
TB0041. 
3. VANZAC requested guidance on number of ERGM rounds to fire.  Cannot specify 
number of rounds in ADOCS.  Does unit or XP determinate the number of rounds to fire. 
4. VANZAC was unclear on tab protocol.  XP developed and disseminated tab protocol 
during the exercise, but tab protocol/documentation required prior to STARTEX to 
clarify requirements for exercise participants.   
5. VANZAC intermittently dropped out of GCCS. 
6. Air gap latency didn’t appear to hinder VANZAC response to chat. 
7. VANZAC achieved chipped image electronic transfer into FBE-K target folders at NPT 
for web dissemination.  
8. Multiple ADOCS system down times hindered play.  Chat successful in engineering 
work around during ADOCS outages.  
 
Wednesday, April 30, Observations 
9. Fires Mission Manager FRD tab doesn’t turn green after vANZAC fires. 
10. Fires Mission Manager E2X, DDX, ANZ, ADC and JIC tabs reset to white for every 
RMG transmission – work around is for ADOCS operator BLR to edit tabs.  
11. JTST Manager MSN tab is not turning to green when weapon is released.  
12. Not able to select weapons-target pairing from options menu – unable to assign ANZAC-
ERGM weapon-target pairing for AA0305.  
13. Two targets (AB5035 and AB5035) result from the re-nomination of AA0305. 




Thursday, May 1, Observations  
15. Multiple ADOCS system down times hindered play.  Chat successful in engineering 
work around during ADOCS outages. 
16. Air gap latency didn’t appear to hinder VANZAC response to chat. 
17. Confirmed that RMG interchange between high and low sides deleted EZX, DDX, ANZ, 
JIC, and ADC tabs information in Missions Coordination Manager with each 
transmission.  Work around is for low side to pen and paper ADOCS play while high side 
communicates process via chat and updates ADOCS. 
 
Friday, May 2, Observations 
18. Multiple ADOCS system down times hindered play.  Chat successful in engineering 
work around during ADOCS outages. 
19. XP distributed refined process (including tab) protocols.  The refined protocol was used 
to prosecute targets. 
20. Air gap latency didn’t appear to hinder VANZAC response to chat. 
21. RMG interchange between high and low sides continued to delete EZX, DDX, ANZ, JIC, 
and ADC tabs information in Missions Coordination Manager with each transmission.  
Work around is for low side to pen and paper ADOCS play while high side 
communicates process via chat and updates ADOCS. 
22. RMG interchange problems detracted significantly from vANZAC participation in an 
engagement mode in the fires network. 
23. BLR network didn’t appear suitable to host ADOCS.  Slow speed of ADOCS and system 
crashes prevented full utilization of the system. 
24. Although air gap latency didn’t significantly hinder communications with vANZAC, the 
use of a third party “air gap” was cumbersome and did result in ambiguity. 
 
Amplifying information: 
• Occasionally, use of the zoom function caused the ADOCS system to crash.   
• ADOCS map updates occurred every 3 minutes.  This was not fast enough in some cases. 
• How does one know when a target has been pushed to them? 
• ADOCS computer setups should be standardized. 
• The chat room rules were not adequately established. 
• ADOCS was not providing indication of target being hit fast enough to allow efficient 
control of ISR assets for BDA. 
 
 
5.1.3 Coalition Partner Observations   
 
While coalition partner observations occurred at two widely geographically separated locations, 
at the Defense Science and Technology laboratory in Fern Hill, Australia and the Navy Warfare 
Development Command Modeling and Simulation laboratory in Newport, Rhode Island, a single 
combined set of observations is presented here. This is reasonable because, at least for ADOCS, 
both locations were, in theory and as far as was tested during execution in practice, viewing the 
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same data. It is however important to note that there were differences in the situational 
awareness at the two sites resulting from access, or lack of it, to other systems at the two sites. 
GCCS-M and GISRC were available in Australia, but not in the Coalition Cell in Newport, while 
US SECRET NOFORN network including Web pages, IRC chat and Voice over IP (VoIP) were 
accessible to the coalition in Newport, but obviously not directly in Australia. 
 
Given the detailed reporting of technical observations related to the coalition initiative elsewhere in 
this report the following observations are reported in summary form. 
 
C4I Systems 
ADOCS Integration: The key technical issue facing the coalition was its ‘seamless integration’ 
as a node within a distributed fires network. While some level of integration was achieved it was 
certainly not seamless and this was most evident with ADOCS, which was intended to be the 
principle tool to support the command and control of nodes in the fires network. 
 
Despite continued efforts throughout both the final operational sequence diagram (OSD) testing 
period and the rehearsal period between the CPX and FTX phases the full integration of ADOCS 
across the boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN and SECRET AUSCANUKUS 
Releasable networks was not achieved. 
 
While the majority of the problems initially observed during final OSD testing were resolved, 
others, including most notably the over-writing of the colored boxes in the Fires Manager, did 
not become apparent until execution, by which time their resolution was impractical, if not 
impossible. Efforts to resolve ADOCS issues continued into the execution phase, but to allow the 
operational experimentation objectives to be explored a work around involving chat coordination 
of fires command and control was implemented. 
 
While the reasons for the unavailability of ADOCS developers during the integration periods is 
understood and the excellent support provided by NWDC contract personnel throughout the 
integration and exercise periods is greatly appreciated, their limited experience with ADOCS and 
an understandable lack of access to its code seriously impacted their ability resolve these 
problems. The availability of an ADOCS developer during the final OSD testing did assist in 
resolving a number of issues, however their remote assistance during the execution phase was 
less helpful. 
 
ADOCS Network Performance: As the FTX phase progressed an increase in the latency of 
updates in the ADOCS network became apparent. When initially reported during execution day 
Wednesday April 30 it prompted a check of the overall network performance, which failed to 
reveal any issues. 
 
During the execution day Thursday May 1 the latency became extreme and as was noted during 
the presence of the Distinguished Visitors at Fern Hill exceeded ten (10) minutes from an action 
reportedly being taken on the BLR to an update reflecting that action being seen at either of the 




A post experiment review of the network architecture deployed for FBE-K suggests that this 
obviously unacceptable latency was the result of a combination of the topography of the ADOCS 
server network resulting in a choke point and the underlying protocol for ADOCS 
communications, which ironically was, designed to service disadvantaged users. 
 
There appeared to be some degree of correlation between increased latency of the ADOCS 
network, the duration that it had been operating without restart and correspondingly the number 
of target nominations accumulated in the target list. Consequently the more frequent ‘reboots’ of 
the ADOCS servers early in the FTX as a consequence of communications network issues and 
attempts to resolve continuing ADOCS issues may have masked these effects. That being said 
the number of targets in the track list never exceeded a couple of hundred, which was reported to 
be trivial for an operational ADOCS network. 
 
GCCS-M: With rare exceptions, induced by network outages, the GCCS-M system functioned 
fully effectively. The ability to transfer data between GCCS-M and JSAF as a means of 
importing and exporting relevant entities between simulated and real worlds was both crucial 
and highly successful. 
 
GISRC: The operation of GISRC was, with one critical exception, reported to be very successful. 
There is however a disconnect between the reported operator experience in Fern Hill and the 
recorded data. 
 
The operator reports indicate that target nominations were routinely sent from GISRC, via secure 
e-mail, to the ANZAC ADOCS system. With the exception of when this was attempted during 
the presence of the Distinguished Visitors on execution day May 1, this was reported as 
successful. Unfortunately, these observations are not supported by the data recorded at various 
locations, as no ‘GA’ (GISRC ANZ) targets are recorded. Further, as the data from the ANZAC 
ADOCS is unavailable for analysis it is not possible to determine the origin of this problem. 
 
Radiant Mercury Guard: To bridge the security boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN 
and SECRET AUSCANUKUS Releasable networks an approved guard device, a Radiant 
Mercury Guard (RMG), was employed. Given tight budget constraints and equally tight time 
lines to accredit the use of this device it was decided during the Initial Planning Conference to 
‘re-use’ a previously approved rule set. Without this decision it is highly likely that the coalition 
initiative would not have proceeded. 
 
Unfortunately, while the existing rule set did include message formats for the essential ADOCS 
(formerly Land Attack Weapons System – LAWS) messages, they did not reflect the current 
version of those messages. The understandable inflexibility of the security accreditation process 
meant that while it would have been technically to update the rules, it was not allowable to do so. 





With respect to its support for transmitting the Common Operating Picture (COP) via the Global 
Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M), the Radiant Mercury Guard was 
observed to function fully effectively. 
 
IKA /CIE Systems 
A number of Information Knowledge Advantage (IKA) or more accurately Collaborative 
Information Environment (CIE) tools were employed in FBE-K, including in support of the 
Coalition Initiative. 
 
Air Gap: While Radiant Mercury Guard was used to filter and transfer structured messages 
between the SECRET US NOFORN and SECRET AUSCANUKUS Releasable networks the 
absence of an approved guard device to do so for unstructured, human centric communications 
necessitated the inclusion of a human-in-the-loop ‘air gap’. 
 
Staffed by principally reserves at the Coalition Cell in Newport, releasable information from 
Chat, E-mail, Voice communications and Web pages was reviewed and where appropriate 
transferred across the boundary between the networks. 
 
While far from ideal this function was crucial to the success of the Coalition Initiative and served 
to highlight a critical issue that exists in terms of supporting the integration of coalition partners. 
 
While it is noted that technical solutions, for example ISSE Guard, do exist to support most, but 
not currently all, of the functions achieved by human-in-the-loop operations, the lead time 
required to approve the use of such devices, like those for RMG were so long, and costly as to be 
unworkable in FBE-K. 
 
Chat: Given the difficulties encountered with the technical integration of ADOCS chat provided 
a crucial backup that enabled both command and control for fires coordination and interactions 
with the operator of the UAVSim to direct its employment. 
 
Despite their best efforts the reservists were unable to maintain a direct transfer of messages 
across the air gap. While latency wasn’t perceived to be a major issue this ‘transcription’ of 
messages was reported to lead to some ambiguity between the XP Cell on the BLR and the 
ANZAC command team in Fern Hill. 
 
E-mail: A relatively low volume of e-mail was sent to and received from the ANZAC, which 
resulted in its transfer not being considered too burdensome. However due to the arrangement of 
air gap operator stations the arrival of any e-mail did result in an increased latency of chat 
transfers. 
 
The majority of e-mails came from the ANZAC and these contained ‘chipped’ images from the 
GISRC that were on-forwarded to an address that automatically populated them into the 
corresponding target folder. Later in the execution process requests for mensurated coordinates, 




VoIP: VoIP communications were established between the Coalition Cell in Newport and the 
ANZAC in Fern Hill. The Coalition Cell was also able to communicate with all US nodes that 
had access to VoIP, although in practice this use was far more limited. 
 
VoIP provided a crucial interactive means of addressing complicated technical issues, particularly 
those involving the problems associated with ADOCS integration. While there were initial problems 
with quality of service due to the configuration of some of the network infrastructure, once these 
were resolved VoIP was consistently of a high standard. 
 
VoIP was observed to work very successfully for technical troubleshooting and also demonstrated its 
potential to be used for tactical coordination. 
 
Web-pages: Despite assurances to the contrary the majority of the information published on the 
TT-03 and associated FBE-K web pages were not marked as Releasable AUSCANUKUS, as a 
consequence during the rehearsal period and into the first days of the FTX only limited 
information was able to be transferred. 
 
Fortunately a reasonable portion of the information was static; nonetheless as the process of 
transferring data was relatively complicated it still took a single operator more than twenty 
minutes to transfer the very limited amount of daily updated information that was relevant and 
releasable. 
 
As with chat the increasing reliance on web portals to provide access to information necessitates 
a better solution to the problem of integrating coalition partners. 
 
Networks 
CFBlnet: A cryptographically isolated bi-lateral (AUS-US) community of interest (COI) was 
established within the Four-Eyes (AUS/CAN/UK/US) enclave of the Combined Federated Battle 
Laboratory network (CFBLnet). With a nominal network capacity of 1.5 MB and even in a non-
optimal configuration (IP vs ATM) the network was never reported to have saturated and was 
typically observed to have operated at approximately 50% capacity. 
 
While problems were experienced with the delivery and maintenance of cryptographic keys, 
including with the roll over of a new month, these problems did not seriously impact the execution 
of the coalition initiative. 
 
FBEnet: During the final OSD testing period significant problems were experienced establishing 
the advanced networking capabilities out to the fleet including the BLR. While these were 
resolved they did contribute to a loss of valuable time in which to address issues such as those 
that arose with ADOCS integration, the majority of which only became apparent when BLR 
ADOCS was brought into the system. 
 
FBEnet stability during the FTX was generally reported as stable and the available bandwidth 
was apparently adequate to support all the necessary functions. As noted already an investigation 
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of the network traffic prompted by the observation of increased latency of the ADOCS network 
did not reveal broader FBE network issues. 
 
Modeling and Simulation 
JSAF: The core modeling and simulation for FBE-K was provided by Joint Semi-Automated 
Forces (JSAF) operated from the NWDC Modeling and Simulation laboratory, Newport. JSAF 
integrated real world entities ‘stripped’ from GCCS-M by the C4I gateway and similarly 
populated / stimulated GCCS-M and other C4I systems. 
 
With one or two exceptions, when it appeared to crash, JSAF operated successfully throughout all 
phases of FBE-K, from integration testing to FTX FINEX. 
 
UAVSim: The simulation of and distribution of UAV video imagery was a critical component of 
the Coalition Initiative as it not only provided the necessary realism of input data sources for the 
ANZAC operators it also provided valuable lessons learned as far as the issue associated with 
the employment of such capabilities. 
 
As with all systems temporary losses of network connectivity compromised the function of 
UAVSim and its related components in Fern Hill, however these problems were quickly rectified 
once the network was re-established. 
 
The ANZAC operators were particularly gratefully for the support, including instruction on 
operational realities, received from the UAV operator(s) stationed in Newport. 
 
VMS: The Virtual Maritime System is the modeling and simulation capability used to create the 
vANZAC. While its functionality in FBE-K was relatively limited it was successfully ‘federated’ 
with the core JSAF simulation via a convoluted arrangement involving multiple instances of 
JSAF and the C4I gateway; the RMG and a Federation Object Model / Run Time Infrastructure 
(FOM/RTI) Bridge. 
 
This federation successfully proved the feasibility of incorporating coalition simulations, from 
geographically remote sites, into the FBE modeling and simulation architecture. It also served to 
identify the requirements to reduce the complicated arrangement of systems needed to achieve such 
federations in the future. 
 
Human Factors 
Command and Control Process: The absence of a ‘clearly defined’, ‘tactical level’, ‘step by step’ 
process for the command and control coordination of fires was, with the possible exception of 
the technical issues associated with ADOCS integration, the most significant issue encountered 




The provision of the Fires Manager color chart and the associated articulation of a step-by-step 




While experimentation with the fires process was expected the majority of the discussion on the 
topic was focused more on understanding process, and not so much on improving it. Operator 
confusion at the ANZAC and at the Coalition Cell in Newport was high, leading to lengthy chat and 
VoIP communications to seek clarification, where as these communications channels should have 
been being employed primarily for actual coordination. 
 
Operator Training / Involvement: The presence of experienced operators and technical support 
personnel both in Fern Hill and to a lesser extent in the Coalition Cell in Newport, together with 
the presence of a Liaison Officer in the XP Cell onboard the BLR contributed significantly to the 
level of success achieved by the Coalition Initiative. 
 
While an appropriate degree of system level training was provided to ANZAC operators the 
technical difficulties addressed above compromised the ability to do unit level and above 
training. 
 
The absence of ‘a priori’ standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the fires coordination 
process, together with the continued presence and efforts to resolve ADOCS integration issues 
essentially undermined all higher level training. The result was the on-going confusion 
experienced by the Coalition team in the fires coordination process. 
 
 
5.2 TST PROCESSES INITIATIVE RESULTS  
 
5.2.1  Pending Tasks   
 
The TST C2 System needs to explicitly tell operators which tasks are theirs to perform and their 
priority.  The ADOCS approach of one big table for MISSION FIRES COORDINATION and 
one big table for the JOINT TIME SENSITIVE TARGETS MISSIONS is not well engineered 
for people performing required tasks.   
• JFMCC, the JFACC, the JFACC TST cell, X-Ray Papa, and others need to distinguish 
which targets on the list are their responsibility and which are someone else’s.   
o This requires them to scan the list doing mental vertical sorting.  
• They also need to see if there is some action for them to take.   
o This requires them to scan the table doing mental horizontal sorting.   
• They have no list of pending actions.   
• There is no prioritization of actions waiting to be performed.    
 
Tracks or tasks are implicitly queued up waiting for action, but the ADOCS system has no 
explicit queues of pending actions.  If one thinks of tasks (tracks) as waiting for service by 
someone, then there is no engineered discipline about who gets served next.  It isn’t even fair to 
say that the next target to be served is random (in the Monte Carlo sense).   It appears that it will 
vary from operator to operator depending on how an operator’s eyes scan the table.  It is more 
haphazard than how different people scan their e-mails (most people routinely approximate 




The order in the ADOCS table has to do with when the original nomination came in.  There is no 
organization based on actions waiting to be performed.  The implication of this observation, is 
that there should probably be explicit lists (queues) of waiting actions, and a requirement for 
explicit tools or windows for people to cycle through those pending actions in some default or 
operator-adjusted prioritized order. 
 
 
5.2.2   Human Systems Integration for Color-coding   
 
For time-critical tasks, the TST C2 System color-coding should be standardized and intuitive so 
that operators will respond predictably and quickly. 
Color-coding is critical to using ADOCS as a coordination tool.  Operator discussion which 
color means what quickly degenerated to  
• “You can use this color to mean this if it’s in this block entered by this person, but it 
could mean that in that block if entered by that person.” or  
• “This other color could be used here, and that color could be used there.”   
The discussion usually reaches a climax when someone says that a color can  
• “mean whatever you want.”   
Then they finally sit down and invent a color scheme, which is non-standard because there are 
no standards.   
 
This isn’t merely a training or doctrine issue.  If color-coding is being used for coordination of 
time-critical tasks, then the colors or symbols used should be engineered to be much more 
intuitive than they are.  Ideally,  
• as intuitive as real traffic lights so that people will respond predictably, and quickly. 
 
 
5.2.3  Human Systems Integration for Symbol-coding  
 
For time-critical tasks, the TST C2 System use of symbol-coding to supplement color-coding 
should be automated, streamlined, or eliminated.  The coding scheme developed for ADOCS 
blocks includes an X in some blocks on top of the color.  This scheme now requires two 
distinctly different sets of actions, one to set the color, and another sequence of actions to add the 
X when needed.  This is not as streamlined and error-resistant as a TCT process should be.    
 
 
5.2.4  Equipment Casualty Modes   
 
The TST C2 System needs to have reliable alternative modes of operation and more graceful 
degradation than is currently available with open-architecture LANs and internet-style networks. 
 When the Secret LAN wasn’t available and there was no ADOCS, no chat, no SIPRNET e-mail, 
etc., one of the reactions was to discuss and explore “what are our work-arounds.”   
• A bigger question for Network-centric Warfare and FORCEnet is whether or not casualty 
modes will be engineered into the architectures.   
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Most legacy combat systems have casualty modes.  Some have several levels of casualty modes. 
 There is a risk that the down-time and network problems encountered in FBE-K may not be 
atypical of what might occur in the real world with leading edge technologies, pushing the 
envelope, built on open-architecture machines and networks. 
 
 
5.2.5  Target Prioritization   
 
The TST C2 System needs a TST prioritization scheme that takes into account both the 
importance of the target and the amount of time that it will be available for engagement.  There 
is a non-mandatory block in ADOCS for target priority.  Some units made their own inputs there. 
 Most didn’t.   
• Procedures are needed for who is supposed to enter a priority.   
Most important are:  
• What does the priority mean?   
• How is it to be determined?   
There are static priority categories listed in the CJTF TST matrix, but those numbers don’t take 
into account 
• the amount of time available to engage the target.   
There are available simple mathematical models (formulas) for prioritization based on both 
target utility and probability that it will remain engageable for some period of time (one simple 
approach looks like economic discounting).  Target prioritization needs to be addressed in TST 
command and control. 
 
 
5.2.6  TSTs that move, re-position, and change status  
 
The TST C2 System needs functionality for automatically and unambiguously keeping track of 
targets that move, re-position, and change status.  ADOCS needs functionality added for targets 
that may move (allowing a track number to move with them so long as they are held by sensors), 
i.e., dynamic target position information rather than static data fields.  Concurrently functionality 
is needed for automatic updating and alerting of decision makers and engagers.  This shouldn’t 
rely on voice or chat or typed-in remarks.   
 
ADOCS functionality is also needed for other critical changes in target status, such as missiles 
transitioning from stowed to erected positions.  This may require dynamic updating of target 
description, and certainly needs automatic updating and alerting of decision makers and 
engagers.   
 
   
5.2.7  Alternative Approaches to Time Sensitive Command and Control   
 
Systems engineering of a TST C2 System should look beyond the extensive typing input-output 
approach in ADOCS, and its matrix displays, for TST coordination status.  It became apparent 
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during FBE-K that many of the C2 processes in ADOCS are  
• complicated,  
• difficult to define unambiguously,  
• challenging to train to, and  
• highly dependent on internet chat and voice elaboration.   
 
It is understood that the “development” of ADOCS is an Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD).  Presumably, the ACTD was focused on whether or not this concept 
and technology can be applied for Army artillery deep operations.  A question now that the 
technology is being demonstrated is: 
• Is it is the right concept to be applied to Joint Time Sensitive Targeting?   
Because of the time-sensitivity of the targets and because it is at the tactical level of war, some 
of the functionality built into air defense command and control systems, such as NTDS or 
AEGIS or AWACS should be examined for applicability to ground TSTs.    
 
Besides being used for air targets, NTDS and AEGIS, C2 systems are applied very effectively 
for anti-submarine command and control, and for maritime anti-surface command and control.  
These systems, and their inherent interoperability with AWACS, Link 16, (and maybe CEC), 
etc., should be examined closely for functionalities applicable to ground TST C2.   
 
No matter what advances are made in internet technology (and FORCEnet), it is unimaginable 
that anyone would ever seriously suggest replacing existing Air Defense C2 systems with 
internet chat and convoluted status board collaboration as currently used in ADOCS.   
• This suggests that the advantages of real-time tactical data systems should considered for 
other tactical time-sensitive command and control such as for ground TSTs.  
 
 
5.3 OBJECTIVE DATA 
 
5.3.1  Data Overview  
 
Compared to other recent FBEs the objective data provided for this experiment was deficient in 
quantity and quality.  In particular: 
• The provided TES-N covered only a few days of the CPX and was reformatted so as to 
be unusable. 
• No GISRC data were provided. 
• The ADOCS JTST manager did not set capture mission histories for the last two days of 
the experiment 
• After acquiring excellent mensuration data from RRF in FBE-J, FBE-K reverted to PTW 
which has never provided usable data.  
• The JSAF event data logged in SNN did not include Fire events.  There were gaps in the 
JSAF event data and/or many fire commands did not reach JSAF. 
 
Among the factors contributing to this degraded data state: 
 62 
 
• The teams supporting some of the systems, notably ADOCS and GISRC, were new to 
FBEs. 
• More systems were organic to operational platforms. 
• Integration testing ran behind schedule.   
 
 
5.3.2 ADOCS Fires and JTST Displays 
 
The ADOCS data logs were collected daily and provide the end-state of the experiment day’s 
Mission Coordination: Fires (hereafter Fires) and JTST Manager displays. Table 1 below 
provides the number of nominations as a function of the nominator for the last several days of 
the FTX.  The experiment day ran from approximately 800 to 1800 Guam time. The times 
reported in ADOCS were GMT.  The missions in ADOCS were assigned to Guam experiment 
day X if the time the mission was received in ADOCS was between GMT day X-1 1400 hours 
and GMT day X 1400 hours.  Most missions were received during the nominal experimental day 
but some nominations, particularly for DD-X, were received outside these hours. The data in 
Table 1 were derived from the ADOCS logs from the Newport ADOCS server. The Newport 
server data were not captured on April 29.  Only the period subsequent to April 27 is addressed.  
 
Table 1. ADOCS Target Nominations from the Newport ADOCS Server 
 
Target Nominations Date 
AA AB AE AX GE GX TB XX 
TOT 
5/2 9 9 0 27 5 18 3 0 71 
5/1 3 31 0 1 5 23 9 4 76 
4/30 11 15 0 22 5 20 4 2 79 
4/29 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
4/28 10 10 0 0 5 0 3 11 39 
TOT 33 65 0 50 20 61 19 17 265 
Notes to Table 1: 
The nominator codes appearing in Table 1 are as follows: 
AA ANZAC ADOCS 
AB Blue Ridge ADOCS 
AE E-2C ADOCS 
AX DD-X ADOCS 
GE E-2C GISRC 
GX DD-X GISRC 
TB Blue Ridge TES-N 
XX Test  
Codes are used as prefixes for the target numbers nominated by the corresponding nodes. 
  
Not all test cases were distinguished by the XX prefix.  There were a few cases where 
nominations are identified as tests in the target description but are given the normal 




Table 2 presents the same data as seen in data logs from the Blue Ridge ADOCS server.  
• The expectation is that Tables 1 and 2 would show the same results.  They do not.   
 
Table 3 shows the nomination differences between the Blue Ridge and Newport ADOCS server 
logs for each experiment day as a function of nominator.  In a few cases, one of the logs will 
inexplicably contain a mission from a previous day.  In principle, the discrepancies could also be 
caused if one of the ADOCS servers was shut down prior to the end of the experiment day. But a 
review of the data for May 1 and 2 show no evidence of this.   Each cell in Table 3 contains the 
total discrepancy between the two Newport and Blue Ridge ADOCS listing the total number of 
nominations that appear in one ADOCS but not the other, rather than the simple difference in the 
counts in the two displays.    
 
The impact of the failure of all target nominations to appear in all ADOCS workstations is 
illustrated by nomination TB0051 which occurred on April 30.  This mission appears in both the 
Blue Ridge and ADOCS servers it did not appear in the E-2C ADOCS workstation which was 
being tasked by the TST_LNO to engage the target.  Communications and actions relating to this 
nomination are found in Annex B2. 
 











Table 3.  The difference in nominations appearing in the Blue Ridge and Newport ADOCS 
 
Date Target Nominators 
 AA AB AX GE GX TB 
5/2 1 8 0 0 1 1 
5/1 3 8 0 0 1 2 
4/30 1 0 10 1 8 0 
4/29 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
4/28 6 2 0 0 NA 0 
 
 
The ADOCS Fires Manager is the tool for engagement prosecution.  The ADOCS Joint Time 
Sensitive  Target (JTST) Manager  is the tool for cross Component TST coordination.  Only the 
Blue Ridge ADOCS server displayed and logged the JTST Manager data (All the Component 
Target Nominations  
Date AA AB AE AX GE GX TB XX 
TOT 
5/2 8 14 0 27 5 17 2 0 73 
5/1 5 37 0 1 5 24 8 3 83 
4/30 10 15 0 12 6 12 4 2 61 
4/29 2 17 1 6 5 6 9 0 46 
4/28 4 10 0 0 5 0 3 20 42 
TOT 29 93 1 46 26 59 26 25 305 
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inputs were simulated in various cells on the Blue Ridge).    
 
Table 4 compares the data from the Fires and JTST Managers.  The number of target nomination 
appearing in the JTST Manager is many fewer than appears in the Fires Manager  This is not 
unexpected since non-TST targets should not be promoted to the JSTS.  Other differences are of 
more concern.  In particular, some targets appear in JTST but not in Fires (e.g. TB 0060 on 1 
May and TB 0063 on May 2).  Another problem is that the status of engaged targets that appear 
in both tables is not the same (e.g., on May 1 Both TB0062 and TB0058 are shown as engaged in 
Fires  but only TB0058 is shown as engaged in JTST).   
 
Table 4.  Comparison of Mission Coordination: Fires and JTST  
             nominations from the Blue Ridge ADOCS server data 
  AA AB AE AX GE GX TB 
  N  F N F N F N F N F N F N F 
Fires 8 3 14 1 0  0 27 21 5 0 17 8 2 1 5/2 
JTST 4 1/1 1 0/1 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 1/1 3 0/3
Fires 5 0 37 16 0 0 1 0 5 0 24 12 8 1 5/1 
JTST 2 0/1 1 0/1 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 0/2 6 2 
Fires 10 4 15 9 0 0 12 12 6 4 12 10 4 0 4/30 
JTST 4 2/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2/1 2 1/1 4 0/3
Fires 2 0 17 6 1 0 6 0 5 1 6 2 11 1 4/29 
JTST 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 4 2 
Fires 4 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 4/28 
JTST 1 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Notes to Table 4: 
(1)Column N gives the number of target nominations 
(2)Column F  gives the number of missions where the target was engaged. 
(3)Fires engagement is defined as having the FRD block green 
(4)JTST engagement is defined as having the MSN block green.  EXE is almost always 
also displayed in the block. 
(5)The data in the F column for JTST is presented in the form 2/1.  The first number 
indicates the number of MSN blocks that are green and contain the characters EXE.  The 
second number indicates the number of MSN blocks that contain EXE but are yellow.  
(6)The interpretation of the second number is unclear.  Where only a single number 
appears all the fired missions were Green with EXE. 
(7)Some inconsistencies between the number of missions fired in Fires and JTST are 
indicated by bold typeface. 
 
It is concluded there are significant inconsistencies in the ADOCS Fires displays in different 
servers and significant inconsistencies between the Fires and JTST Manager displays.  As a 






5.3.3  Target Handoffs. 
 
From the last four days of the FTX the table below presents, for each nominator, the number of 
nominations that were paired to a firer, as indicated in the Blue Ridge ADOCS, and which firer 
they were paired with.   The last column provides the percent of the cases where the paired 
shooter was the same as the nominator.  Where the nominator had an engagement capability, the 
mission nominator was also the shooter in 71 to 100 percent of the cases; relatively few 
nominations were passed to another shooter for execution.  There was limited collaboration 
among the engagement platforms. The DD-X in particular (nomination prefixes AX and GX), 
engaged virtually all the targets it nominated.  The nominations originating on the Blue Ridge 
(nomination prefixes AB and TB) had to be passed to other platforms for engagement since the 
Blue Ridge had no engagement capability. The GISRC on the vANZAC performed no target 
nominations or at least none that reached the FBE net ADOCS. 
 
Table 5.  4/29 to 5/2 BLR ADOCS Data.  Number of nominations that were Weapon-Target 
paired and the number that were paired with the nominator as a function of nominator. 
 
Paired platforms Nominator # Noms # Noms 
paired 
% 
paired DAH ANZ E2 
% paired with  
nominator 
AA 25 14 56 2 10 2 71 
AB 79 52 66 30 18 4 0 
AX 46 43 93 43 0 0 100 
AE 1 0 0 0 0 0 NA 
GE 20 11 55 2 0 9 82 
GX 60 45 75 43 1 1 96 
TB 26 11 42 6 1 4 0 
 
 
5.3.4  Mensuration. 
 
In FBE-K, the messages used to request target mensuration and to report the georefinement 
results used in other FBEs were not employed.  The pre experiment mensuration procedure was a 
chat request for mensuration to PTW and for the PTW operator to enter the georefinement result 
directly into the Electronic Target Folder (ETF).  There was a IRC comment by the PTW 
operator that he was not connected to the web, hence he could not insert the results into the ETF. 
In practice, mensuration was seldom performed as result attributable, in part, to the poor quality 
of some of the imagery and in the difficulties in transmitting imagery to PTW.  It is the case that 
there is not a single instance, for the interval 28 April to 2 May, where the Georefinement block 
in the ADOCS Fires Manager indicates that georefinement data was provided for a target. 
 
The TST_GEO_REF IRC channel was unused for the duration of the experiment 
 





5.3.5  Rapid Planning Mode (RPM) 
 
RPM is a system used to, on request, compute the routes for TLAM missions.  The data collected 
from this system have been used to compute the intervals between receipt of the mission request 
and the start of the route computation , the interval required for then actual route computation, 
and the interval between the completion of the route computation and the transmission of the 
route result.  These intervals are shown in Table 6 where are compared with the results from 
FBE-I.  The data for FBE-K include only the interval April 28 to May 2.  In both cases only GO 
results are included. The much longer interval in which the route are waiting attention and the 
much faster computing time in FBE-K are notable.  The following explanation of these 
differences was provided by Dan Turpin of Boeing. 
 
In FBE-K  the new PC-based RPM was used.  The FBE-I system was a UNIX-based 
implementation.  On that system, the SMTP (E-mail) server delivered E-mail to the waiting 
client immediately upon receipt.  On the PC implementation, used for FBE-K, there is a polling 
interval which has a minimum setting of one minute.  In the PC implementation, Microsoft 
products are relied on to handle the E-mail interface, while on the UNIX side Boeing 
implemented their own interface to the HP-UX SMTP server.  The timing information reported 
when a request was received on UNIX is truly the time the local SMTP server received the 
message and notified the waiting RPM client.  On the PC side, it looks like the time is generated 
by the Exchange server, external to the local Outlook Express client on the RPM machine.  It 
appears that the receipt time on the PC version is probably set earlier than when the message is 
actually received by the RPM software.  The timing information for message receipt to the start 
of processing is really difficult to compare between the two implementations.  For the route 
computation time, that's a function of processor speed.  The old HP UNIX systems were running 
around 100 MHz while the PC systems were somewhere in the 1.2GHz range. 
 
Table 6.  A comparison of RPM Processing times from FBE-K and FBE-I 




receipt to start 











FBE-K 251 17 5 277 116 




5.4 ENGAGMENT TIMELINES 
 
5.4.1 TST TTP 
 
The significance of the colors in the ADOCS coordination blocks and the agent that controls the 
status of the blocks is routinely a problematic issue in FBEs. FBE-K was no exception.  Table 7 
presents the instructions distributed to participants for the ADOCS Mission Coordination: Fires 
Manager.   Following that, in Table 8, is an excerpt taken from the ANZAC_OPS IRC channel 
on April 30.  In this, XP_ANZAC defines the methodology to be used for color changes in the 
ADOCS Mission Coordination: Fires XPA and ANZ coordination blocks.  The two procedures 
described in Tables 7 and 8 are not the same.  For example, Table 7 indicates the ANZ going 
yellow shows the ANZAC is ready to engage.  Table 8 states the ANZ going yellow indicates the 
assignment of the target to ANZAC by XP.  This no doubt contributed to participant confusion 
regarding ADOCS TTP procedures.   That confusion is well illustrated by an excerpt from the 
AIR_OPS IRC channel of a conversation that occurred on April 30 (see Appendix A). 
 
In the examination of individual engagement timelines where there is a conflict between the 
procedures defined in Tables 7 and 8, the latter is taken as the standard. 
 
Table 7.  FBE-K ADOCS Mission Coordination Fires Approval Block Color Codes 
 
Tab Tab Definition Responsible Party Definition
Yellow Possible TST, Begin Strike Planning
Red Not a TST
Green Confirmed TST/PID
Yellow Strike approval received
Blue Acknowledged
Green Cleared to engage (w/ green range)
Red Abort
Blue Acknowledged 
Yellow Ready to engage
Green Shooter cleared to fire
Red Unable to execute
White No Mission assigned
Blue Acknowledged 
Yellow Ready to engage
Green Shooter cleared to fire
Red Unable to execute
White No Mission assigned
Blue Acknowledged 
Yellow Ready to engage
Green Shooter cleared to fire
Red Unable to execute












XPExperimental Strike Warfare 
Commander
XPA
ANZAC Virtual ANZAC Mission Assignment 
Coordination
JIC
ADC Air Defense Commander
JIC
Mission Coordination: Fires - Active Missions
Color
Joint Intelligence Center
TCT Time Sensitive Target 
determination
E2X Virtual vE2X Mission Assignment 
Coordination




Table 8.  ADOCS Missions Coordination: Fires TST TTP (Chat Excerpt)  
 
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 1. XP acknowledged and working mission - XP turns XPA tab 
yellow. 
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 2. XP assigns mission to vANZAC - XP turns ANZ tab yellow  
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 3. VANZAC acknowledges mission - XP ANZAC turns ANZ tab 
blue once acknowledgement received via chat from CO ANZAC. 
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 4. VANZAC accepts mission - XP ANZAC turns ANZ tab green 
once mission is accepted via chat from CO ANZAC. 
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 5. XP acknowledges mission acceptance - XP ANZAC turns XPA tab 
blue. 
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 6. XP authorizes engagement - XP turns XPA tab green 
[00:07] <XP_ANZAC> 7. CO ANZAC engages.  
[00:09] <XP_ANZAC> This is current procedure for us.   
[00:09] <CO_ANZAC> rgr-copy.  We will pass to AUS 
 
The headings of the coordination blocks in the post trial reconstructed ADOCS Fires displays are 
the same as those used in FBE-J and are not those used in FBE-K.  The correspondence between 
the headings is shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9.  In the Mission History files, a completely 
different set of names are used when referring to coordination block actions.  The 
correspondence between those names and those used in the ADOCS Fires display is given in the 
third column of Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Correspondence between the Multiple names applied to the  
             ADOCS Mission  Coordination: Fires Coordination Blocks 
 
Post Trial Display FBE-K Mission History 
MCC TCT TGT 
STW XPA OPS 
SCC E2X AIR 
MIW DDX OPT1 
IWC ANZ OPT2 
ADC ADC OPT3 




5.4.2  TTP Issues  
 
Appendix A contains event timelines for several target nominations.  Detailed examination of the 
engagement timeline events provides objective information on the TST TTP actually used and an 
assessment of the systems employed in prosecuting the targets. All the timelines include operator 
actions extracted from the ADOCS Mission History logs and participant conversations excerpted 
from multiple IRC channels.  Where pertinent, data are also taken from RPM and SNN which 
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respectively contain TLAM route generation events and JSAF engagement information. General 
conclusions from a review of these timelines are presented below. 
 
ADOCS Coordination Block Actions 
The actions of the ADOCS workstation operators in changing the colors of the coordination 
blocks illustrate many departures from the published TTPs.  A primary cause for this was the 
participant confusion regarding the TST TTP. Such confusion has been a chronic ADOCS 
problem in  FBEs.  Another factor contributing to these departures is latencies and 
inconsistencies in the ADOCS displays (see Section 5.2.2) 
 
The types of departures, in ADOCS, from the TTP include: 
 
a. Required TTP actions not taken. 
 
b. Actions taken but not by the responsible node. 
 
c. Actions taken that are undefined by the TTP and hence meaningless. 
 
d. Actions executed in the wrong sequence. 
 
e. Actions executed in such a way as to indicate that the actions were taken to  force the 
engagement to a conclusion rather than as a result of a realistic response to the simulated 
engagement. 
 
Table 10 shows, for the five timelines examined from late in the FTX, the correspondence 
between required coordination block actions (as defined by Tables 7and 8) and what actually 
occurred. 
Table 10.  Mission Conformance to TTP 
 
Target Nomination Actio 
TB0050 TB0051 AB5027 GX0321 AA0368
TCT yellow (begin strike planning) N Y N N Y 
TCT green/red ( yes/no TST) N Y N Y (4) Y 
Promote to JTST  Y Y N Y Y 
ADC red (deconflicting) Y N N Y Y 
ADC green (deconfliction complete) Y Y N N Y 
XPA yellow (working mission) Y Y Y (1) Y Y 
Shooter yellow (assigned mission) Y Y Y (1) Y N 
Shooter blue (ack assignment) Y N Y (2) Y(3) N 
Shooter green (accept mission) Y N Y (3) Y(3) Y 
XPA blue (ack acceptance) Y N Y Y N 
XPA green (authorize engagement) Y N Y Y Y 




Notes to Table 10: 
(1). These events appear in the wrong sequence. 
(2). This is IRC statement from ANZAC that they turned the ANZ block blue in their 
display.  This does not appear in the FBE net ADOCS. 
(3) This action was taken by BLR on behalf of ANZAC. 
(4) Action out of sequence.  The target was not confirmed as TST until after the 
engagement was completed. 
 
ANZAC ADOCS Coordination Block Actions 
In the BLR ADOCS Mission History no actions were reported as executed by ANZAC. All those 
actions which should have been executed by ANZAC were carried out on the BLR The IRC chat 
shows that the ANZAC was executing the required actions (e.g., see mission AB5027 Annex B3) 
but it appears that these events were not making it through Radiant Mercury to the FBE net.  The 
ADOCS TTP promulgated on May 1 (see Table 8) has the BLR entering into ADOCS the 
required ANZAC actions on receiving the IRC communications requesting those actions from 
the ANZAC.  It is presumed this TTP was created to circumvent Radiant Mercury. 
 
Redundancy of IRC and ADOCS 
The event timeline IRC entries sometimes show detailed reporting regarding the color block 
changes that are being made to the ADOCS display (e.g., see AB 5027).  This is attributable, in 
part, to uncertainty among some participants about the TST procedures and, in part, to the lack 
of confidence in ADOCS to accurately reflect, in a timely manner, the operator block actions to 
all ADOCS workstations.  These detailed  communications result in an expansion of the 
engagement timeline and, in effect, make ADOCS redundant – all the coordination actions 
appear to be occurring in chat and ADOCS becomes unnecessary. 
 
 
5.4.3  ADOCS issues 
 
Latencies and Inconsistencies 
Latencies and/or inconsistencies in the ADOCS information  are common. Such ADOCS 
latencies/inconsistencies have been a recurrent  problem in FBEs.   Specific problems revealed in 
the development of engagement timelines include: 
 
a. Missions appear in some ADOCS workstations but not others. 
 
b. The coordination block status can be different at different ADOCS workstations. 
 
c. The mission status (e.g. fired or not fired) may be different in the Mission Coordination: 
Fires and JTST Managers. For the JFMCC/XP ADOCS Mission Coordination: Fires 
Manager is the primary tool for prosecution of TSTs. The  JTST Manager is a 
collaboration tool to provide TST situational awareness to all Components.   
 
 




e. Mission status as determined from the Mission History may not agree with the status in 
the Mission Coordination: Fires display 
 
f. Some events are missing from the Mission Histories. 
 
g. There are multiple examples in the Mission History of blocks being changed from colors 
that they do not hold.  For example mission GX0231, at 3:15 XPA changed from white to 
blue (by BLR SPARE 4 ADOCS workstation).  The next recorded action for that block 
shows it being changed at 3:18 from white to yellow (by the BLR JOC STATION 3).  
There are two possible explanations for this:  there is an event changing the block from 
blue to white missing from the Mission History log or the change at 3:15 was not 
received by the second workstation so in his context the block was still white . 
 
Specific examples and details of these problems are highlighted in the examination of mission 
timelines in Appendix A. 
 
ADOCS is the core tool for TST engagement and target management.  If this tool does not 
provide timely reliable and consistent information the engagement process, at the least, will be 
degraded in terms of timely and accurate delivery of ordinance  to  the target, at worst the 
engagement will not be executed at all.  These inconsistencies also make it difficult to 
reconstruct and evaluate what actually occurred. 
 
Radiant Mercury 
ANZAC reported Fires mission manager for ANZ tab resets to white for every Radiant Mercury 
Guard (RMG) transmission.  The work around was for BLR ADOCS operator to edit ADOCS 
tabs on behalf of ANZAC. 
 
 
5.4.4 Other issues 
 
System Clock Synchronization 
System clocks were not synchronized.  The time stamps applied to the ADOCS Blue Ridge logs 
are about 4 minutes different from the time stamps applied to IRC logs. 
 
Target Position Georefinement 




Because the FBE net and Coalition net are not connected, IRC communications must be 
manually transferred from one net to the other.  Typically there was about a seven minute 
interval between the appearance of a message in the two IRC nets. 
 72 
 
5.5 ISR AND JFN OBSERVATIONS  
 
These results are extracted from Appendix D.  For a complete description of ISR and JFN 
observations from the viewpoint of operations within the JIC, see that appendix.  Those deemed 
to have had the most significant impact on achieving the Fires Initiatives objectives are discussed 
here.  The observations are in categories and presented as paired observation-recommendation.   
 
 
5.5.1 FBE Planning, Organization, and Execution 
 
Continuity Between Concept Development and Experiment Implementation  
 Observation:  A lack of continuity existed between the development of FBE-K 
concepts/initiatives involving ISR/JFN, and the actual FBE-K planning/implementation.  Among 
other things, this discontinuity hampered the development of meaningful analytic questions, and 
the experimental techniques to help answer those questions.   
 Recommendation:  Those involved in the development of experimental concepts and 
initiatives must remain fully engaged throughout the FBE planning process, if not also during the 
execution and after-action analysis, to ensure the FBE is properly focused on addressing the 
original intent of those concepts and initiatives. 
 
Staff Participation; Fleet Training vs. Experimentation  
 Observation:  From the ISR perspective, FBE-K degenerated almost completely into a 
JFN systems training event, largely because participation by C7F Staff and Fleet forces in the 
planning, preparation, and execution was constrained to such an extent as to preclude meaningful 
ISR and JFN-related experimentation. 
 Recommendation:  Ensure ISR and JFN related experimentation involving a Numbered 
Fleet has full buy-in and participation of that Numbered Fleet staff, particularly the operations 
(N3) staff.  Be prepared to postpone or cancel experimentation events that are dependent on 
Numbered Fleet staff participation as soon as it becomes obvious that the bulk of that staff’s 
focus will and should be elsewhere other than on experimentation.  And focus experiments on 
experimentation, and not on Fleet training / exercises.  
 
NWDC Division of Labor and FBE “Supporting Services”  
 Observation:  FBE-K experienced some of the same difficulties with intra-NWDC 
organizational challenges and “division of labor” issues as past FBEs.  While these were 
decidedly not “showstoppers” in FBE-K, future FBE planning and execution could be 
significantly enhanced by their rectification. 
 Recommendation:  Provide greater clarity on intra-NWDC “division of labor” for all the 
various aspects of FBE planning and execution.  Explicitly identify “supporting services” (such 
as information/knowledge management and COP/database maintenance) that are above the 
strictly technical level, but are distinct from any “supported” functional/experimental initiatives. 






 Observation:  Like most previous FBEs, FBE-K suffered from a lack of document control 
for most of the key coordinating documents. 
 Recommendation:  Early in the FBE planning stages, identify key coordinating 
documents (and their owners), and implement an FBE-wide common methodology for the 
cooperative production, review, maintenance and accessibility of those documents -- while at the 
same time keeping this “FBE document control” methodology / system as accessible, flexible, 
and non-burdensome as possible.  
 
Live Forces, ISR Assets, OPFOR, Emitters, and Fires  
 Observation:  As advanced as today’s M&S is, it is no substitute for the incorporation of 
live forces and live operations into Fleet Battle Experiments. 
 Recommendation:  Conduct all future ISR, targeting, and JFN-related experimentation 
with as many live forces (including live OPFOR) as possible to increase the fidelity of the 
experiment to a level that includes as many of the “truly hard” analytic processes as possible.  
 
 
5.5.2 Technology and Systems 
 
Operational Sequence Diagrams  
 Observation:  Functional Flow Diagrams (FFDs) should be developed prior to (or in 
conjunction with) Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSDs). 
 Recommendation:  For subsequent FBEs (and other experimentation events), FFDs 
should be institutionalized as required documents for all initiatives, to describe who at which 
functional nodes need (or will provide) what information from (to) whom and why.  The OSDs 
should subsequently (or concurrently) be developed as the technical reflection of those FFDs.    
 
Common Operational Picture (COP)  
 Observation:  The COP in FBE-K did not have explicit “ownership” by any initiative, 
and was not maintained to a level required to support ISR and JFN in support of TST. 
 Recommendation:  Early in the FBE planning stages, identify who has responsibility for 
each of the many complex, interdependent functions that go into producing an accurate, stable 
COP from which players will be capable of “fighting the experiment” (instead of fighting with 
the COP).  Consider doing the same with other “foundational” FBE processes, depending on the 
nature of the experiment.  
 
Tactical Exploitation System – Navy    
 Observation:  FBE-K reconfirmed that TES-N has a number of powerful tools (some of 
which are unique to TES-N) that potentially could be of great use to Naval forces involved in 
Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).  Unfortunately, FBE-K also reconfirmed that TES-N remains a 
very complex and developmentally immature system, with extremely limited interfaces to other 
C4I systems that are critical to TST, in particular GCCS-M and ADOCS.  
 Recommendation:  Don’t use TES-N in any further TST-related experimentation until 
major advances are made to at least the following: (1) interface with ADOCS; (2) interface with 
GCCS-M; (3) interface to PTW and any external target folder applications (e.g., attachment of 
image chips to ATI.ATR messages); (4) handling of ISR video and platform/sensor telemetry; 
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and, (5) SCI COMINT analysis tools, and SCI-to-GENSER connectivity via ISSE Guard. 
 
 
5.6 TECHNICAL RESULTS 
 
These results are extracted from Appendix C.  They provide a more complete description of 
technology issues than presented in the former section.  For a complete description of technical 
impacts on the experiment, see Appendix C.  Those deemed to have had the most significant 




     
• In-depth insight was gained into many JFN systems issues, myths and realities.  It was 
learned once again that TES-N is a complex and developmentally immature system 
whose strength/weakness are directly related to the strengths/weaknesses of its interfaces 
with communications, with other JFN systems, and with ADOCS. 
o Getting TES-N, the rest of the JFN equipment, and its many intricate interfaces to 
really full mission capability requires the regular (daily?) attention of a wide 
range of cooperating technicians and system operators, both on board and off 
board.   
o Operational testing, using scripted scenarios (if not live downlink events) forces 
issues to surface that would not appear in system demonstrations or static testing. 
 
• Remote M&S stimulation of TES-N / JFN was sufficient for familiarizing C7F Staff with 
the basic processes involved in using TES-N / JFN in support of TST but not for true 
training or experimentation. 
o Continue to improve quality of M&S video and imagery (e.g., 1-meter base), and 
platform / sensor / feed characteristics (particularly simulation of U-2 products). 
 
• TST Target Folder server concept as a common repository for relevant TST target data 
was successfully demonstrated. 
o Continue attempts to incorporate program-of-record digital target folder solution 
(e.g., Joint Targeting Toolbox, based on MIDB) into future ISR / TST 
experimentation events. 
 
• Several planning issues impacted the quality of the experiment.  Recommendations for 
improvement are: 
o Thoroughly test TES-N to ADOCS target nomination interface prior to event 
STARTEX, including a close examination of how individual data fields are 
handled through the whole process. 
o Clarify division of labor (and increase frequency of joint planning sessions) 
between functional leads, IKA team, and the technical team 
o Assign COP ownership and explicitly state roles and responsibilities (of above 
three, plus players) 
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o Produce “Functional Flow Diagrams” (FFDs?) before technical-level OSDs. 
o Provide FBE-wide document responsibilities, control, and distribution. 
 
 
5.6.2 M&S Feeds Into TES-N  
 
Video:  During both CPX and FTX, simulated ISR video was produced by AFSERS-MUSE, fed into the 
NWDC video controller in Newport, distributed as MPEG-4 to BLR via the FBE WAN (including 
KuBand SATCOM).  The MPEG-4 stream was converted and fed by the NWDC video remote server on 
BLR as analog video (RS-170) into TES-N’s video switch, which then presumably re-digitized the video 
for distribution to any GENSER-level TES-N Multi-Function Workstation 
• The video feed into TES-N was stable and reliable aside from BLR video remote server’s 
display need for re-set. 
• Simulated ISR Video C2 allowed rapid response to changes in circumstances and/or FBE 
participant requirements.   
• Some confusion over who had C2 over which simulated ISR video asset demonstrated 
the need for a well-established C2 structure for ISR operations.   
• Coordinate with ISR “pilots” via voice-only proved unwieldy due to lack of a 
workstation IP Chat capability.  
• After an A-to-D conversion or two, the video displayed on the TES-N MFWS was barely 
useable for TST detection and identification. 
• Video image “chips” captured by TES-N were of significantly lower quality than those 
captured from the same source by the GISRC workstations at Newport and Dahlgren.  
• The quality of the simulated video would not be sufficient for any type of targeting 
experimentation beyond just going through the process motions.    
o When zoomed in close enough to support positive identification (PID) of the TST, 
the background of base imagery became so blurred as to appear solid, thereby 
losing all visual context.   
o The combination of low resolution and the lack of features that are easily 
identified at coarse image resolution prevented visual-point-transfer between the 
video images and the Digital Point Positioning Database (DPPDB). 
o The 3D models of the TST objects are too easy to pick out (initial detection), as 
they “lay on top” of the terrain instead of being part of it, thereby providing a 
false sense of the level of difficulty of initial TST detection with a video sensor.  
• TES-N could not do any parsing or processing of the telemetry data provided by the ISR 
video platform M&S system other than display it, on-screen, “burned in” as part of the 
video images themselves.   
Imagery via JCA  Imagery from simulated national and other sources was produced in NITF 
format by the AutoSIGS system at M&S Central in Newport, and then transferred (FTP) to 
JCA’s Command IPL located at ONI in Suitland, MD.  JCA connectivity (via Challenge Athena 
III SHF SATCOM) allowed users aboard BLR to access the JCA IPL (via the web-based Quick 
Query or Q2 application), and pull the images down to the BLR IPL.  From there they could be 
accessed by either PTW or TES-N, the latter of which could pull the images over to its own 




• There were two major hurdles to successful use of this method of image file transfer:   
o Getting permissions to access the “real world” JCA IPL is a long and difficult 
process.   
o Modifying AutoSIGS software to allow production of NITF headers with a 
country code of something other than the default CC. 
• Simulated AutoSIGS image quality  
o was sufficient for analysts to run through proper procedures,  
o was insufficient for any experimentation involving actual imagery analysis, 
targeting, or battle damage assessment. 
 
U-2 Dragon Lady simulation (from AFSERS-TENCAP aboard BLR)  Attempts were made to 
simulate the inputs into TES-N that would come from a U-2 Dragon Lady aircraft as if it were 
downlinking directly to BLR.  These inputs fall into two categories: 
• Images:  AFSERS-TENCAP on BLR would FTP two images per collection “event” in 
NITF format to TES-N:  a low-resolution image to the TES-N Screener application, and a 
high-resolution image of that same area of coverage to the TES-N DBO application.   
• Telemetry:  AFSERS-TENCAP provided a data stream (UDP) to TES-N that tells where 
the simulated U-2 is located at any given time.   
This capability worked only briefly during TT03/FBE-K (last two days of CPX) because of a 
number of complex issues including an initial lack of mission plans, an initial lack of a required 
software script, errors in subsequent mission plans, and suspected software problems in TES-N   
 
Several issues arose with regard to this simulation: 
• There exists no capability in AFSERS-TENCAP to provide the “waterfall” type of 
display in the TES-N Screener application that one would get from a live U-2 aircraft.   
• The AFSERS-TENCAP base imagery was a mix of 5- and 1-meter resolution stitched 
together, providing significantly better resolution in some areas (where there was 1-meter 
coverage) than the base imagery used in AutoSIGS and AFSERS-MUSE. 
• Receiving and processing the AFSERS-TENCAP telemetry data, required that TES-N 
run a script custom built for the task that is, apparently, not part of the standard TES-N 
version 5.0.   
• AFSERS-TENCAP simulated SAR imagery was illegible by TES-N.   
o Work-around, have simulated U-2 fly an ASARS sensor, produce EO images, and 
players pretend they were seeing SAR.    
 
ELINT / ESM  Attempts were made to send simulated ELINT/ESM from various M&S sources 
to the Tactical Data Dissemination System (TDDS) Network Management Center (TNMC) to be 
put onto the TDDS broadcast, with receipt of the broadcast on BLR via organic means, and 
processing of exercise/experiment ELINT using the GALE software in TES-N.   
• Successful receipt was achieved from 
o JQUAD (Camp Smith, HI) 
o JSAF-ASSET (NWDC Newport, RI)  
o ISR UUV-CSIM (NUWC Newport, RI) (never successful going direct to TNMC 
but email draft TACELINT to ASSET Simms Hall then sent to TNMC.  
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• TES-N GALE was unable to receive, process, and display TACELINT messages from 
ISR UUV that reported an LOB.   
o These messages were apparently being received and processed by GCCS-M. 
o Work-around, the M&S operators in Newport sent the TACELINTs as very thin, 
elongated ellipses that would look like a single line on the display.  
 
COMINT   CPX:  COMINT injects were to be crafted by Kunia Regional SIGINT Operations 
Center (KRSOC) scripters who were resident in the TT03 JECG at Camp Smith, HI.  Injects 
would be sent via SI broadcast to BLR and received by a COMINT analyst using TES-N.   
• COMINT injects were received only on SCI GCCS-M, as that is the way the BLR SCI 
architecture was configured. 
o The COMINT analyst at the SCI GCCS-M would receive the injects as emails, 
print them, and sneaker-net them to the TST team manning TES-N terminals.   
FTX:  KRSOC scripters could not stay for the FTX.   
• COMINT injects were from the NWDC Facilitator crafting a GESNSER-level COMINT 
spot report, and emailing the report to as an “initial tipper”.   
 
Other issues prevented adequate COMINT for both CPX and FTX. 
• TES-N does not have any true COMINT analysis tools (as does SCI GCCS-M). 
o C7F cryptologists have chosen to not use TES-N for COMINT analysis.   
o Consequently, none of the required connectivity (other than JWICS Intelink web-
browsing access, and SCI-level chat) for using SCI TES-N was not in place for 
use during TT03/FBE-K.   
• TES-N Information Support Server Environment Guard was non-functional on BLR.   
o Could not move data from the SCI to the GENSER side of TES-N.   
 
 
5.6.3 TES-N Outputs 
 
Target nomination messages (ATI.ATRs) to ADOCS and to TST Target Folder Server   The 
objective was for the TST nomination analyst to use TES-N to create a target nomination 
message (in USMTF “ATI.ATR” format), and to send that nomination message (via SMTP) to 
the ADOCS server on BLR, and to the TST Target Folder server at NWDC.  [ADOCS would 
receive the ATI.ATR from TES-N and, after parsing it, would send another ATI.ATR to the TST 
Target Folder server; the target folder for any given TES-N created TST nomination would have 
both the ATI.ATR directly from TES-N and from ADOCS].   
• Considerable effort was required to get all systems interoperating correctly, TES-N LAN, 
ship’s LAN/Exchange server, FBE-K WAN and Exchange servers, ADOCS mail server.   
• Once set up properly, no problems were encountered until corrupted files in the TES-N 
Cross-INT filter database occurred due to log files being over-filled.  
• Target Identification was a problem.   
o Inconsistencies existed in how target nominations were handled by ADOCS and 
how they were showing up in the TST Target Folder server.   
o Fault was in both TES-N and ADOCS, with inconsistencies in target line usage.  
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o ADOCS turned around an ATI.ATR with fields out of order and truncated.    
 
 Images related to target nominations to PTW for aimpoint refinement  The objective was for the 
TST nomination analyst to attach the image or several images (e.g., video “chips” showing the 
TST) to the outgoing target nomination, and send the nomination simultaneously to three places: 
• ADOCS to begin weapon-target paring and engagement processes.  
• TST Target Folder server to either create a new target folder or update an existing target 
folder.  
• PTW to begin the aimpoint refinement process.   
The version of PTW used on BLR could not receive and parse ATI.ATR messages (i.e., did not 
have the DTMS software used in MC02/FBE-J).  The work-around was supposed to be that the 
PTW operator would open the target folder after it had been created in the TST Target Folder 
server and pull down the images from there.   
• TES-N does not allow images to be attached to outgoing ATI.ATRs.   
o All images captured, chipped, and saved (as NITF) in TES-N had to be manually 
transferred (FTP) to PTW.  The PTW operator would then pull up the images and 
conduct aimpoint refinement, then save the images (as both JPEG and NITF) to a 
shared directory on the BLR IT-21 LAN. 
 
Images related to target nominations to TST Target Folder Server  The objective was for the TST 
nomination analyst to attach images to the outgoing target nomination so that the TST Target 
Folder server could add the image(s) to the TST’s target folder.   
• The new version 5.0 of TES-N software still cannot attach images to ATI.ATRs.   
o The workaround was to use MS Outlook to create a one-line ATI.ATR email 
(using the “TNO” line only) with subject line “Target”, pull the image(s) from the 
shared directory and attach to the email, and send to the TST Target Folder 
server.  
• TST Target Folder server worked well.   
• The NWDC TST Target Folder server application was simple but powerful prototype.   
  
U-2 mission plan creation and output to AFSERS-TENCAP  A well-written help-tutorial on-line 
in TES-N’s EMPS application was used to guide creation a mission plan to output to AFSERS-
TENCAP for its use in providing a simulated feed of U-2 imagery and telemetry back to TES-N. 
The plan consisted of a navigation plan and a collection plan built using a specific set of 
collection requirements for a specific sensor type, associated with a specific aircraft tail number, 
flying a specific track, downlinking to a specific ground station. 
• EMPS uses different maps than ITD.   
• Not only does it load the maps from a different set of files, but the user interface (e.g., 
zoom, pan, etc.) is completely different (and very cumbersome).   
• AFSERS-TENCAP can only reliably simulate ASARS sensors.   
o AFSERS-TENCAP could not ingest the initial U-2 mission plans built for the EO 
sensor packages (SYERS and SYERS 2).   
 
DIOP of U-2 imagery and telemetry to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC (FTX)   The objective in 
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CPX was to have the U-2 simulation coming into TES-N from AFSERS-TENCAP turned around 
to ISRM (a TES RTC) at Hickam AFB using the TES-N Data Input/Output Port (DIOP).  The 
DIOP connectivity between BLR, ISRM, and ESX RTC tested successfully using recorded 
mission tapes and demo files built from actual U-2 missions specifically to demonstrate and train 
the DIOP capability when no live U-2 was airborne and downlinking.  
• AFSERS-TENCAP simulation stream cannot be “DIOP’d”.   
o AFSERS-TENCAP uses different processes (FTP for imagery and UDP for 
telemetry) to provide the inputs to TES-N than a live U-2 (which would be 
sending it through the CDL-N and CIP), thus the AFSERS-TENCAP feeds could 
not be turned around using DIOP.  
 
File transfer to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC / RTC Lites (FTX)   Because “DIOP” is only for 
the transfer of U-2 imagery that is being (or has just been) directly downlinked, other file types 
must be exchanged between TES-N and remotes like ISRM and RTCs using standard means 
such as FTP and SMTP.  During FTX only, three RTC Lites were employed, one aboard the 
vSSN (virtual submarine simulator at NUWC, Newport, RI), one aboard the E2XV 
(Experimental Hawkeye-2003 surrogate van in the NWDC parking lot in Newport, RI), and one 
aboard the virtual DDX (at NSWC Dahlgren, VA).  
• FTP and SMTP worked great.   
• RTC Lites worked -- eventually.  
o RTC Lite at NUWC was fairly easy to get up, configuring the others was difficult.  
o The actual utility of RTC Lites to “virtual shooter” nodes remains indeterminate. 
 
Cross-INT replication from TES-N to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC (FTX)   Replication of 
TES-N’s Cross-INT database was attempted to both ISRM (CPX) and the ESX RTC (FTX), but 
with very limited success. 
• During CPX, Cross-INT was not replicated to ISRM due to ISRM instability problems. 
• During FTX, Cross-INT was replicated to ESX RTC.  
• Target Nominations created in TES-N are not replicated to ISRM / RTC.   
 
 
5.6.4 COP Issues  
 
TST location output to COP (i.e., Manual Contact to GCCS-M) for “tracking” and SA:  The 
objective was for the TST nomination analyst to not only create an ATI.ATR as above, but to 
then use TES-N’s rudimentary interface to GCCS-M to input the target into the COP as a track, 
for the situational awareness of ALCON, and to assist (theoretically) in the “tracking” of the 
TST while waiting for it to be engaged.  
• The TES-N output to GCCS-M only worked for two days at the same rudimentary and 
suboptimal level at which it was working for MC02/FBE-J; for the remainder of 
TT03/FBE-K it was functionally inoperative. 
• GCCS-M configuration on BLR was sub-optimal.   
o BLR had a wide variety of serious issues (e.g., different software versions from 
machine to machine), some of which took the entire event to straighten out.   
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• TES-N output to GCCS-M was inoperative on BLR for CPX.   
o Even with the new TES-N version 5.0, there was no improvement in TES-N’s 
ability to output to GCCS-M from what was used in MC02/FBE-J.   
o A workaround with the TES-N’s Cross-INT database was developed, then went 
down when nothing could be saved to that database.   
 
GCCS-M COP Tracks into TES-N ITD   In addition to TES-N’s rudimentary capability to send 
“Manual Contacts” to GCCS-M, COP tracks can also be sent from GCCS-M to TES-N.  The 
objective of attempting to do so was to provide a richer context of contacts, tracks, Blue ISR 
asset locations, etc. in TES-N for the analysts trying to find and fix TSTs. 
• TES-N’s incoming “Message and Data Log” showed a good number of incoming tracks 
from GCCS-M, but those tracks did not appear to be parsing into the TES-N ITD.  
• When GCCS-M tracks coming into TES-N were able to be brought up on the ITD it did 
not display any track labels. 
o GCCS-M tracks in TES-N’s ITD appeared in their proper locations but the 
symbols do not have any labels associated with them (e.g., no track names), 
making them all but functionally useless to the TST team.   
o TES-N symbology was used, which is based on MIL-STD-2525, not GCCS-M 
symbololgy 
 
M&S simulated ISR asset display in GCCS-M COP  By the end of FTX, all of the simulated 
Blue ISR assets active in M&S were simultaneously displayed on BLR’s GCCS-M COP with 
appropriate labels (e.g., two ISR UUVs, two Predator UAVs, one U-2). 
• This was the first time that this has happened in an FBE.  The key enablers were very 
closely coordinated troubleshooting between the NWDC Facilitator, the FBE-K ATO 
builder, the M&S Director, and the GCCS-M Tech on BLR.  
 
 
5.7 FIRES PLANNER OBSERVATIONS 
 
These results are extracted from Appendix E.  For a complete description of experiment planning 
and execution from the Fires planner viewpoint, see that appendix.  Those deemed to have had 
the most significant impact on achieving the Fires Initiatives objectives are discussed here.  The 
presentation in the appendix is an observation, a discussion, and a recommendation.  The 
discussions are omitted or shortened here.   
 
 
5.7.1 Sea Strike Operational Planning 
 
Planning Directive   No experiment directive was published for this FBE.   
Discussion:  The Planning Directive is a Rosetta stone of information that outlines 
responsibilities, functions, and path toward execution of an experiment event.  Lack of this 
document can cloud fleet numbered responsibilities and makes “arrangements” for support non-
binding and unofficial.   
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Recommendation:  Use this instrument in every FBE and LOE that is conducted. 
 
Forward FBEs and NWDC Fleet Presence   Forward presence by the NWDC staff and key 
planners was lacking.  
Discussion:  Forward fleets require constant attention during the FBE planning process.  
During FBE Kilo, uniformed initiative leads were present at the forward fleet toward the end of 
the planning process, but many of the other key planners did not interact with the fleet on a 
substantial basis until they arrived for execution of the experiment.   
Recommendation:  Attempt to get key planners forward often in the planning process and 
ALWAYS hold the Final Planning Conference at the forward numbered fleet home location.  
This will leverage fleet interaction and participation. 
 
Fleet Interface and Fleet Initiative Sponsors   No uniformed numbered fleet sponsor (uniformed 
warfighter) for the Sea Strike Initiatives was identified or utilized.   
Discussion:  The Sea Strike Initiatives did not have substantive uniformed numbered fleet 
representation throughout FBE Kilo (planning and execution).  Not having warfighter 
sponsorship at the numbered fleet level for FBE initiatives is unacceptable.    
Recommendation:  Use the experiment directive to outline the fleet sponsorship 
requirement and do not examine initiatives that do not have proper uniformed sponsorship within 
the numbered fleet staff. 
 
 
5.7.2 Sea Strike Operational Execution 
 
IKA Support   IKA support to the FBE was minimized due to MBC participation in the 2nd Fleet 
LOE.  There was no coordinated IKA support for FBE execution.   
Discussion:  No IKA lead planning or execution support for the FBE was responsible for 
many delays and training problems.  Ad-Hoc /initiative level IKA measures had to be 
implemented on the fly to support FBE execution.  To exacerbate this matter, no clear level of 
IKA support was ever articulated to the planners during the planning process. 
Recommendation:  Identify IKA (or other initiative area) participation level in FBE and 
ensure that it is maintained. 
 
Fleet Execution Support   Numbered fleet staff support was abysmal for the Sea Strike 
Initiatives.  The promised JFACC support was also minimal and not what had been planned.      
Discussion:  This lack of support in all these area was the largest single factor in not 
realizing the experimental potential of the Sea Strike efforts in FBE Kilo.  This could be seen 
during the planning process but was not corrected by the MBC uniformed staff. 
Recommendation:  Early and frequent interaction with the uniformed staff at the ACOS 
level is required for all initiatives in an FBE, especially within a forward numbered fleet. 
 
 
5.7.3 Sea Strike Backdrop/Scenario 
 
FBE overlay on Exercise Construct   FBE Kilo construct only loosely fit Tandem Thrust 03.    
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Discussion: The overall FBE construct that was layered over the exercise construct was 
adequate for execution had the exercise construct been completed.  Database testing for the event 
was woefully lacking and joint force (JFACC) participation was almost nonexistent.  This 
resulted in errant databases (MIDB, AODB, BSCMs), that did not function properly.   
Recommendation:  Planner and technologies must participate in any exercise database 
testing events that are integrated into the FBE construct. 
 
Exercise Augmentees   C7F only received a small percentage (~30%) of the planned staff 
augmentation and component augmentation required to carry out the Sea Strike initiatives. 
Discussion:  Events beyond the control of both the MBC and the numbered fleet resulted 
in manpower shortages that greatly hindered the FBE effort.  While these may have been 
unavoidable, they were foreseen.  Prior to execution, manning go/no criteria need to be 
established and utilized to prevent execution of events just for the sake of “doing something.”   
Recommendation:  Institute manning go / no go levels during the planning process.  Do 
this in concurrence with the numbered fleet.  Be prepared to not execute portions of an FBE if 
these criteria are not reached. 
 
Scenario  The FTX scenario did not match (very closely), the FBE Sea Strike live force scenario. 
Discussion:  This problem was due in most parts to the CJTF (C7F) fighting the sim and 
live scenarios together when they were designed to be separate.  While it may be out of the 
MBC’s control to drive this during execution, there is room to avoid this by proper prior 
planning, which was not the case in FBE Kilo.  This problem is directly related to lack of 
numbered fleet involvement in the planning cycle. 
Recommendation:  Force a higher level of fleet experiment/exercise integration 
familiarization early and often in the planning process. 
 
Assumptions and Required Products   An assumption was made by the FBE planning staff that 
certain products required for FBE execution (AODB, MIDB, BSCMs, etc…) would be available. 
Discussion:  The database test was inadequate, resulting in errant information for use in 
the XC4I systems used during the FBE.  
Recommendation:  NWDC must participate with both planners and technologies in the 
database test process.  If products required are substandard, then they must be identified and 
corrected prior to execution 
 
 
5.7.4 Sea Strike Technical/xC4I  
 
Shipboard System Specifications   USS Blue Ridge has a 10 mb switch backbone that is 
connected via 155 mb links.  This, along with inconsistent network card setting hindered 
ADOCS use during the FBE.   
Discussion:  Standard, shipboard LAN configurations that support ADOCS need to be 
established.  This applies to switch, link, and network card settings on these machines.  
Hardware limitations may require platforms to set up multi-server configurations to reduce the 
effect of less modern network backbones. 





Recommended Shipboard System Configurations   USS Blue Ridge’s LAN will require specific 
ADOCS configurations to support usage on that platform. 
Discussion:  To reduce the effect of a less modern backbone, placement of ADOCS 
servers in a multiserver configuration and standardization of network interfaces is required. 
Recommendation:  Place ADOCS servers in the following spaces:  JIC, JOC (master), 
JAOC.   Configure these machines so they are all pointed at the switches where the clients they 
support reside.    
 
ADOCS Recommend Software / Hardware Changes   Many recommended changes to ADOCS 
were compiled during the FBE. 
Discussion:  ADOCS changes are indicative of command and control capability 
requirements that currently exist.   
Recommendations: 
Software 
1.  Ability to pair a target to an ITO mission via a button 
2.  Ability to highlights targets in Fires and JSTM managers when changes have 
occurred…alert? 
3.  A configurable Fires Manager (within the ADOCS GUI). 
4.  Add “hour glass” icon to ADOCS to display system working. 
5.  TST supported CDR indicator in JTSTM. 
6.  Hot link to ROE url. 
7.  Hot link to TST priorities url. 
8.  Creation of a Combat Assessment manager and removal of that function from the 
Fires/JTST managers. 
9.  Hot link to target folder url.  
  Hardware 
1.  Two (2) displays for ADOCS users that are doing target development and 
coordination 
 
JFN interaction with ADOCS   ATI.ATR target nomination from JFN was incomplete. 
Discussion:  ATI.ATR target nomination to JFN was incomplete and not really viable for 
usage.  This problem needs to be fixed.  It was identified over 2 years ago and is still a problem. 
Recommendation:  Detailed ADOCS – JFN testing to fix this problem.  This should be 
completed in a lab setting vice waiting for another FBE. 
 
 
5.7.5 Operational Road-Ahead and Other Recommendations 
 
ADOCS Road Ahead for C7F / COMPACFLT / USPACOM   ADOCS will be integrated into 
the PACOM C2 structure.  FBE Kilo was a major event in this transition. 
Discussion:  ADOCS use in FBE Kilo was the first in a series of event that will 
proliferate ADOCS across the PACOM.  Lesson learned from this effort should be passed on to 
facilitate a higher level of functionality in future PACOM events (IPD, TF04, CG04). 
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Recommendation:  Pass detailed ADOCS report to PACOM via C7F and COMPACFLT 
to help this effort along.  Report should be a NWDC/JPSD collaborative effort. 
 
 
Time Critical Targeting Functionality Afloat   The Xray Papa cell was an excellent test case for 
familiarization of the TCTF concept to the fleet. 
Discussion:  TCTF is a USAF program that outlines the C2 requirements and systems for 
conducting TCT operations.  In support of JCC and JCC (Afloat), the USN needs to further 
refine this concept to support both joint and maritime forces from a flag configured platform. 
Recommendation:  Use TCTF Afloat a starting point for future Sea Strike initiatives. 
 
Coalition Fires Experimentation   Coalition shooter information requirements where not met by 
the RMG technology. 
Discussion:  The RMG technology and its approved rulesets did not allow the coalition 
forces to fully integrate with the other shooter platforms.  This problem resulted in SA 
deficiencies on both sides of the guard. 
Recommendation:  Develop two paths for future coalition experimentation, one based on 
full network integration and the other based on LNO supported by US releasable C2 systems and 
backbone.  Both are viable and critical to continued integration of coalition forces. 
 
Xray Papa and Maritime Component Time Sensitive Targeting   The Xray  Papa cell identified a 
time sensitive targeting gap at the maritime component level that needs to be addressed.  
Discussion:  JFMCC’s conduct of broad scale TST operations that are integrated with 
other components is beyond the traditional role of the Bravo Papa.  A staff function at the 
operational level (JFMCC) that supports TST prosecution is required. 
Recommendation:  Integrate this effort with the TCTF effort described above to help 
identify maritime TST command and control requirements of the future. 
 
 
5.8 JFN PROGRAM OFFICE RESULTS  
 
During FBE-Kilo the JFN Program Office gathered information about the performance of that 
system.  A report has been delivered to the Program Office and the following are excerpts from 
that report.   
 
The Tandem Thrust specific analytical objectives for TT03 were based on PEO-IWS-6-C 
specific guidance on how to best support present and future implementation of TES-N systems to 
support warfighting.  This analysis effort will provide information to the modeling effort and 
provide feedback to PEO-IWS-6-C to support future acquisition and fielding decisions.   
 
Initially, the high level objectives for this experiment were: 
• Document the Joint TES architecture and interoperability in order to provide operational 
and technical insight to modeling. 
• Document TST timeline events in TT03 TES scripted combat operations. 
• Document TES functionality and products in the IPB process. 
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• Contribution to Operational- and Tactical Level Situational Awareness 
• Document the functions and capabilities of AFATDS and ADOCS in the JFN 
• Provide insight to support system acquisition decisions as it supports the Distributed 
Common Ground Surface-Station concept (DCGS). 
• Provide insight to operator training and JFN CONOPS development. 
 
Because of a shortage of funds and the poor quality of some of the technical data, analysis was 
not conducted some of the objectives.  Only the following of the above objectives were there 
minimally sufficient data to provide some analytical insight. 
• Document the Joint TES architecture and interoperability in order to provide operational 
and technical insight to modeling. 
• Document TST timeline events in TT03 TES scripted combat operations. 
• Document TES functionality and products in the IPB process. 
• Interface performance of TES-N with other systems (specifically, ADOCS). 
 
 
5.8.1 TST Thread Example 
 
In order to determine JFN performance, two detect-to-engage threads were tracked.  Information 
from those threads is presented below. 
 
TST Thread Example:  (SA-15, 16 April 03) 
 
Time (local)    Event 
Received 5 ELINT hits  that correlated to a radar for an SA-15 site 
(SIPRnet Email from USS Blue Ridge) 
 
P3-AIP tasked (via JECG) to provide video in vicinity of the ELINT contacts.  
(SIPRnet Email from USS Blue Ridge) 
 
Video from P3 received and analyzed at JFN MFWS.  Target was easily identified.  
(SIPRnet Email from USS Blue Ridge) 
 
JFN Image Analysts refined location and pass ELINT data to AOC (Hickam)  
(SIPRnet Email from USS Blue Ridge) 
 
1240 ELINT Contact Report received from JFN (Blue Ridge) to ISR-M (Hickam)  
(CHAT Sidebar 12) 
1240 TCT Chief and Deputy CCO discuss potential TST and attack options.   
Attack Ops requests initial target coordinates from Targeteer and requests  
Targeteer to provide potential platforms with load-outs on current ATO. 
1246 Attack Coordinator prepares strike package options 
1251 SIDO consults with TCT Chief regarding expected imagery and DMPI’s 
1257 TCT Chief briefs CCO and JFACC about SA-15. 
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1300 ISR-M Operator chats with JFN Operator (USS Blue Ridge) and tells them that  
strike package is prepared but imagery required for more precise coordinates and  
collateral damage assessment. (CHAT Sidebar 12) 
1305 TCT Chief provides status brief for CCO and JFACC.  JFACC decides that  
mensuration is not required because strike package calls for Laser Guided Bomb  
(LGB).  JFACC “not worried about collateral damage because several DMPI’s  
in vicinity of SA-15 were hit earlier in the day” 
1308 ISR-M Operator chats with JFN Operator (USS Blue Ridge) and requests refined  
coordinates.  Explains that JFACC does not want to wait for imagery.   
(CHAT Sidebar 12) 
1309 JFN Operator mentions that he was unsuccessful in sending imagery and will  
forward coordinates.  (CHAT Sidebar 12) 
1310 ISR-M Operator receives refined coordinates from JFN Operator via Chat circuit  
and provides to SIDO and TCT Chief. 
1310 Coordinates are passed to Attack Coordinator and JFACC directs immediate execution. 
1311 TCT Chief discusses Phase II BDA Plan with SIDO 
1313 TCT Chief requests JFN coordinate additional imagery for BDA. (CHAT Sidebar 12) 
1318 JFN Operator reports that P3 tasked (via exercise controller) to provide  
additional video after the strike. 
1325 Additional video collected and displayed on JFN.  JFN Operator could not  
forward imager to ISR-M 
1331 In response to queries from AOC (TCT Chief), JFN analyst reported that image  
showed black smoke from radar station – Destroyed. (CHAT Sidebar 12) 




Time Event Data Source Remarks 
010404May BR TES-N nominates CDCM 




Dwell time is to 010604 
May (2 hours) 
010428May J2 Ops states that refined 
coordinates are available for this 
target. 
IRC Chat Logs  
010445May The TST LNO asks the XP ISR 
Manager to ask E-2C to execute 
mission. 
IRC Chat Logs TST ADOCS is not 
working 
010455May E-2C identifies 2 x F/A-18C 




ATO lists A/C availability 
from 010430 to 
010600May 
010455May XP informs TST staff that they 
must notify the XP prior to using 
Navy assets. 
IRC Chat Logs Possible C2 procedure 
issue. 
010457May E-2C states to XP that he has been 
double tasked for the same target 
IRC Chat Logs  
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Time Event Data Source Remarks 
both by the XP and the JTF TST 
010505May TST LNO requests best TOT time 
from E-2C for sortie 1025. 
IRC Chat Logs  
010513May J2 Ops tasks UAV for BDA on 
target. 
IRC Chat Logs  
010500May E-2C states that TOT was 0520. IRC Chat Logs  
010533May BDA Imagery in target folder.  
Assessment is “unrepairable, 
possible scrap….catastrophic 
damage..,” 
ADOCS Logs  
 
The decision event timeline for the F2T2EA process of TB0062 shows a target executed in 89 
minutes.   This process is within the 120 minute assigned dwell time.  This time starts when the 
JIC nominates a target for execution.  The JIC continuously monitors the event as evidenced by 





Time Event Data Source Remarks 
290318 
Apr 
BR TES-N nominates a 




290323Apr Target assigned a dwell 






290341Apr JTF ISR asks if  TST 
watch if they need Rivet 
Joint or U2 support 
IRC Chat Logs Based on whether target is DF 
because of COMINT.  
Declines offer because of 
Predator availability 
290341Apr COMINT reported firing 
sites in vicinity of Central 




290349Apr XP notifies E-2C that a 
SAM has been located 
over target. 
IRC Chat Logs  
290351Apr XP asks Targeting Officer 
for geo-refined 
coordinates. 
IRC Chat Logs Target folders for this target 
cannot be found.  Queries JIC 
290352Apr ISR Mgr assigns UAV 1 to 
cover target area 
 
IRC Chat Logs  
290353Apr XP queries E-2C if there IRC Chat Logs  
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Time Event Data Source Remarks 
are air assets available to 
strike target. 
290356Apr XP begins coordination 
with ANZAC on assigning 
them target. 
IRC Chat Logs  
290358Apr E-2C states that target is a 
CDCM, not SAM. 
IRC Chat Logs XP directs E-2C to nominate 
as target.  Target being 
worked by 2 platforms. 
290401Apr E-2C requests imagery. IRC Chat Logs XP states that imagery is not 
available.  JIC having 
problems with target folders. 
290403Apr UAV on station.  Operator 
begins sending reports. 
IRC Chat Logs  
290415Apr JFMCC is taking control 
of the target 
ADOCS Mission 
History Logs 
E-2C not informed. 
290424Apr TST LNO reports ADOCS 
technical problems. 
IRC Chat Logs Apparent problem with 
different Zulu times affecting 
the remarks section. 
290427Apr XP states that they are 
showing WTP ANZAC-
ERGM on ADOCS 
IRC Chat Logs Still confusion on ANZAC 
concerning when to execute.  
ANZAC can only collaborate 
on ADOCS in TCT, XPA, 
WRD and FRD.  Other blocks 
must be transmitted via voice 
communications. 
290439Apr ANZAC executes mission. IRC Chat Logs ADOCS Mission History 
records following:  JFACC 
WTP at 290433Apr;  MCC 
(ANZAC) WTP at 
290420Apr. 
290512Apr XP requests target 
intelligence from JIC. 
IRC Chat Logs  
290520Apr JIC confirms that UAV1 is 
tasked for BDA 
IRC Chat Logs  
 
The target TB0041 timeline documents the F2T2EA process for a coalition decision making 
event.  Timeline for execution is 122 minutes.  What is noteworthy for this event is how the 
target is processed by 2 separate entities (E-2C for an airstrike and the JFMCC for a surface fires 
strike).  There are indications that initially there is  a lack of synchronization by both entities.  
There seems to be some confusion on whether the target is a CDCM or SAM.  This confusion 
may have delayed the decision making time (can be surmise that the E-2C may have been 
reluctant to send aircraft into the vicinity.  What is finally resolved is that the ANZAC will be 
the primary shooter with strike fighters providing back-up.  This target apparently is developed 
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from COMINT sources.  However, there seems to be a cueing process as a Predator is tasked to 
surveil the target and ELINT ISR sources are not employed.  There is a problem with imagery 
availability from the target folders that may have slowed the process. 
 
 
5.8.2 Findings and Conclusions  
 
These findings deal with the following questions: 
• How do TES products contribute to the IPB process?  
• Do TES products enhance predictive analysis of enemy course of action? 
This analytical objective focused on the process and configuration of TES, GCCS-M and 
ADOCS as they relate to the IPB process in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).  Doctrinally, IPB 
provides a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment  in a specific 
geographic area.  It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making.  
Applying the IPB process helps commanders selectively apply and maximize his combat power 
at critical points and times in the battlespace. 
 
The JIC intelligence staff  was surveyed on whether the JFN enhanced the IPB process and TST 
operations.   The specific focus of JFN enhancements was TES.  There were certain constraints 
to the experiment that may have influenced their opinion.  These constraints include manning, 
training, and scenario relevancy.  While the sample was small; there were some insights that 
emerged. 
 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents indicated that TES aided in 
identifying gaps in the commands knowledge of the threat and the current threat situation. 
 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion that TES products 
were used to portray threat models that included doctrinal templates.  Additionally, the same 
percentages were reflected in the respondents’ perception of TES products usefulness in 
developing models that depicts threat courses of action. 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion on ADOCS 
usefulness in providing TST operations situational awareness. 
 
25% of the respondents disagreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion that ADOCS 
provided useful information to continuously update the enemy situation template. 
 
All respondents agreed or strongly agreed that there was effective coordination between the TES 
imagery screener, the ELINT screener, and the video screener. 
 
All respondents agreed that the imagery analyst processed imagery accurately and timely. 
 
50% of the respondents agreed and 50% of the respondents had no opinion that the configuration 
of the JFN systems in the JIC was sufficient to ensure fusion of intelligence was accurate and 




25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion that JFN provided the 
tools to fuse products that would answer the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. 
 
All respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the configuration of  the JFN systems in the JIC 
was sufficient to facilitate collaboration between different functions.   
 
50% of the respondents disagreed and 50% of the respondents had no opinion that track elements 
on the TES Integrated Tactical Display (ITD) were the same as the GCCS-M COP. 
 
66.66% of the respondents disagreed and 33.33% of the respondents had no opinion that 
ADOCS and JFN systems provided situational awareness of theater wide ISR operations. 
 
75% of the respondents agreed and 25% of the respondents had no opinion that the JIC provided 
targeting data to the JAOC and XP to support TST operations. 
 
All of the respondents disagreed that the JFN systems were technically reliable.   
 
Conclusions: 
Several constraints to the data collection and analysis efforts preclude making definitive 
conclusions.  These constraints include:  small sample size; technical difficulties; control of the 
experimental design; and adequate manning.  However, there are several insights that can be 
extracted form the data. 
 
TES capabilities have the potential to contribute to the IPB process.  Noteworthy was TES 
contribution to portray threat models that included doctrinal templates, and their usefulness in 
developing models that depicts threat courses of action. 
 
There was not any data to support confidence in that TES and GCCS-M had a common picture 
of the friendly and enemy situation.   
 
There were indications  that the configuration of the JIC was sufficient to ensure that capabilities 
of different systems could be applied to fusion of intelligence products. 
 
Technical performance was a significant factor the limited optimal operational capabilities. 
 
A second high-level analytical objective dealt with interface performance of TES-N with other 
systems.  Difficulties covered previously in this report prevented gathering adequate information 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTEXT 
 
The analysis and reporting contained here for FBE-Kilo is different than what has been done for 
previous FBEs.  Formerly, the concentration was on operational and tactical processes, how well 
they could be performed.  Analysts and subject matter experts worked with data and information 
that had been obtained with a focus on decision-making, speed of performance, those things that 
lead to improved operational capabilities.  In FBE-Kilo planning, personnel, and equipment 
problems that have been described in former sections and Appendices resulted in processes not 
being performed in a way that would yield much in the way of usable process data or 
information.  
 
As a result, the majority of the results and conclusions presented here deal with experiment 
conduct and supporting equipment.  Information about operational processes that can be gleaned 
is presented but represents a small part of the whole.   
 
Because of the unusual nature of this experiment noted above, the most valuable observations 
and information are from those people responsible for performing the events and for making the 
equipment work.  Three high quality, detailed, and comprehensive reports on the experiment’s 
conduct and equipment have already been written by these people (see Appendices C, D, and E). 
 Some of the conclusions and recommendations presented here are extracted from those 
appendices, others come from direct observations by the analysts who observed the experiment.  
Those who wish to understand the details of FBE-Kilo should read completely the three 
appendices.  The extractions presented here cover their main points in abbreviated fashion.  They 
have included other observations that are not presented here.  
 
Conclusions are presented as Findings and Insights and many of them are accompanied by 
recommendations.  An overarching recommendation for the Fires Initiatives is that the results 
from FBE-Kilo be used to step back, assess, and improve the Navy experimentation process.  If 
this is done, the Kilo experience will prove to be worthwhile.   
 
Four Findings from the CPX phase of FBE-Kilo are included with the Principal Conclusions and 
at the end of this section.  They are included because of their applicability to all of the 
experiment.   
 
6.2 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Principal Conclusions are first presented in a format meant to facilitate their use for 
presentations.  Each area of interest conclusions are presented on a single page with highlights in 
a box, as might be used for a view graph or Power Point, followed by a brief explanation of each 
point.   
 
Principal Findings are presented in the following order: 
 Experiment  (3) 
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 Coalition  (3) 
 Fires  (5) 
 TST Organization  (1)  
 FBE Data  (1) 
 Technology  (4)  
 CPX Extraction (4) 
The numbers in the parentheses are the numbers of findings types in each category, a total of 21. 
 The number is this large because Findings in each of the categories need to be presented to 
adequately represent FBE-Kilo results.    
 
This ordering is used because the more important results from FBE-Kilo had to do with 
experiment performance.  Because of the many difficulties that existed, initiative results were 
difficult to obtain.  Equipment difficulties, including connectivity, caused many of the 
difficulties.  They are presented last because they explain some of the initiative results presented 
before them.   
 
A significant FBE-Kilo outcome was that a large number of experiment conduct and equipment 
improvements were identified.  If the recommendations developed are implemented, a 























No experiment Planning Directive was published for this FBE-Kilo.  It is a necessary document, 
supplying information that outlines responsibilities, functions, and path toward execution of an 
experiment event.  Lack of this document can cloud numbered fleet responsibilities and makes 
“arrangements” for support non-binding and unofficial.   
 
Forward presence by the NWDC staff and key planners was lacking for FBE-Kilo.  Constant 
collaboration with the Fleet is needed during experiment planning.  Uniformed initiative leads 
were present at the Fleet toward the end of the planning process, but many of the other key 
planners did not interact with the Fleet on a substantial basis until they arrived for execution of 
the experiment.   
 
No uniformed Fleet sponsor (uniformed warfighter) for the Sea Strike Initiatives was identified 
for FBE-Kilo for planning and execution.  Not having warfighter sponsorship at the numbered 
fleet level for FBE initiatives severely hampers planning and coordination.      
 
A lack of continuity existed between the development of FBE-K concepts/initiatives involving 
ISR/JFN, and the actual FBE-K planning/implementation for FBE-Kilo.  This discontinuity 
hampered the development of meaningful analytic questions, and the experimental techniques to 
help answer those questions.   
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Experiment #1 – Experiment Planning 
 
• No experiment planning directive.  
 
o Fleet support responsibilities unclear.   
 
• NWDC staff forward presence lacking. 
 
• No uniformed Fleet sponsor for Sea Strike.  
 























Some products required for FBE execution (AODB, MIDB, BSCMs, etc…) were not available.  
The test of the database was inadequate, resulting in errant information for use in the XC4I 
systems used during FBE-Kilo.  
 
 Like most previous FBEs, Kilo suffered from a lack of document control for most of the key 
coordinating documents.  Early in the FBE planning stages, key coordinating documents (and 
their owners), should be identified and implemented an FBE-wide common methodology for the 
cooperative production, review, maintenance, and accessibility.  
 
From the ISR perspective, FBE-Kilo degenerated almost completely into a JFN systems training 
event, largely because participation by C7F Staff and Fleet forces in the planning, preparation, 
and execution was constrained to such an extent as to preclude meaningful ISR and JFN-related 
experimentation.  ISR and JFN related experimentation require numbered Fleet full buy-in and 
participation, particularly the operations (N3) staff.  The focus needs to be on the experiment 
rather than on Fleet training/exercises.  
 
Functional Flow Diagrams (FFDs) should be developed prior to (or in conjunction with) 
Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSDs).  They describe who at which functional nodes need (or 
will provide) what information from (to) whom and why.   
 
The COP in FBE-Kilo did not have explicit “ownership” by any initiative, and was not 
maintained to a level required to support ISR and JFN in support of TST.  Early in the FBE 
planning stages it is necessary to identify who has responsibility for each of the many complex, 
interdependent functions that go into producing an accurate, stable COP from which players will 
be capable of “fighting the experiment”.  
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Experiment #2 – Experiment Preparation  
 
• Some required products not available.   
 
• Lack of document control.  
 
• Lack of Fleet staff participation.  
  
o Both real-world operations and coordination impacts.  
 
• Operational Sequence/Functional Flow Diagrams insufficient.  
 























A combination of events provided warnings that FBE-Kilo could not be carried out as planned.  
These were both personnel shortages to man operational positions and equipment problems.  It is 
not worthwhile, in hindsight, to discuss whether or not the experiment should have been 
conducted.  The experience does indicate that a processes is needed for making a go/no-go 
decision.  
 
Events as large as an FBE naturally build up a momentum toward execution that is almost 
irresistible.  There does not exist a process to decide whether or not to execute an experiment.  A 
definite process is needed that contains the following steps: 
 Examine current status.  
 Determine steps and effort needed to achieve full experiment requirements. 
 Determine what additional can be realistically achieved with resources available.  
 Determine projected status at the time of the experiment.  
 Make a go/no-go decision or proper level of scaling back.  
 
A go-ahead decision requires that the projected status satisfies a pre-set level of personnel and 
system support to carry out an adequate experiment.   
 
A decision would not have to be binary.  It should be possible to scale back the experiment to 
what is achievable.   
  
Implementing such a decision system would require a much better mapping of initiative 
requirements to system and process capabilities than is now available.  
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Experiment #3 – Experiment Go/No-Go  
 
• Significant shortfalls to adequate experiment execution identified prior to 
FBE-Kilo.   
 
• No process exists to decide whether or not to execute an experiment.  
 
o Personnel impacts.   
 
o Equipment impacts.  
  
• A definite process for no-go is needed.  
 
o A process for comparing goals to capabilities would be required.  
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Coalition #1 – Radiant Mercury Guard  
 
• Rule set did not use the latest message format used in ADOCS 
 


















RMG bridged the security boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN and SECRET 
AUSCANUKUS releasable networks.  Due to budget and time constraints for accreditation of 
RMG, a previously approved rule set was used.   
• This rule set did not use the latest message format used in ADOCS.   
o Not all of the data sent through RMG from SECRET US NOFORN ADOCS was 
transferred to the Coalition network.   
• GCCS-M COP was transmitted effectively across RMG.   
 
Radiant Mercury Guard was used to filter and transfer structured messages for FBE-K.  To 
exchange unstructured messages (Chat, e-mail, VoIP, web pages) between U.S. and Coalition 
systems, a human-in-the-loop ‘air gap’ (Sneaker-Net) was utilized.  Information from U.S. was 
reviewed and relevant information for Coalition was transferred across the boundary.   
• Utilized due to the lengthy approval process for an automatic filtering system.   
• Using Sneaker-Net, a direct transfer of chat messages was not maintained.   
• Delay in message transfer was not the major issue for this system.   
• E-mail volume did not increase the delay of chat message transfer.   
 
The air gap between the Coalition IRC net and FBE IRC net systems: 
• Introduced latencies of typically about seven minutes.  
• Was manpower intensive to pass information across the gap.   
• An automated filter (e.g. ISSE Guard) is required. 
 
The transfer of web page information was complicated and a significant amount of time was 
used for this process.   
• As with Chat, the reliance on web portals to provide access to information necessitates a 
better solution to the problem of integrating coalition partners. 
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 The most significant issue encountered by Coalition was the absence of a clearly defined, 
tactical level, step-by-step process for the command and control coordination of fires.   
• Creation of a step-by-step process for fires coordination part way through the FTX was 
too late.  
o Discussion was focused on understanding processes and not on improving it.  
• Operator confusion at ANZAC and at the Coalition Cell was high, which lead to lengthy 
chat and VoIP communications for clarification.   
 
The lack of SOPs for the fires coordination process, together with the continued presence and 
efforts to resolve ADOCS integration issues essentially undermined all unit and higher-level 
training. The result was the on-going confusion experienced by the Coalition team in the fires 
coordination process.   
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Coalition #2 – Coalition Fires TTP  
 
• No defined tactical C2 process for coordinated Fires.  
 
o Operator confusion at ANZAC and Coalition Cell.   
 
o Work focused on understanding process.  
 





















The RMG and ANZAC ADOCS interface apparently had problems.   
• The ANZAC ADOCS operators attributed coordination blocks defaulting to white to 
RMG.   
o Resulted in ANZAC transmitting, by IRC, to the Blue Ridge desired coordination 
block actions that were inserted in the ANZ coordination block by a Blue Ridge 
ADOCS operator. 
• No ANZAC GISRC target nominations were found in the ADOCS FBE net servers. 
ANZAC GISRC target nominations were made.  
o The reason why these nominations were not seen in the FBE net ADOCS is 
unknown.   
 
Although the majority of ADOCS problems noted during the final OSD testing were resolved, 
other issues became apparent during experiment execution.   
• Full integration of ADOCS across the boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN and 
SECRET AUSCANUKUS releasable networks was not achieved.   
o Delays in the updates to Coalition ADOCS from Blue Ridge were unacceptable.  
• Post experiment review of the network architecture revealed the cause of the update 
delays to be a constraint in the ADOCS server network and the underlying protocol used 
for ADOCS communications 
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Coalition #3 – ADOCS and RMG 
 
• Full integration of ADOCS across RMG not achieved.  
 
o ANZAC GISRC nominations not found in FBE ADOCS.   
 
o Nominations forwarded by IRC Chat.   
 






















FBE-K demonstrated that TES-N has a number of powerful tools (some of which are unique to 
TES-N) that potentially could be of great use to Naval forces involved in Time Sensitive 
Targeting (TST).   Unfortunately, FBE-K reconfirmed that TES-N remains a very complex and 
developmentally immature system, with extremely limited interfaces to other C4I systems that 
are critical to TST.   Major advances are needed for the following:  
• Interface with ADOCS or other TST Command and Control system 
• Interface with GCCS-M 
• Interface to PTW and any external target folder applications 
• Handling of ISR video and platform/sensor telemetry 
SCI COMINT analysis tools and SCI-to-GENSER connectivity via ISSE Guard  
 
The presented target detection and identification problem from simulated video was 
unsatisfactory and unrealistic due both to the nature of the simulated imagery and TES-N 
processing of the imagery.  This is an equipment problem identified elsewhere, but it also 
indicates the need for additional human factor engineering so that efficient usage of imagery can 
occur.  Specific problems include: 
• Video quality was poor and the displayed target coordinates could not be read  
• The chipped images were of low resolution and unsuitable for georefinement. 
• TES-N could not process the telemetry data that accompanied the imagery.  This slowed 
and complicated the target nomination process. 
 
TES-N shouldn’t be used in further TST experimentation until improvements are made in the 
above areas.  In its present state of development, experimentation results focus on system needs 
rather than TST process.   
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Fires #1 – TES-N 
 
• Powerful system of potential great use for Navy TST.  
 
• Developmentally immature. 
 
o Limited interfaces to other TST C4I systems.   
 
o Handling of ISR video and platform sensor telemetry.  
 
o SCI analysis tools and SCI to GENSER connectivity.  
 




















Systems engineering of a TST C2 System should look beyond the extensive typing input-output 
approach in ADOCS, and its matrix displays, for TST coordination status.  It became apparent 
during FBE-K that many of the C2 processes in ADOCS are complicated, difficult to define 
unambiguously, challenging to train to, and highly dependent on internet chat and voice 
elaboration.  FBE-K raised the question if the ADOCS approach is the right concept to be 
applied to Joint TST.  Some of the functionality built into air defense command and control 
systems, such as AEGIS or AWACS should be examined for applicability to ground TSTs.    
 
The TST C2 System needs a TST prioritization scheme that takes into account both the 
importance of the target and the amount of time that it will be available for engagement.  There 
is a non-mandatory block in ADOCS for target priority.  Some units made their own inputs there. 
 Most didn’t.  There are static priority categories listed in the CJTF TST matrix, but those 
numbers don’t take into account the amount of time available to engage the target.   
 
The TST C2 System needs to explicitly tell operators which tasks are theirs to perform and their 
priority.  The ADOCS approach of one big table for MISSION FIRES COORDINATION and 
one big table for the JOINT TIME SENSITIVE TARGETS MISSIONS is not well engineered 
for people performing required tasks.   
• JFMCC, the JFACC, the JFACC TST cell, X-Ray Papa, and others need to distinguish 
which targets on the list are their responsibility and which are someone else’s.   
• They also need to see if there is some action for them to take.   
• They have no list of pending actions.   
• There is no prioritization of actions waiting to be performed.    
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Fires #2 – ADOCS for TST C2 
 
• Extensive input/output typing cumbersome.   
 
o Need an AEGIS or AWACS type methodology.    
 
• Target prioritization scheme needed.  
 
• Pending actions notification needed. 
 





















By the end of FTX, all of the simulated Blue ISR assets active in M&S were simultaneously 
displayed on BLR’s GCCS-M COP with appropriate labels (e.g., two ISR UUVs, two Predator 
UAVs, one U-2).  This was the first time that this has happened in an FBE.   
 
Manual Contacts were to be transferred to GCCS-M for “tracking” and SA.  The objective was 
for the TST nomination analyst to not only create an ATI.ATR, but to then use TES-N’s 
rudimentary interface to GCCS-M to input the target into the COP as a track, for the situational 
awareness of ALCON, and to assist (theoretically) in the “tracking” of the TST while waiting for 
it to be engaged.  
• The TES-N output to GCCS-M only worked for two days only, and at the same 
rudimentary and suboptimal level at which it was working for MC02/FBE-J. 
• Even with the new TES-N version 5.0, there was no improvement in TES-N’s ability to 
output to GCCS-M from what was used in MC02/FBE-J.   
 
In addition to TES-N’s rudimentary capability to send “Manual Contacts” to GCCS-M, COP 
tracks can also be sent from GCCS-M to TES-N.  The objective of attempting to do so was to 
provide a richer context of contacts, tracks, Blue ISR asset locations, etc., in TES-N for the 
analysts trying to find and fix TSTs. 
• TES-N’s incoming “Message and Data Log” showed a good number of incoming tracks 
from GCCS-M, but those tracks did not appear to be parsing into the TES-N ITD.  
• When GCCS-M tracks coming into TES-N were able to be brought up on the ITD they 
appeared in their proper locations but the symbols do not have any labels associated with 
them (e.g., no track names), making them all but functionally useless to the TST team.   
 
Post-experiment analysis of logged data showed that different information appeared in GCCS-M, 
ADOCS, and TES-N.  In effect, this means there was never a “Common” Operational Picture.  
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Fires #3 – Common Operational Picture 
 
• All M&S produced assets displayed in GCCS-M, first time achieved.   
 
• TES-N could not output to GCCS-M.  
 
• GCCS-M to TES-N tracks appeared, but with no labels. 
 
• COP not maintained as required to support ISR and JFN for TST.  
  




















The ADOCS Managers exhibit inconsistencies and latencies that at times inhibit and 
occasionally defeat the TST engagement process. Specific problems observed include:  
• Missions appear in some ADOCS workstations but not others. 
• The coordination block status can be different at different ADOCS workstations. 
• The mission status (e.g. fired or not fired) may be different in the Mission Coordination: 
Fires and JTST Managers. For the JFMCC/XP the ADOCS Mission Coordination: Fires 
Manager is the primary tool for prosecution of TSTs. The JTST Manager is a 
collaboration tool to provide TST situational awareness to all Components.   
• The Mission Coordination: Fires and JTST Mission Histories can be inconsistent. 
• Mission status as determined from the Mission History may not agree with the status in 
the Mission Coordination: Fires display. 
• Some events are missing from the Mission Histories. 
• There are multiple examples in the Mission Histories of coordination blocks being 
changed from colors that they do not hold.  Two possible explanations for this are:  there 
are events changing the block status that are missing from the Mission History log or the 
changes implemented at one ADOCS workstation were not received at a second 
workstation that subsequently acted on the block status. 
 
For time-critical tasks, the TST C2 System color-coding should be standardized and intuitive so 
that operators will respond predictably and quickly.  Color-coding is critical to using ADOCS as 
a coordination tool.  Operators ended up inventing a color scheme for FBE-K, which is non-
standard because there are no standards.  This isn’t merely a training or doctrine issue.  Because 
color-coding is being used for coordination of time-critical tasks, the colors or symbols used 
should be engineered to be much more intuitive than they are.  Ideally, as intuitive as real traffic 
lights so that people will respond predictably, and quickly. 
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Fires #4 – ADOCS Managers  
 
• ADOCS managers have inconsistencies and latencies.  
 
o Inhibit and defeat TST engagement process.   
 
o Some events missing from histories.  
 



















Frequent and serious departures from the Fires TTP were, in part, stimulated by player confusion 
or misunderstanding regarding procedures and by the ADOCS displays latencies and 
inconsistencies.  Departures of the following nature were observed in ADOCS coordination 
block actions: 
• Required TTP actions were not taken. 
• Actions taken but not by the responsible node. 
• Actions taken that are undefined by the TTP and hence meaningless. 
• Actions executed in the wrong sequence. 
• Actions executed in such a way as to indicate that the actions were taken to force the 
engagement to a conclusion rather than as a result of a realistic response to the simulated 
engagement. 
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Fires #5 – Fires TTP 
 
• Frequent, and serious departures from Fires TTP.  
 
o Player confusion.   
 
o ADOCS latencies and inconsistencies.  
 




















The Xray Papa cell was an excellent test case for familiarization of the Time Critical Targeting 
Functionality (TCTF) Afloat concept to the fleet.  TCTF is a USAF program that outlines the C2 
requirements and systems for conducting TCT operations.  In support of JCC and JCC (Afloat), 
the USN needs to further refine this concept to support both joint and maritime forces from a flag 
configured platform.  TCTF Afloat should be used as a starting point for future Sea Strike 
initiatives. 
 
The Xray Papa cell identified a time sensitive targeting gap at the maritime component level that 
needs to be addressed. JFMCC’s conduct of broad scale TST operations that are integrated with 
other components is beyond the traditional role of the Bravo Papa.  A staff function at the 
operational level (JFMCC) that supports TST prosecution is required.  Experimentation should 
integrate this development with the TCTF effort described above to help identify maritime TST 
command and control requirements of the future. 
 




• Xray Papa good organization for TST Afloat testing.  
 
o Adaptation of Air Force TCT.    
 
o Maritime targeting gap identified.  
 
























Compared to other recent FBEs the objective data provided for this experiment was deficient in 
quantity and quality.  In particular: 
• The provided TES-N covered only a few days of the CPX and was reformatted so as to 
be unusable. 
• No GISRC data were provided. 
• The ADOCS JTST manager did not set capture mission histories for the last two days of 
the experiment 
• After acquiring excellent mensuration data from RRF in FBE-J, FBE-K reverted to PTW 
which has never provided usable data.  
• The JSAF event data logged in SNN did not include Fire events.  There were gaps in the 
JSAF event data and/or many fire commands did not reach JSAF. 
 
If workflow or timelines are to be a part of evaluating TST capabilities, adequate electronic data 
must be available from all systems that are part of the TST process, including simulations.  
Application of the following measures would do much to improve the collected objective data: 
1. Require for system participation in an experiment that the system incorporate tools that 
log, identify and timestamp all significant operator actions.   
2. Require data logging in formats that can be easily manipulated for analysis.  
3. Include as an objective in pre-experiment integration testing the validation of the data 
logging applications.   
Such a program will require funding be provided to system “owners”. 
• Provide the funding needed for the data capture program. 
 
 




• Less electronic data was available than in other FBEs.   
 
o No TES-N, GISRC, or PTW data produced for FTX.  
 
• Cannot develop TST workflow.  
 
o Only 9 of 29 required data elements produced.  
 
• Objective data requirements program necessary for experiment success.  
 

























USS Blue Ridge has a 10 mb switch backbone that is connected via 155 mb links.  This, along 
with inconsistent network card setting hindered ADOCS use during the FBE.  Standard, 
shipboard LAN configurations that support ADOCS need to be established.  This applies to 
switch, link, and network card settings on these machines.  Hardware limitations may require 
platforms to set up multi-server configurations to reduce the effect of less modern network 
backbones.  ISNS ADOCS standards need to be set prior to an experiment install and configured 
accordingly. 
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Technology  #1 – Shipboard Systems 
 
• Incompatibilities existed between shipboard systems and ADOCS  
 
o Backbone characteristics. 
 
o Inconsistent network card settings.   
 
Need to establish LAN configurations that support ADOCS. 
 
o Switch.   
 
o Link.  
 























Many recommended changes to ADOCS were compiled during the FBE.  ADOCS changes are 
indicative of command and control capability requirements that currently exist.  Software 
improvements are needed for: 
1.  Ability to pair a target to an ITO mission via a button 
2.  Ability to highlight targets in Fires and JTST Managers when changes have 
occurred…alert? 
3.  A configurable Fires Manager (within the ADOCS GUI). 
4.  Add “hour glass” icon to ADOCS to display system working. 
5.  TST supported CDR indicator in JTST Manager. 
6.  Hot link to ROE url. 
7.  Hot link to TST priorities url. 
8.  Creation of a Combat Assessment Manager and removal of that function from the 
Fires/JTST managers. 
9.  Hot link to target folder url.  
  Hardware 
1.  Two (2) displays for ADOCS users that are doing target development and 
coordination 
 
ATI.ATR target nomination to between TES-N and ADOCS was incomplete and not viable for 
usage.  Inconsistencies existed in how target nominations were handled by ADOCS and how 
they were showing up in the TST Target Folder server.  The fault was in both TES-N and 
ADOCS, with inconsistencies in target line usage.  ADOCS turned around an ATI.ATR with 
fields out of order and truncated.   This problem needs to be fixed.  It was identified over 2 years 
ago and is still a problem.  This should be completed in the lab rather than waiting for another 
experiment. 
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Technology #2 – ADOCS Recommendations 
 
• Improvements needed to support C2 requirements. 
 
• ADOCS software changes.  
 
o User interfaces.  
 
o Alerting.  
 
o Links to other information.  
 




















ELINT/ESM was sent from various M&S sources to the TDDS Network Management Center, to 
be put onto the TDDS broadcast, with receipt of the broadcast on BLR via organic means, and 
processing of exercise/experiment ELINT using the GALE software in TES-N.   
• Successful receipt was achieved  
• TES-N GALE was unable to receive, process, and display TACELINT messages from 
ISR UUV that reported an LOB.   
 
COMINT injects were sent via SI broadcast to BLR and received by a COMINT analyst using 
TES-N.   
• COMINT injects were received only on SCI GCCS-M, as that is the way the BLR SCI 
architecture was configured.   
• The COMINT analyst at the SCI GCCS-M received the injects as emails, printed them, 
and sneaker-netted them to the TST team manning TES-N terminals.   
• TES-N does not have any true COMINT analysis tools (as does SCI GCCS-M). 
• TES-N Information Support Server Environment Guard was non-functional on BLR.   
 
Replication of TES-N’s Cross-INT database was attempted to both ISRM (CPX) and the ESX 
RTC (FTX), but with very limited success. 
• During CPX, Cross-INT was not replicated to ISRM due to ISRM instability problems. 
• During FTX, Cross-INT was replicated to ESX RTC.  
• Target Nominations created in TES-N are not replicated to ISRM / RTC.   
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Technology #3 – JFN Recommendations 
 
• JFN had mixed success supporting TST operations.  
 
o ELINT mixed success. 
 
o COMINT unsuccessful. 
 



















The TST nomination analyst used TES-N to create a target nomination message (in USMTF 
“ATI.ATR” format), and to send that nomination message (via SMTP) to the ADOCS server on 
BLR, and to the TST Target Folder server at NWDC.  Considerable effort was required to get all 
systems interoperating correctly, TES-N LAN, ship’s LAN/Exchange server, FBE-K WAN and 
Exchange servers, ADOCS mail server.  Once set up properly the process worked well.   
 
The objective was to attach images (e.g., video “chips” showing the TST) to the outgoing target 
nomination for aim-point refinement, and the nomination sent simultaneously to ADOCS, TST 
Target Folder, and PTW.   
• The version of PTW used on BLR could not receive and parse ATI.ATR messages (i.e., 
did not have the DTMS software used in MC02/FBE-J).    
• TES-N does not allow images to be attached to outgoing ATI.ATRs.   
• All images captured, chipped, and saved (as NITF) in TES-N had to be manually 
transferred (FTP) to PTW.   
• The PTW operator would pull up the images and conduct aimpoint refinement, then save 
the images (as both JPEG and NITF) to a shared directory on the BLR IT-21 LAN.  
 
The TST nomination analyst was to attach images to the outgoing target nomination so that the 
TST Target Folder server could add the image(s) to the TST’s target folder.   
• TST Target Folder server worked well and the NWDC TST Target Folder server 
application proved to be a simple but powerful prototype.   
• The new version 5.0 of TES-N software still cannot attach images to ATI.ATRs.   
  
Because “DIOP” is only for the transfer of U-2 imagery that is being (or has just been) directly 
downlinked, other file types must be exchanged between TES-N and remotes like ISRM and 
RTCs using standard means such as FTP and SMTP.   
• FTP and SMTP worked well.   
• RTC Lites worked, with varying difficulty.  RTC Lite at NUWC was fairly easy to get 
up, configuring the others was difficult.  
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Technology #4 – JFN Recommendations 2 
 
• JFN had mixed success supporting TST operations.  
 
o Target nomination messages.   
 
o Image management.  
 






















The stated JFN objective was to determine the contribution of JFN to TST prosecution.  In order 
to determine JFN-unique contributions, or synergistic JFN effects, a baseline of performance 
without JFN is needed.  Such a baseline requires using the same C2 structure and information 
processes as were used in the experiment.  Baseline information is not available.    
 
Equipment problems prevented testing end-to-end JFN performance.  Target nominations could 
not be passed directly from TES-N to ADOCS, or directly to ISRM.  FBEnet was not operational 
due to Ku Band switching problems in Hawaii.  The result was that many information paths that 
are crucial for realizing JFN potential were not operational.   
 
Because of the collection of equipment and manning problems the only comprehensive test of 
JFN that could be made was of the TES-N component in the JIC.   
 
The basic objectives of this initiative could not be met.  Results that could be derived are 
indications of JFN potential for TST processes within a JIC.  
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CPX PR#2 - Achievement of JFN Contributions to TST Objective 
 
 
• No baseline without JFN available, cannot perform an adequate test.  
 
• Equipment difficulties prevented adequate testing of JFN capabilities. 
 
o Lack of TES-N to ADOCS connectivity.   
 
o Failure of FBEnet.  
 






















Image analysis and processing worked well, essentially creating/producing an efficient assembly 
line.  Operators, with little training, were able to explore images and make both analysis and 
processing decisions fairly quickly.  (Difficulties encountered because of the simulation are 
covered in a subsequent Principal Result (in CPX Report).)   
 
An important capability was for the image analyst to be able to direct tactical sensors.  The 
analyst worked through a sensor manager and the process worked moderately well.  There were 
difficulties with this sensor control, as implemented, in that there was no direct provision for 
sensor control at the analyst's terminal.  A direct link that the analyst can use without 
interrupting, nor losing sight of, imagery is needed.   
 
There were problems with imagery information content.  Transmission of aim points and Lat-




CPX PR#3 - TES-N Capabilities    
 
 
• Works well for IMINT exploitation.   
 
o Video screener a major factor in closing TST timeline.  
 
o Directing tactical imagery assets.   
 
• Inability to drop validated aim points a major drawback.  
 





















With the exception of the team leader, the TES-N operators were totally unfamiliar with the 
system and with TST processes.  Their training was on IPB processes.  Thus, they were being 
introduced to both a new system and a new process.  In spite of this they were enthusiastic about 
TES-N.   
 
They felt the system was easy to learn and that the graphical user interface (GUI) layout and 
methods of use were fairly intuitive.   
 
The system layout was such that a terminal could be used for image screening, image analysis, or 
nomination.  This allowed those operations to be exchanged or shared.  Having multiple 
functions resident within one machine produced manpower savings as a result of increased work 




CPX PR#5 - Operator’s Acceptance of TES-N 
 
 
• In spite of lack of familiarity, operators recognized the system’s potential 
for improving performance and efficiency 
 
• User-friendly and easy to learn.  
 






















CPX was used to provide TES-N operator training in an operational context.  But, the simulation 
used for the experiment presented unrealistic renderings of battlefield objects.  This lack of 
realism interfered with operator performance and therefore with their training.  In addition to low 
fidelity, the presentation of the battlefield was such that image analysts could not distinguish 
different instances of the same object type.  This produced a situation where operators were 
moving back and forth between objects to figure out which was which, interfering with training. 
  
 
A realistic simulation designed specifically for TES-N training is needed.  
 
Operators did not have an understanding of the TST process.  Training on the TST process was 
being conducted at the same time as how to do it.  Training on the full TST process is needed as 




CPX PR#6 - TES-N Training Issues 
 
 
• Current simulation hinders training. 
 
o Lack of reality interfered with all aspects of training and performance.  
 
o Simulation designed specifically for TES-N training needed.  
 




















This principal finding is derived from the CPX recommendation in this reports Section H2.5. 
 
CPX was an unusual situation in that there were major changes in the experiment structure (e.g. 
lack of a JFACC Forward) shortly before the experiment, and then personnel shortfalls due to 
BLUE RIDGE departing early for the typhoon.  However, it is not unusual in FBEs to have 
equipment and process changes occur right up to the beginning of an experiment.  Such changes 
have many effects, such as: 
Disrupt data capture and analysis plans.  
Prevent capturing data required to meet Initiative objectives.    
Cannot provide adequate training on added systems and processes.  
Cannot adequately test added systems.  
 
It is recommended that an experiment be "locked down" four months prior to its start.  An 
exception would be when there is a series of events that includes an equipment testing LOE prior 
to the field experiment.  In this case, the LOE should occur six weeks prior to the operational 




CPX Recommendation H2.5 - Experiment Planning Stability 
 
• Last minute changes interfere with experiment execution. 
 
o Addition of equipment.  
 
o Process modification or changes.  
 




6.3 COALITION INITIATIVE FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS 
 
Radiant Mercury Guard (RMG) is a network security tool that was employed as a message filter 
between U.S. and Australian classified networks during FBE-Kilo.  RMG scans message headers 
for key words and filters (does not pass) messages that contain information deemed inappropriate 
by a predetermined rule set.  If RMG does not recognize a message type, it will not be passed.   
 
 
6.3.1 ADOCS Network Messages  
 
The ADOCS network, as deployed during FBE-Kilo, included the capability to generate and 
exchange prototype messages that could not be recognized by RMG.  This was a known 
condition at the outset of the experiment.  It was very detrimental to the objectives of the 




6.3.2 Coalition Fires TTP  
 
 The most significant issue encountered by Coalition was the absence of a clearly defined, 
tactical level, step-by-step process for the command and control coordination of fires.   
• Creation of a step-by-step process for fires coordination part way through the FTX was 
too late.  
o Discussion was focused on understanding processes and not on improving it.  
• Operator confusion at ANZAC and at the Coalition Cell was high, which lead to lengthy 
chat and VoIP communications for clarification.   
 
The lack of SOPs for the fires coordination process, together with the continued presence and 
efforts to resolve ADOCS integration issues essentially undermined all unit and higher-level 
training. The result was the on-going confusion experienced by the Coalition team in the fires 
coordination process.   
 
 
6.3.3 ADOCS Integration  
 
Although the majority of ADOCS problems noted during the final OSD testing were resolved, 
other issues became apparent during experiment execution.   
• Full integration of ADOCS across the boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN and 
SECRET AUSCANUKUS releasable networks was not achieved.   
o Delays in the updates to Coalition ADOCS from Blue Ridge were unacceptable.  
• Post experiment review of the network architecture revealed the cause of the update 
delays to be a constraint in the ADOCS server network and the underlying protocol used 





6.3.4 RMG Rule Set  
 
RMG bridged the security boundary between the SECRET US NOFORN and SECRET 
AUSCANUKUS releasable networks.  Due to budget and time constraints for accreditation of 
RMG, a previously approved rule set was used.   
• This rule set did not use the latest message format used in ADOCS.   
o Not all of the data sent through RMG from SECRET US NOFORN ADOCS was 
transferred to the Coalition network.   
• GCCS-M COP was transmitted effectively across RMG.   
 
 
6.3.5 Chat, VoIP, and Sneaker-Net 
 
Radiant Mercury Guard was used to filter and transfer structured messages for FBE-K.  To 
exchange unstructured messages (Chat, e-mail, VoIP, web pages) between U.S. and Coalition 
systems, a human-in-the-loop ‘air gap’ (Sneaker-Net) was utilized.  Information from U.S. was 
reviewed and relevant information for Coalition was transferred across the boundary.   
• Utilized due to the lengthy approval process for an automatic filtering system.   
• Using Sneaker-Net, a direct transfer of chat messages was not maintained.   
• Delay in message transfer was not the major issue for this system.   
• E-mail volume did not increase the delay of chat message transfer.   
 
Transcribing messages between the XP cell on Blue Ridge and the ANZAC command team in 
Fern Hill led to some ambiguity in communication.   
 
The air gap between the Coalition IRC net and FBE IRC net systems: 
• Introduced latencies of typically about seven minutes.  
• Was manpower intensive to pass information across the gap.   
• An automated filter (e.g. ISSE Guard) is required. 
 
VoIP was of high quality after network issues were resolved.   
• VoIP was effectively utilized for technical troubleshooting and demonstrated a potential 
for use in tactical coordination.   
 
The transfer of web page information was complicated and a significant amount of time was 
used for this process.   
• As with Chat, the reliance on web portals to provide access to information necessitates a 
better solution to the problem of integrating coalition partners. 
 
 
6.3.6 Interface Problems  
 
The RMG and ANZAC ADOCS interface apparently had problems.   
• The ANZAC ADOCS operators attributed coordination blocks defaulting to white to 
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RMG.   
o Resulted in ANZAC transmitting, by IRC, to the Blue Ridge desired coordination 
block actions that were inserted in the ANZ coordination block by a Blue Ridge 
ADOCS operator. 
• No ANZAC GISRC target nominations were found in the ADOCS FBE net servers. 
ANZAC GISRC target nominations were made.  
o The reason why these nominations were not seen in the FBE net ADOCS is 
unknown.   
 
 
6.4 FIRES INITIATIVES FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS  
 
Findings obtained for the Fires Initiatives are qualitative rather than quantitative, and broad 
rather than specific.  FBE-Kilo introduced the use of JFN, including TES-N, to Seventh Fleet 
personnel.  Training on some of the component systems was conducted and Fleet personnel 
acceptance of the systems, and the possibilities they presented for improved operations, was 
documented.  Indications of possible TST process improvement were obtained rather than a 
determination of what process and system use does and does not work.  Definitive 
recommendations for needed system and process improvements before JFN can achieve the 
needed level of performance for TST have been identified.     
 
 
6.4.1 System Improvements  
 
FBE-Kilo produced a significant number of recommendations for system improvement.  A 
number of these had already been identified in former experiments.  Whether confirming/ 
identifying needed improvements justified the time and expense of this FBE is an unanswered 
question.  It is clear that doing another experiment without these improvements would not be 
justified.   
 Recommendation:  Make the identified JFN system improvements before conducting 
another TST field experiment with this system and/or its components.   
 
 
6.4.2 Tactical Exploitation System – Navy    
 
Needed Improvements   FBE-K demonstrated that TES-N has a number of powerful tools (some 
of which are unique to TES-N) that potentially could be of great use to Naval forces involved in 
Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).   Unfortunately, FBE-K reconfirmed that TES-N remains a very 
complex and developmentally immature system, with extremely limited interfaces to other C4I 
systems that are critical to TST.   Major advances are needed for the following:  
• Interface with ADOCS or other TST Command and Control system 
• Interface with GCCS-M 
• Interface to PTW and any external target folder applications 
• Handling of ISR video and platform/sensor telemetry 
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• SCI COMINT analysis tools and SCI-to-GENSER connectivity via ISSE Guard 
 
 
Target Detection and ID   The presented target detection and identification problem from 
simulated video was unsatisfactory and unrealistic due both to the nature of the simulated 
imagery and TES-N processing of the imagery.  This is an equipment problem identified 
elsewhere, but it also indicates the need for additional human factor engineering so that efficient 
usage of imagery can occur.  Specific problems include: 
• Video quality was poor and the displayed target coordinates could not be read  
• The chipped images were of low resolution and unsuitable for georefinement. 
• TES-N could not process the telemetry data that accompanied the imagery.  This slowed 
and complicated the target nomination process. 
 
 
6.4.3  ADOCS Managers 
 
The ADOCS Managers exhibit inconsistencies and latencies that at times inhibit and 
occasionally defeat the TST engagement process. Specific problems observed include:  
• Missions appear in some ADOCS workstations but not others. 
• The coordination block status can be different at different ADOCS workstations. 
• The mission status (e.g. fired or not fired) may be different in the Mission Coordination: 
Fires and JTST Managers. For the JFMCC/XP the ADOCS Mission Coordination: Fires 
Manager is the primary tool for prosecution of TSTs. The JTST Manager is a 
collaboration tool to provide TST situational awareness to all Components.   
• The Mission Coordination: Fires and JTST Mission Histories can be inconsistent. 
• Mission status as determined from the Mission History may not agree with the status in 
the Mission Coordination: Fires display. 
• Some events are missing from the Mission Histories. 
• There are multiple examples in the Mission Histories of coordination blocks being 
changed from colors that they do not hold.  Two possible explanations for this are:  there 
are events changing the block status that are missing from the Mission History log or the 
changes implemented at one ADOCS workstation were not received at a second 
workstation that subsequently acted on the block status. 
 
 
6.4.4  Fires TTP 
 
Frequent and serious departures from the Fires TTP were, in part, stimulated by player confusion 
or misunderstanding regarding procedures and by the ADOCS displays latencies and 
inconsistencies.  Departures of the following nature were observed in ADOCS coordination 
block actions: 
• Required TTP actions were not taken. 
• Actions taken but not by the responsible node. 
• Actions taken that are undefined by the TTP and hence meaningless. 
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• Actions executed in the wrong sequence. 
• Actions executed in such a way as to indicate that the actions were taken to force the 




6.4.5 Common Operational Picture   
 
A common operational picture is non-existent.  In FBE-K a COP was not maintained to a level 
required to support ISR and JFN in support of TST.  Different pictures always existed in GCCS-
M, ADOCS, and TES-N. 
 
 
6.4.6   ADOCS as the TST Command and Control System 
 
Alternative Approaches to Time Sensitive C2   Systems engineering of a TST C2 System should 
look beyond the extensive typing input-output approach in ADOCS, and its matrix displays, for 
TST coordination status.  It became apparent during FBE-K that many of the C2 processes in 
ADOCS are  
• complicated,  
• difficult to define unambiguously,  
• challenging to train to, and  
• highly dependent on internet chat and voice elaboration.   
ADOCS is an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), but the challenges 
evident in FBE-K raise the question if the ADOCS approach is the right concept to be applied to 
Joint Time Sensitive Targeting.  Because of the time-sensitivity of the targets and because it is at 
the tactical level of war, some of the functionality built into air defense command and control 
systems, such as AEGIS or AWACS should be examined for applicability to ground TSTs.    
 
Target Prioritization   The TST C2 System needs a TST prioritization scheme that takes into 
account both the importance of the target and the amount of time that it will be available for 
engagement.  There is a non-mandatory block in ADOCS for target priority.  Some units made 
their own inputs there.  Most didn’t.   
• Procedures are needed for who is supposed to enter a priority.  Most important are:  
• What does the priority mean?   
• How is it to be determined?   
There are static priority categories listed in the CJTF TST matrix, but those numbers don’t take 
into account the amount of time available to engage the target.   
There are available simple mathematical models (formulas) for prioritization based on both 
target utility and probability that it will remain engageable for some period of time (one simple 
approach looks like economic discounting).  Target prioritization needs to be addressed in TST 
command and control. 
 
Pending Tasks    The TST C2 System needs to explicitly tell operators which tasks are theirs to 
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perform and their priority.  The ADOCS approach of one big table for MISSION FIRES 
COORDINATION and one big table for the JOINT TIME SENSITIVE TARGETS MISSIONS 
is not well engineered for people performing required tasks.   
• JFMCC, the JFACC, the JFACC TST cell, X-Ray Papa, and others need to distinguish 
which targets on the list are their responsibility and which are someone else’s.   
o This requires them to scan the list doing mental vertical sorting.  
• They also need to see if there is some action for them to take.   
o This requires them to scan the table doing mental horizontal sorting.   
• They have no list of pending actions.   
• There is no prioritization of actions waiting to be performed.    
 
TSTs That Move, Re-Position, and Change Status   The TST C2 System needs functionality for 
automatically and unambiguously keeping track of targets that move, re-position, and change 
status.  ADOCS needs functionality added for targets that may move (allowing a track number to 
move with them so long as they are held by sensors), i.e., dynamic target position information 
rather than static data fields.  Concurrently functionality is needed for automatic updating and 
alerting of decision makers and engagers.  This shouldn’t rely on voice or chat or typed-in 
remarks.   
 
ADOCS functionality is also needed for other critical changes in target status, such as missiles 
transitioning from stowed to erected positions.  This may require dynamic updating of target 
description, and certainly needs automatic updating and alerting of decision makers and 
engagers.   
 
Human Systems Integration for Color-coding   For time-critical tasks, the TST C2 System color-
coding should be standardized and intuitive so that operators will respond predictably and 
quickly.  Color-coding is critical to using ADOCS as a coordination tool.  Operators ended up 
inventing a color scheme for FBE-K, which is non-standard because there are no standards.  This 
isn’t merely a training or doctrine issue.  Because color-coding is being used for coordination of 
time-critical tasks, the colors or symbols used should be engineered to be much more intuitive 
than they are.  Ideally, as intuitive as real traffic lights so that people will respond predictably, 
and quickly. 
 
Human Systems Integration for Symbol-coding   For time-critical tasks, the TST C2 System use 
of symbol-coding to supplement color-coding should be automated, streamlined, or eliminated.  
The coding scheme developed for ADOCS blocks includes an X in some blocks on top of the 
color.  This scheme now requires two distinctly different sets of actions, one to set the color, and 
another sequence of actions to add the X when needed.  This is not as streamlined and error-
resistant as a time-critical process should be.    
 
IRC Chat Entries   The event timeline IRC entries sometimes show detailed reporting regarding 
the color block changes that are being made to the ADOCS display.  This is attributable, in part, 
to uncertainty among some participants about the TST procedures and, in part, to the lack of 
confidence in ADOCS to accurately reflect, in a timely manner, the operator block actions to all 
ADOCS workstations.   
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• These detailed communications result in an expansion of the engagement timeline and, in 
effect, make ADOCS redundant.   
• All the coordination actions appear to be occurring in chat and ADOCS becomes 
unnecessary.   
 
Target Georefinement   Target georefinement was not played as an integral part of this 
experiment.  In previous FBEs ADOCS was the tool that requested, displayed and logged 




6.4.7  Equipment Casualty Modes   
 
The TST C2 System needs to have reliable alternative modes of operation and more graceful 
degradation than is currently available with open-architecture LANs and internet-style networks. 
Most legacy combat systems have casualty modes.  Some have several levels of casualty modes. 
 There is a risk that the down-time and network problems encountered in FBE-K may not be 
atypical of what might occur in the real world with leading edge technologies, pushing the 
envelope, built on open-architecture machines and networks. 
 
 
6.5 DOTMLPF IMPACTS  
 
No DOTMLPF impacts can be deduced from this experiment.   
 
6.5.1 Hardware Program Impacts 
 
There are recommendations contained in this report that have an impact on hardware system 
program management.  System performance and compatibility issues are hindering obtaining 
operational benefits that should be realized from some of the new systems.  Some of these issues 
are long standing and should be addressed before further experimentation with them is carried 
out.  Details are contained throughout the report, particularly in Sections 6.8, 6.9, 6.11, and 
Appendices C and E.   
 
 
6.6 EXPERIMENT PLANNING LESSONS LEARNED  
 
Planning Directive   No experiment Planning Directive was published for this FBE-Kilo.  It is a 
necessary document, supplying information that outlines responsibilities, functions, and path 
toward execution of an experiment event.  Lack of this document can cloud fleet numbered 
responsibilities and makes “arrangements” for support non-binding and unofficial.   
Recommendation:  Use this instrument in every FBE and LOE that is conducted. 
 
Forward FBEs and NWDC Fleet Presence   Forward presence by the NWDC staff and key 
planners was lacking for FBE-Kilo.  Constant collaboration with the Fleet is needed during 
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experiment planning.  Uniformed initiative leads were present at the Fleet toward the end of the 
planning process, but many of the other key planners did not interact with the Fleet on a 
substantial basis until they arrived for execution of the experiment.   
Recommendation:  Insure key planners are forward often in the planning process and 
hold the Final Planning Conference at the Fleet's home location.   
 
Fleet Interface and Fleet Initiative Sponsors   No uniformed Fleet sponsor (uniformed 
warfighter) for the Sea Strike Initiatives was identified for FBE-Kilo for planning and execution. 
 Not having warfighter sponsorship at the numbered fleet level for FBE initiatives severely 
hampers planning and coordination.      
Recommendation:  Do not examine initiatives that do not have proper uniformed 
sponsorship within the numbered Fleet staff. 
 
Continuity Between Concept Development and Experiment Implementation   A lack of 
continuity existed between the development of FBE-K concepts/initiatives involving ISR/JFN, 
and the actual FBE-K planning/implementation for FBE-Kilo.  This discontinuity hampered the 
development of meaningful analytic questions, and the experimental techniques to help answer 
those questions.   
 Recommendation:  Those involved in the development of experimental concepts and 
initiatives remain fully engaged throughout the experiment planning process to ensure it is 
properly focused on addressing original intent. 
 
 
6.7 EXPERIMENT PREPARATION LESSONS LEARNED  
 
Required Products   Some products required for FBE execution (AODB, MIDB, BSCMs, etc…) 
were not available.  The database test was inadequate, resulting in errant information for use in 
the XC4I systems used during FBE-Kilo.  
Recommendation:  NWDC must participate with both planners and technologies in the 
database test process.  If products required are substandard, then they must be identified and 
corrected prior to execution 
 
 Document Control   Like most previous FBEs, Kilo suffered from a lack of document control 
for most of the key coordinating documents. 
 Recommendation:  Early in the FBE planning stages, identify key coordinating 
documents (and their owners), and implement an FBE-wide common methodology for the 
cooperative production, review, maintenance, and accessibility.  
 
Staff Participation; Fleet Training vs. Experimentation   From the ISR perspective, FBE-Kilo 
degenerated almost completely into a JFN systems training event, largely because participation 
by C7F Staff and Fleet forces in the planning, preparation, and execution was constrained to 
such an extent as to preclude meaningful ISR and JFN-related experimentation. 
 Recommendation:  Ensure ISR and JFN related experimentation involving a numbered 
Fleet has full buy-in and participation of that Fleet staff, particularly the operations (N3) staff.  
Focus experiments on experimentation, not on Fleet training/exercises.  
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Be prepared to postpone or cancel experimentation events that are dependent on 
Numbered Fleet staff participation as soon as it becomes obvious that the bulk of that 
staff’s focus will and should be elsewhere other than on experimentation.   
 
Operational Sequence Diagrams   Functional Flow Diagrams (FFDs) should be developed prior 
to (or in conjunction with) Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSDs).  They describe who at 
which functional nodes need (or will provide) what information from (to) whom and why.   
 Recommendation:  Institutionalize FFDs as required documents for all experimentation 
events.  The OSDs should subsequently (or concurrently) be developed as the technical 
reflection of those FFDs.    
 
Common Operational Picture (COP)    The COP in FBE-Kilo did not have explicit “ownership” 
by any initiative, and was not maintained to a level required to support ISR and JFN in support 
of TST. 
 Recommendation:  Early in the FBE planning stages, identify who has responsibility for 
each of the many complex, interdependent functions that go into producing an accurate, stable 
COP from which players will be capable of “fighting the experiment”.  Consider doing the same 
with other “foundational” FBE processes, depending on the nature of the experiment.  
 
 
6.8 EXPERIMENT EXECUTION LESSONS LEARNED  
 
IKA Support   There was no coordinated IKA support for FBE-Kilo execution.  No IKA lead 
planning or execution support was responsible for many delays and training problems.  Ad-Hoc, 
initiative-level, IKA measures were implemented on the fly to support execution.  No clear level 
of IKA support was ever articulated to the planners during the planning process. 
Recommendation:  Identify IKA (or other initiative area) participation level in FBE and 
ensure that it is maintained. 
 
Fleet Execution Support   Fleet staff support was inadequate for the Sea Strike Initiatives.  The 
promised JFACC support was also minimal and not what had been planned.   This lack of 
support was a significant factor in not realizing the experimental potential of the Sea Strike 
efforts in FBE-Kilo.   
Recommendation:  Insure the proper level of Fleet staff support for an experiment will be 
available by frequent interaction with the uniformed staff at the ACOS level. 
 
Scenario   The FTX scenario did not match (very closely), the FBE Sea Strike live force 
scenario.  This was due to the CJTF (C7F) fighting the simulation and live scenarios together 
when they were designed to be separate.   
Recommendation:  Force a higher level of fleet experiment/exercise integration 
familiarization early and often in the planning process. 
 
 




There is some duplication here with material presented above for Fires Initiative conclusions.  It 
is felt that duplication is preferable to having the reader possibly miss important points by not 
examining both sections.   
 
Shipboard System Specifications   USS Blue Ridge has a 10 mb switch backbone that is 
connected via 155 mb links.  This, along with inconsistent network card setting hindered 
ADOCS use during the FBE.  Standard, shipboard LAN configurations that support ADOCS 
need to be established.  This applies to switch, link, and network card settings on these machines. 
 Hardware limitations may require platforms to set up multi-server configurations to reduce the 
effect of less modern network backbones. 
Recommendation:  Set ISNS ADOCS standards prior to install and configure 
accordingly. 
 
ADOCS Recommend Software / Hardware Changes   Many recommended changes to ADOCS 
were compiled during the FBE.  ADOCS changes are indicative of command and control 
capability requirements that currently exist.   
Recommendations: 
Software 
1.  Ability to pair a target to an ITO mission via a button 
2.  Ability to highlight targets in Fires and JTST Managers when changes have 
occurred…alert? 
3.  A configurable Fires Manager (within the ADOCS GUI). 
4.  Add “hour glass” icon to ADOCS to display system working. 
5.  TST supported CDR indicator in JTST Managers. 
6.  Hot link to ROE url. 
7.  Hot link to TST priorities url. 
8.  Creation of a Combat Assessment Manager and removal of that function from the 
Fires/JTST managers. 
9.  Hot link to target folder url.  
  Hardware 
1.  Two (2) displays for ADOCS users that are doing target development and 
coordination 
 
JFN interaction with ADOCS   ATI.ATR target nomination to JFN was incomplete and not 
viable for usage.  This problem needs to be fixed.  It was identified over 2 years ago and is still a 
problem. 
Recommendation:  Perform detailed ADOCS–JFN testing to fix this problem.  This 
should be completed in the lab rather than waiting for another experiment. 
 
Tactical Exploitation System – Navy   FBE-Kilo reconfirmed that TES-N has a number of 
powerful tools (some of which are unique to TES-N) that potentially could be of great use to 
Naval forces involved in TST.  It also reconfirmed that TES-N remains a developmentally 
immature system, with extremely limited interfaces to other C4I systems that are critical to TST, 
in particular GCCS-M and ADOCS.   
 Recommendation:  Don’t use TES-N in any further TST-related experimentation until 
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major advances are made to at least the following:  
• Interface with ADOCS  
• Interface with GCCS-M  
• Interface to PTW and any external target folder applications (e.g., attachment of image 
chips to ATI.ATR messages)  
• Handling of ISR video and platform/sensor telemetry  
• SCI COMINT analysis tools, and SCI-to-GENSER connectivity via ISSE Guard. 
 
ELINT / ESM   ELINT/ESM was sent from various M&S sources to the TDDS Network 
Management Center, to be put onto the TDDS broadcast, with receipt of the broadcast on BLR 
via organic means, and processing of exercise/experiment ELINT using the GALE software in 
TES-N.   
• Successful receipt was achieved  
• TES-N GALE was unable to receive, process, and display TACELINT messages from 
ISR UUV that reported an LOB.   
 
COMINT   COMINT injects were to be crafted by Kunia Regional SIGINT Operations Center 
(KRSOC) scripters who were resident in the TT03 JECG at Camp Smith, HI.  Injects would be 
sent via SI broadcast to BLR and received by a COMINT analyst using TES-N.   
• COMINT injects were received only on SCI GCCS-M, as that is the way the BLR SCI 
architecture was configured.   
• The COMINT analyst at the SCI GCCS-M received the injects as emails, printed them, 
and sneaker-netted them to the TST team manning TES-N terminals.   
• TES-N does not have any true COMINT analysis tools (as does SCI GCCS-M). 
• TES-N Information Support Server Environment Guard was non-functional on BLR.   
 
 
Target nomination messages (ATI.ATRs) to ADOCS and to TST Target Folder Server   The 
objective was for the TST nomination analyst to use TES-N to create a target nomination 
message (in USMTF “ATI.ATR” format), and to send that nomination message (via SMTP) to 
the ADOCS server on BLR, and to the TST Target Folder server at NWDC.  Considerable effort 
was required to get all systems interoperating correctly, TES-N LAN, ship’s LAN/Exchange 
server, FBE-K WAN and Exchange servers, ADOCS mail server.  Once set up properly the 
process worked well.   
 
Target identification difficulties   Inconsistencies existed in how target nominations were 
handled by ADOCS and how they were showing up in the TST Target Folder server.  The fault 
was in both TES-N and ADOCS, with inconsistencies in target line usage.  ADOCS turned 
around an ATI.ATR with fields out of order and truncated.    
 
 Images related to target nominations to PTW for aim-point refinement   The objective was to 
attach images (e.g., video “chips” showing the TST) to the outgoing target nomination, and send 
the nomination simultaneously to ADOCS, TST Target Folder, PTW.   
• The version of PTW used on BLR could not receive and parse ATI.ATR messages (i.e., 
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did not have the DTMS software used in MC02/FBE-J).    
• TES-N does not allow images to be attached to outgoing ATI.ATRs.   
• All images captured, chipped, and saved (as NITF) in TES-N had to be manually 
transferred (FTP) to PTW.   
• The PTW operator would pull up the images and conduct aimpoint refinement, then save 
the images (as both JPEG and NITF) to a shared directory on the BLR IT-21 LAN.  
 
Images related to target nominations to TST Target Folder Server  The objective was for the TST 
nomination analyst to attach images to the outgoing target nomination so that the TST Target 
Folder server could add the image(s) to the TST’s target folder.   
• TST Target Folder server worked well and the NWDC TST Target Folder server 
application proved to be a simple but powerful prototype.   
• The new version 5.0 of TES-N software still cannot attach images to ATI.ATRs.   
  
File transfer to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC / RTC Lites (FTX)   Because “DIOP” is only for 
the transfer of U-2 imagery that is being (or has just been) directly downlinked, other file types 
must be exchanged between TES-N and remotes like ISRM and RTCs using standard means 
such as FTP and SMTP.   
• FTP and SMTP worked well.   
• RTC Lites worked, with varying difficulty.  RTC Lite at NUWC was fairly easy to get 
up, configuring the others was difficult.  
 
Cross-INT replication from TES-N to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC (FTX)   Replication of 
TES-N’s Cross-INT database was attempted to both ISRM (CPX) and the ESX RTC (FTX), but 
with very limited success. 
• During CPX, Cross-INT was not replicated to ISRM due to ISRM instability problems. 
• During FTX, Cross-INT was replicated to ESX RTC.  
• Target Nominations created in TES-N are not replicated to ISRM / RTC.   
 
 
6.10 EXPERIMENT COP ISSUES  
 
M&S simulated ISR asset display in GCCS-M COP   By the end of FTX, all of the simulated 
Blue ISR assets active in M&S were simultaneously displayed on BLR’s GCCS-M COP with 
appropriate labels (e.g., two ISR UUVs, two Predator UAVs, one U-2).  This was the first time 
that this has happened in an FBE.   
 
TST location output to COP   (i.e., Manual Contact to GCCS-M) for “tracking” and SA):  The 
objective was for the TST nomination analyst to not only create an ATI.ATR as above, but to 
then use TES-N’s rudimentary interface to GCCS-M to input the target into the COP as a track, 
for the situational awareness of ALCON, and to assist (theoretically) in the “tracking” of the 
TST while waiting for it to be engaged.  
• The TES-N output to GCCS-M only worked for two days at the same rudimentary and 
suboptimal level at which it was working for MC02/FBE-J; for the remainder of 
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TT03/FBE-K it was functionally inoperative. 
• Even with the new TES-N version 5.0, there was no improvement in TES-N’s ability to 
output to GCCS-M from what was used in MC02/FBE-J.   
 
GCCS-M COP Tracks into TES-N ITD   In addition to TES-N’s rudimentary capability to send 
“Manual Contacts” to GCCS-M, COP tracks can also be sent from GCCS-M to TES-N.  The 
objective of attempting to do so was to provide a richer context of contacts, tracks, Blue ISR 
asset locations, etc., in TES-N for the analysts trying to find and fix TSTs. 
• TES-N’s incoming “Message and Data Log” showed a good number of incoming tracks 
from GCCS-M, but those tracks did not appear to be parsing into the TES-N ITD.  
• When GCCS-M tracks coming into TES-N were able to be brought up on the ITD it did 
not display any track labels. 
o GCCS-M tracks in TES-N’s ITD appeared in their proper locations but the 
symbols do not have any labels associated with them (e.g., no track names), 
making them all but functionally useless to the TST team.   
 
 
6.11 ORGANIZATION CONCLUSIONS 
 
Time Critical Targeting Functionality Afloat   The Xray Papa cell was an excellent test case for 
familiarization of the TCTF concept to the fleet.  TCTF is a USAF program that outlines the C2 
requirements and systems for conducting TCT operations.  In support of JCC and JCC (Afloat), 
the USN needs to further refine this concept to support both joint and maritime forces from a flag 
configured platform. 
Recommendation:  Use TCTF Afloat a starting point for future Sea Strike initiatives. 
 
Xray Papa and Maritime Component Time Sensitive Targeting   The Xray Papa cell identified a 
time sensitive targeting gap at the maritime component level that needs to be addressed. 
JFMCC’s conduct of broad scale TST operations that are integrated with other components is 
beyond the traditional role of the Bravo Papa.  A staff function at the operational level (JFMCC) 
that supports TST prosecution is required. 
Recommendation:  Integrate this effort with the TCTF effort described above to help 
identify maritime TST command and control requirements of the future. 
 
 
6.12 FBE DATA LESSONS LEARNED  
 
There have always been problems in FBEs with obtaining all of the data needed from the various 
hardware systems to form complete Fires timelines.  This was not improved for FBE-Kilo.   
 
Referring to Table 4.1, we see that only 9 of the required 24 data elements were obtained.  We 
repeat the data overview statement from Section 5.3.1: 
Compared to other recent FBEs the objective data provided for this experiment was deficient 
in quantity and quality.  In particular: 




• No GISRC data were provided. 
• The ADOCS JTST manager did not set capture mission histories for the last two days of 
the experiment 
• After acquiring excellent mensuration data from RRF in FBE-J, FBE-K reverted to PTW 
which has never provided usable data.  
• The JSAF event data logged in SNN did not include Fire events.  There were gaps in the 
JSAF event data and/or many fire commands did not reach JSAF. 
 
There continues to be a problem with Fires systems not being time synchronized.  
 
Ironically, even though the data situation was worse in Kilo, the impact was not as large as it has 
been for other experiments.  This is because former experiment results depended strongly on 
being able to develop valid, quantitative, TST timelines.  Here we have been interested in 
broader issues such as CONOPS and how JFN contributes to TST processes.  Even so,  
degradation in the ability to obtain needed electronic data does not bode well for future 
experimentation. 
 
 Recommendation:  Develop a program to insure needed electronic data is made available 
from all systems that are part of the TST process, including simulations.   
 
The following are implementation measures for the recommended program.  In future 
experimentation the application of these measures would do much to improve the collection of 
objective data: 
 
a. Require for system participation in an experiment that the system incorporate 
tools that would log, identify and timestamp all significant operator actions.   
 
b. Require data logging in formats that can be easily manipulated for post 
experiment analysis. 
 
c. Include as an objective in pre-experiment integration testing the validation of the 




Appendix A ADOCS TST PROCEDURES CHAT 
 
This Appendix contains an extensive discussion collected from the AIR_OPS  IRC channel on 
April 30 that illustrates the participant confusion regarding ADOCS TST procedures that 
persisted even in the closing days of the experiment. 
 
The nomination discussed, GE0157, was a tracked vehicle target nominated by the E-2C GISRC 
and was received in ADOCS at 300137Z The target was paired to TACAIR mission 1023.  The 
target was not engaged. 
 
[02:58] <XP_E2X> MSN GE0157 
[02:59] <E2C-5> MSN 0157 
[03:00] <XP_E2X> take a look at it in ADOCS 
[03:00] <E2C-5> looking at it 
[03:01] <E2C-5> we nominated it about an hour and a half ago 
[03:01] <XP_E2X> acknowledge 
[03:01] <E2C-5> is there something you want to know about it? 
[03:01] <XP_E2X> understand the process takes a while 
[03:01] <E2C-5> what process/ 
[03:01] <E2C-5> ? 
[03:02] <XP_E2X> ADOCS TST process 
[03:03] <E2C-5> ADOCS is almost immediate 
[03:03] <XP_E2X> have you acknowledged in ADOCS 
[03:03] <E2C-5> acknowledged what? we nominated it 
[03:04] <XP_E2X> yes but it has to be assigned/WTP etc  you don't own it until XP tells you do 
[03:04] <E2C-5> ok, so.... ARE you TELLING me to WTP it? 
[03:04] <E2C-5> I can DO that 
[03:05] <XP_E2X> it already has been but if you have a closer or better asset then make the 
recommendation to XP 
[03:07] <E2C-5> I don't know what we're waiting for. The tactical picture changes in the period 
of an hour and a half. WTP is only good for so long.  
[03:07] <E2C-5> I can change the WTP when you want to fire. If I WTP and then an hour and a 
half goes past, then I might not even have the same assets in the air. 
[03:09] <E2C-5> If you don't want to kill the target, there's literally no point in doing WTP. 
[03:11] <E2C-5> Standing by for tasking... 
[03:16] <E2C-5> where are we in the process at this point. Is there anything we can do to help 
the process along? 
[03:22] <XP_E2X> if we don't assign it as TST we wait to make a decision if we want to attack 
or not or wait until tomorrow's ATO 
[03:23] <XP_E2X> in the mean time you can change your box for msn GE0157 blue=ack 
[03:24] <XP_E2X> YYYYEEEESSSS 
[03:24] <E2C-5> ok, what does acknowledge mean? 
[03:24] <E2C-5> what am I acknowledging? 
[03:25] <XP_E2X> that you understand that the msn is being assigned to you and assets under 
your control if we should decide to attack it 
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[03:25] <E2C-5> do we have to WTP in order to desig as a TST? I would think that TST 
decision would be independent of the weapon used to execute. 
[03:26] <XP_E2X> after we both go blue=ack then ADC will go red until the TST or 
deconfliction is complete 
[03:26] <E2C-5> how do I know that I should go blue? 
[03:26] <XP_E2X> do you have JMEMS airborne  
[03:27] <E2C-5> no 
[03:27] <XP_E2X> blue=ack do you have the color box matrix we forwarded 
[03:27] <E2C-5> we have the matrix 
[03:28] <XP_E2X> then read along 
[03:29] <E2C-5> when we are assigned a mission, we assume that the decision to execute has 
been made. 
[03:29] <XP_E2X> not until the boxes are turned the correct colors 
[03:29] <XP_E2X> by ALL PLAYERS involved in the process 
[03:30] <E2C-5> ok, so you need to tell me that I should expect to be tasked with a mission, then 
that I will be tasked with a mission, then that I should execute the mission. Is that correct? 
[03:30] <XP_E2X> it hasn't been nom'ed as a TST so XP is making a determination if they care 
to attack it or not 
[03:30] <XP_E2X> correct 
[03:31] <XP_E2X> unless tasked directly from the JFACC 
[03:31] <E2C-5> ok, would it be possible for you to just tell me when you want to execute a 
target? 
[03:32] <E2C-5> or are we strapped to these rules? 
[03:33] <XP_E2X> check the box in ADOCS I will turn XPA green=ready to engage then you 
turn your box green 
[03:33] <XP_E2X> I will also pimp you via chat 
[03:33] <E2C-5> ok 
[03:34] <XP_E2X> this is the process using ADOCS...and that is what we are sitting out here 
trying to do 
[03:34] <XP_E2X> what did you think we were doing 
[03:35] <XP_E2X> wow it only took a week to achieve this level of understanding 
[03:35] <E2C-5> I guess with this process I can understand why it takes so long. 
[03:37] <E2C-5> again, I refer you to the fact that by the time all this happens, we might have 
lost the assets we were planning on executing with, and cause us to go back to the beginning 
with the new WTP. 
[03:37] <E2C-5> Cycle time on a Hornet is not in excess of 1.5 hours, he very well might be on 
tanker when the decision comes through 
[03:39] <E2C-5> The optimal air asset to execute a target changes in a period of 15 minutes. 
We'll play by the experimental rules, but want to make sure all are aware of the issues involved 
in this process to real world ops. 
[03:39] <E2C-5> so now I'm waiting for your box to go green right? 
[03:42] <XP_E2X> understand..that's why if the asset need to be updated you need to pass that 
along to XP and go into ADOCS saying you can't execute..go to chat explain the what the plan is 
will be hammered out. 
[03:42] <E2C-5> also be advised if you're looking to execute on this target, we're going to need 
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to update the WTP for this target, the original asset has RTB'd 
[03:43] <E2C-5> we can still execute, just with a different asset 
[03:43] <XP_E2X> don't think TST as within the next 5 mins...for now 
[03:44] <XP_E2X> noted on asset update 
[03:47] <XP_E2X> be advised the people in the JIC/JFACC/JCMCC/XP/BLR/& the Fleet have 
never seen or ever worked with these systems before..and identifying this process is what we are 
here for...remember who the customer is is not the guys in Newport with there joystick in there 
hands but 7th fleet 
 
[03:48] <E2C-5> I recognize that. I'm trying to help you guys. I'm just trying to point out where 
the system is going to break in the real world 
[03:48] <E2C-5> right now I can't pair anything in LAWS 
[03:49] <E2C-5> I've already changed the time to allow for targeting, as it had turned red 
[03:49] <E2C-5> the NLT I mean 
[03:49] <E2C-5> now LAWS is saying that all my assets will have no effect on the target. 
[03:49] <E2C-5> we're going  to re-start ADOCS 
[03:49] <E2C-5> standby 
[03:51] <XP_E2X> I knew that when we started but again this is there first introduction to 
ADOCS... no Subject matter experts just a bunch of guys trying to figure out what these box do 
[03:52] <XP_E2X> I changed your box white until we develop things better here 
















Appendix B SPECIFIC TARGET TIMELINE AND INFORMATION  
This Appendix contains information for five targets.  There are Annexes, each containing a  
timeline for a selected TST engagement.  Following the timestamp for each entry in the timeline 
is the source of the information. This will be a system (e.g. ADOCS) or an IRC chat channel.  In 
the case of the ADOCS Mission History, the agent for the change is identified.  For IRC, the 
specific chat channel is cited followed by the name of the node initiating the communication.  If 
the channel was in the Coalition’s IRC net the name of the channel is followed by “(Coalition 
channel)”. 
All times are GMT. 
Annex Target # Engagement 
B1 TB0050 TES-N nominated SA-15 engaged by DDX LRLAP 
B2 TB0051 TES-N nominated SCUD, WTP to TACAIR but not engaged 
B3 AB5027 BLR nominated vehicle. convoy engaged by ANZAC with 
ERGM 
B4 GX0321 DDX nominated field artillery engaged by ANZAC with ALAM 




Annex B1 -  Nomination TB0050 
1.Timelime 
TB0050 was an April 30 nomination of an SA-15 target by TES-N. The target was prosecuted by 
the DD-X with 8 LRLAP rounds.  Table B1.1 shows the critical timeline events.  All actions and 






Table B1.1 TB0050 Timeline 
 
Event Time 
Nomination received in ADOCS 00:13 
XP acknowledges mission 00:23 
Begin strike planning (TCT =yellow) Not done 
Target confirmed TST Not done 
Nomination promoted to JTST 00:23 
JOCC WTP to DDX 00:29 
ADC initiates deconfliction 00:34 
DDX assigned mission 00:34 
DDX acknowledges mission assignment 00:37 
NLT time 02:13  
Target is deconflicted 03:28 
XP authorizes engagement 03:28 
DDX accepts mission 03:28 
DDX fire when ready 03:43 
LRLAP Fired 03:57 
The interval between the receipt of the mission and the fire event was three hours and 44 
minutes. This mission is considered a failure since it was not fired until 200 minutes after the 
NLT time.  This failure was due to a large unexplained interval between the DDX 
acknowledging the mission (00:37) and the appearance in ADOCS of various mission approvals 
(03:28) 
 
LRLAP is a precision weapon that normally would require a precise target position.  Target 
mensuration was not discussed regarding this mission and a mensurated position does not appear 
in the ADOCS tabs.  The salvo of eight rounds may have been considered to override the 
requirement for a precise target position. 
 
2.TTP  
The ADOCS actions in this engagement are compared to the ADOCS TST TTP outlined in 
Table 7 and Table 8. 
 
The ADOCS TTP (Table 8) indicates that the TCT block should be used (turned yellow) to 
initiate strike planning for a TST. It was not so used in this engagement. The JIC turned the TCT 
block blue (at 00:31).  This an undefined color choice in the ADOCS TTP and hence 
meaningless.  
 
The BLR turned the  DDX block to back to yellow (01:05) after the shooter had changed it to 
blue.  This action is undefined and unexplained. 
 
The JIC Air IPB set the ADC block to red (00:54) but the BLR SPARE 4 set it to green (03:15) 
indicating deconfliction was completed. The latter workstation also simultaneously set the DDX 
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(this is a DDX responsibility) and XPA blocks to green.  This appears  as an unrealistic action  
performed after more than an hour of no action in order to force  the engagement to a conclusion. 
  
At 3:52 the DDX requests permission to engage.  XP says the display is all green and instructs 
him to fire.  If the DDX display was all green he should not have wasted time in seeking 
permission to fire.  If his display was not all green due to ADOCS latencies then he had to resort 
to chat to get fire permission.  In either case, the potential for ADOCS as a tool to expedite the 
TST engagement process is not being realized. 
 
3.ADOCS 
ADOCS is the primary tool and data source in the engagement of TSTs. Failures or 
inconsistencies in ADOCS have an important impact on the engagement process and experiment 
analysis.  Some of the problems encountered in this mission are listed below 
 
The time the nomination was received in ADOCS as indicated in the mission history (00:13) and 
in the fire mission targeting tab (00:59) are inconsistent.  The latter time is incompatible  with 
the IRC data therefore the former time is adopted. 
 
The JTST Mission History was very incomplete.  Only a  single event was recorded 
 
There appears to be a time  problem between the IRC times and the ADOCS times.  For 
example, in IRC it is reported the mission was fired at 3:57, but the  FRD block turned green in 
ADOCS at 3:45. It is known that the IRC chat times were accurate to within two or three 
minutes. 
 
There are sometimes substantial latencies in the receipt of color block changes by all 
workstations.  Some  examples: 
a. at 3:27 XP_DDX states the TB0050 mission is all green. At 3:30 TAO_DDX reports that 
on his display XPA is yellow and ADC is red.   
 
b. At 0:50 DDX turns the DDX blue to acknowledge the mission, at 1:05 BLR turns the 
block yellow, at 1:24 DDX turns it back to blue.  At 1:50 XP_DDX requests DDX 
acknowledge the mission.  At 1:54 XP_DDX tells DDX the box should go blue.  At 1:58 
TAO_DDX responds that his DDX box is blue.  Apparently XP_DDX does not hold on 
his ADOCS display  the acknowledgment  (blue DDX block) made by DDX  30 minutes 
ago 
 
c. This problem is also illustrated by Table B1.2  Which shows the final state of the 
ADOCS Fires display from: the Mission Coordination: Fires Mission History, the BLR 
Mission Coordination: Fires display and the Newport Mission Coordination: Fires 









Table B1.2.  Final Mission state from Different ADOCS sources 
 
Source TCT XPA E2X DDX ANZ ADC WRD FRD BDA
Mission History  G  G  G G G  
Mission Coordination: 
Fires display BLR 
 G  G  G    
Mission Coordination: 
Fires display Newport 
 G  G  G G G  
 
The Fires Mission History exhibits a number of inconsistent coordination block changes  that 
may be attributable to ADOCS latency.  An example:   
 
At 2:03 the DDX server ADOCS workstation turns the DDX block from blue to green. At 2:05  
the DDX Shooter 1 ADOCS workstation turns the DDX block from blue to green.  The block 
should have already green.  At 3:28 BLR turns the DDX block from yellow to green, but the 
block was already green and was last yellow at 1:24. An interpretation of these, and other similar 
anomalies, is that the earlier changes to the DDX  had not arrived at the workstation making the 
change and so it made the change based on the color of the block it displayed.  
 
In the JTST display the MSN block status is yellow EXE indicating the mission was not fired. 
 
4.Timeline actions and events. 
Listed below in time tagged order are all significant IRC channel communications and ADOCS 
actions obtained from the ADOCS Mission History logs that relate to TB0050. 
 
00:13 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  Time the nomination was received in ADOCS from TES-
N. 
00:20 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JIC RFI ASST refines target type as SA-15 and  modifies 
the target Not Later Than (NLT) Time. 
00:23 ADOCS Fires Mission History / JTST target data tab.  The nomination is promoted to 
JTST. 
00:23. ADOCS Fires Mission History. JOCC turns XPA block yellow indicating XP 
acknowledges  the mission.   
[00:28] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> XP. received TCT for TB0050, hold DDX 
Coord box as white. 
00:29. ADOCS Fires Mission History. JOCC WTP  the target to DDX and LRLAP. 
00:31. ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JIC Air IPB turns  TCT block blue.    
00:37  ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX sets mission volley size to 8. 
00:47 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JIC Air IPB turns ADC block red indicating the mission 
is being deconflicted. 
00:47 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JIC Air IPB turns DDX block to yellow. Indicating the 




00:50  ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns the DDX block yellow to blue indicating he 
acknowledges the mission assigned to him. 
01:05 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  BLR turns DDX block from white to yellow.  
01:24 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns the DDX block from yellow back to blue. 
[01:38] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP...  req WTP TB0050 for LRLAP mission.  
[01:45] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> DDX RGR wait one 
[01:50] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> DDx TAO  pls ack receipt of tgt TB0050 on 
ADOCS 
[01:54] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> DDX shows ADC holding TB0050 red. 
[01:54] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> rgr DDx box should go blue 
[01:56] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> rgr blue 
[01:58]  IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> DDX shows our box blue 
02:03 – 02:16 ADOCS Fires Mission History. DDX made multiple changes to the DDX block 
with the block starting and ending blue. 
02:13.  ADOCS. NLT time 
[03:27] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> DDx-TAO TB0050 is all"green" engage tgt.  
Please confirm though what you show 
03:28 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  BLR (spare 4)  turns ADC block green indicating the 
mission is deconflicted 
03:28. ADOCS Fires Mission History.  BLR (spare 4)  turns XPA block green meaning the 
shooter is cleared to engage. 
03:28. ADOCS Fires Mission History.  BLR (spare 4)  turns DDX block  
[03:30] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP... We show XPA as yellow; DDX as green; 
ADC still red. 
[03:30] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> TAO DDx confirm u  r in positive control of 
UAV2 
[03:31] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> rgr ddx. 
[03:31] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> DDX has pos control of UAV2 
[03:31] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> u r authorized to engaged vis this chat. 
[03:38] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP...  having probs with NFCS. Req WTP 
TB0050 with TLAM. 
03:43 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns fire when ready block green. 
[03:50] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP...  DDX can now execute TB0050 with 
LRLAP. 
[03:52] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP...  NFCS is down but ADOCs is up.  We'll 
use ADOCs for LRLAP msns. 
[03:52] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP..  Req permission to engage TB0050 with 
LRLAPs. 
[03:53] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <XP_DDX> I show all green for permission.  Engage TB0050 
[03:55] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP...  DDX engaging TB0050 with 8 LRLAP 
rnds. 
[03:56] IRC. MARITIME_OPS. <TAO_vDDX> XP..  LRLAP rnds away at 0357 
03:58 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns FRD block green.  Mission fired. 




1. Timeline TB0051 
This was an April 30 TES-N nomination of a SCUD target.  The mission was assigned to 
TACAIR but not executed. Table B1.1 shows the critical timeline events.  All actions and IRC 
communications related to the TB0051 engagement are listed in Section 4. 
 
Table B2.1 TB0051 Timeline 
 
Event Time 
Nomination received in ADOCS 00:41  
JIC refines target type and NLT 00:43 
Nomination promoted to JTST 00:44 
XP acknowledges mission 00:44 
Deconfliction initiated Not done 
Deconfliction complete 01:16  
WTP ATO mission Hornet21 01:22 
Mission assigned to E2-C 01:27 
 target type refined 01:38 
WTP ATO mission LOITER07 01:56 
NLT time 02:41  
WTP ATO mission HORNET65 03:43 
E-2C ack assignment Not done 
E-2C accepts mission Not done 
XP ack mission acceptance Not done 
XP authorizes mission Not done 
 
At various times, the target was assigned to three different ATO missions and at different times a 
U-2 and a Predator were on station to obtain BDA.  But it appears from ADOCS and IRC that 
the target was ever engaged. From IRC, it is clear that the E2C did not see the mission in his 
ADOCS.  It did appear in the ADOCS viewed by the TST_LNO.  Since the E2 does not hold and 
could not act on the mission, TST_LNO  arbitrarily assigned a TOT time. 
  
E-2C never acknowledged assignment of the mission to him because the mission did not appear 
in his ADOCS.  XP never went green to authorize mission engagement. 
 
The original experiment plan was to enter georefinement results into the ETF. It was requested 
for this mission (1:09) that georefinement results be entered in the JTST Target Data tab. There 
is no indication there or elsewhere that target georefinement was ever performed. 
 
The IRC contains several example of particular nodes having to type the same message in 
multiple chat channels.  This inefficiency should be mitigated by a more careful assigning of 
functions and participants to particular channels. 
2. TTP 
At 1:16 the JAOC SIDO turned the ADC block from white to green indicating deconfliction was 
 139 
 
complete.  The block was never turned red as required to indicate deconfliction was underway. 
Further, the deconfliction was complete  before the mission was formally WTP to Hornet21 
although that pairing was discussed in IRC before it was implemented.  However, the target was 
subsequently WTP to two other ATO missions.  Presumably the deconfliction result would not 
apply to these subsequent missions 
 
At 1:26 JAOC TGTS simultaneously changed the JTF, SOF, LCC and MCC blocks green I the 
JTST display.  This appears as a pro forma action without any operational significance. 
 
3. ADOCS 
The E-2C  ADOCS never received the mission  
 
The information about the mission is not consistent between the Fires and JTST histories.  For 
example the JTST History shows the JAOC TGTS first paired the target with ATO call sign 
Hornet 21 at 1:22.  Both histories show the target paired with ATO call signs LOITER07 and 
HORNET65 at 1:56 and 3:43 respectively.  The JTST shows the target type was refined from 
SCUD D to SCUD D camouflaged at 1:38.  This change does not appear in the Fires History.  
For the JFMCC/XP ADOCS fires is the primary tool for prosecution of TSTs.  JTST is a 
collaboration tool to provide Situational awareness to all Components of the status of TSTs.  
They should contain the same information and changes in one Manager should automatically 
update the other 
 
The color changes to the TCT block recorded in Fires Mission History are not internally 
consistent and not consistent with the ADOCS Fires displays.  The changes reported in the 
Mission History are shown in  Table B2.2. 
 
Table B2.2  Color changes to the TCT Block 
 
Agent Time Color Change 
JAOC SIDO 1:16 yellow to green 
JAOC TGTS 1:27 white to green 
JAOC TGTS 1:29 green to yellow 
 
The first change at 1:16 should have started with white, the second change at 1:27 should have 
started with the existing state (green).  The final state of both the BLR and Newport ADOCS 
displays show the state of the TCT block as green rather than yellow (see Table B2.3).  These 
inconsistencies may be, at least in part, a result of ADOCS latencies but some could be 









Table B2.3.  Final Mission state from Different ADOCS sources 
 
Source TCT XPA E2X DDX ANZ ADC WRD FRD BDA
Mission History Y Y Y   G    
Mission Coordination: 
Fires display BLR 
G Y Y   G    
Mission Coordination: 
Fires display Newport 
G Y Y   G    
 
4. Timeline Actions and Events 
00:41 ADOCS Fires Mission History. Nomination received in ADOCS from TES-N 
00:43 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JIC RFI ASST refines target type to SCUD D and 
modifies the NLT time. 
00:44 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  Nomination promoted to JTST.   
00:44 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  BLR sets XPA to yellow indicating the mission is 
acknowledged and being worked. 
[00:50] IRC. JTF_TST_COORD <TST_LNO> JFMCC/XP - zoom in on ADOCS once FIND on 
MAP.  TB0051 plots on FDM! 
[00:52] IRC. JTF_TST_COORD <TST_LNO> XP/JFMCC - pls work best TOT for Hornet21 
IOT engage TB0051 and for BDA gameplan 
[00:53] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <TST> WRT: TB0051 we need collection for PID 
[00:57] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <TST> WRT: TB0051 what was the source of INTEL on this? 
[00:58] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <TGT_OFF> TST_LNO - the imagery of the 
CAMOFLOUGED Scud is in the ETF 
[00:58] IRC. JTF_TST_COORD <TST_LNO> XP/JFMCC: PLS work a best TOT for Hornet21 
IOT eventually engage TB0051 and to coord BDA w/ U2.  TCT block in Fires Mgr is 
YELLOW.  NOT cleared yet to engage! 
 [01:07] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <TST_LNO> E2C-5:  Looking for TOT for Hornet21 IOT 
engage TB0051 and to work BDA coord.  Pls pass via chat. 
[01:08] IRC.  AIR_OPS <E2C-5> looking for TOT for Hornet21 to engage TB0051 
[01:09] IRC.  AIR_OPS <E2C-5> Tacair you there? 
[01:09] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> attempting to establish comms with TACAIR 
[01:09] IRC. JTF_TST_COORD <TST_LNO> JIC:  Any chance of getting geo-refinement on 
TB0051?  If so pls enter in Tgt Data tab (JTST Mgr) 
[01:12] IRC. JTF_TST_COORD <TST_LNO> ALCON:  Couldn't wait.  Set TOT for TB0051 of 
0135Z 
[01:12] IRC.  AIR_OPS <XP_E2X> hold up on that who gave you tasking for TB0051 
[01:13] IRC.  AIR_OPS <E2C-5> TST_LNO 
[01:13] IRC.  AIR_OPS <E2C-5> I don't have TB0051 in LAWS anyway 
[01:13] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> I don't show TB0051 in LAWS 
[01:13] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <TST_LNO> E2C-5 it's in both Fires Mgr and JTST Mgr.  
Couldn't wait.  Set notional TOT for Hornet21 of 0135Z 
[01:14] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> TACAIR is having computer problems 
[01:14] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> we are waiting for them to fix their issues and get 
aircraft launched for this event 
 141 
 
[01:15] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <TST> WRT: TB0051 we'll be requesting post-strike BDA on 
target w/in 30 minutes of TOT which is 0135Z. 
[01:16] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> are  you planning on hitting with with other assets? 
[01:16] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> have you coordinated with XP? 
[01:16] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <JFN_J2_OP> copy BDA on TB0051 
[01:16] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> I don't have TACIAR to task at the moment 
1:05 ADOCS JTST Collection Request tab.  U2 tasked to remain on station for BDA 
1:16 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JAOC SIDO changes ADC to green indicating 
deconfliction complete. 
1:16 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JAOC SIDO changes TCT block to green indicating the 
target is a confirmed TST. 
1:16 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JAOC SIDO changes the E2X block to yellow indicating 
mission assignment. 
1:22 ADOCS JTST Mission History. JAOC TGTS pairs mission with ATO call sign 
HORNET21. 
1:26 ADOCS JTST Mission History. JAOC TGTS simultaneously changed the JTF, SOF, LCC 
and MCC blocks green.   
1:38 ADOCS JTST Mission History. JAOC TGTS refines target type to SCUD D camouflaged. 
[01:43] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> looks like we have TACAIR under our control and 
are standing by for tasking 
[01:53] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <JFN_J2_OP> ISR reports no strike in area.  TEL reported as 
packing up and preparing to depart.  ETD is 10 minutes.  UAV1 to RTB f 
[01:54] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <JFN_J2_OP> UAV1 RTBing to EOM 
[01:54] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> so we're going to let him pack up and move? 
[01:55] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <JFN_J2_OP> unless you can roll something in 10 minutes.  
was there ever a MISREP from LOITER07? 
[01:55] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> is the target in LAWS? 
[01:56] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <JFN_J2_OP> target is in ADOCS 
[01:56] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> ok, what is the target number 
[01:56] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <JFN_J2_OP> TB0051 
[01:56] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> don't show that in my target list 
[01:57] IRC.  JTF_ISR_COORD <E2C-5> if you pass location I could investigate options, but 
that would be outside of LAWS 
 
1:43 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  JAOC TGTS pairs mission with ATO call sign LOITER07. 
 
2:00 ADOCS JTST Target data tab.  Predator on station 1:05 to 1:50 and did not see any 
detonation in vicinity of target. Reported target  was preparing to depart site at 1:45. Predator 
returning to base. 
 
02:41. NLT time. 
 






Annex B3 - Nomination AB5027 
 
1. Timeline 
This was a vehicle convoy nominated by the Blue Ridge ADOCS on April 29 GMT (April 30 
experiment day).  The target was engaged by the vANZAC with four ERGM. 
 
Table B3.1 AB5027 Timeline 
 
Event Time 
Nomination received in ADOCS 23:42 
WTP to ANZAC and ERGM 23:47 
Begin strike planning (TCT =yellow) Not done 
Target confirmed TST Not done 
Deconfliction initiated Not done 
Deconfliction complete Not done 
ANZAC assigned mission 23:47 (1) 
XP acknowledges mission 00:29 (1) 
ANZAC acknowledges mission assignment 01:07 (2) 
ANZAC accepts mission 01:13 (3) 
XP acknowledges mission acceptance  01:15 
XP authorizes engagement 01:16 
ERGM fired 01:19 
 
Notes to table: 
(1). These events appear in the wrong sequence. 
(2). This is IRC statement from ANZAC that they turned the ANZ block blue in their 
display.  This does not appear in the FBE net ADOCS. 
(3) This action was taken by BLR on behalf of ANZAC. 
 
The interval between receipt of the nomination in ADOCS and the impact of the rounds was 1 
hour and 46 minutes. No NLT time was specified for this target. 
 
The mission was not promoted to the JTST 
 
It was never defined if the convoy was moving or stationary.  Since it was WTP to ERGM the 
presumption is that it was stationary. 
 
The event timeline IRC entries show detailed reporting regarding the color block changes that 
are being made to the ADOCS display (e.g., see the interval 1:07 –1:12).  This is attributable, in 
part, to uncertainty among some participants about the TST procedures and, in part, to the lack 
of confidence in ADOCS to accurately reflect, in a timely manner, the operator block actions to 
all ADOCS workstations.  These detailed  communications result in an expansion of the 
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engagement timeline and, in effect, make ADOCS redundant – all the coordination actions 
appear to be occurring in chat and ADOCS becomes unnecessary. 
 
The table below gives the times of ADOCS block actions reported in chat compared to the times 
of block actions reported in the ADOCS Mission History.  The time differences indicate 
approximately a four minute difference in the clocks used to timestamp the IRC and Mission 
History events.  
 
Table B3.2.  Time Correspondence of IRC and ADOCS Mission History Actions 
 
 Time of Action  
Action in IRC in History Comment  
ANZ block W to Y NA 23:47    01:07  
ANZ block Y to B 01:07 Does not occur  
ANZ block to G 01:09 01:13 History shows W to 
G 
XPA block W to Y 00:29 00:29  
XPA block Y to B 01:11 01:15  
XPA block B to G 01:12 01:16  
FRD Y to G 01:14 01:19  
 
Color codes: W= white, B=blue, Y =yellow, G = green 
 
Because the FBE net and Coalition net are disconnected, communications must be manually 
transferred from one net to the other.  For example the FBE net reports at 1:10 that the XPA 
block is being turned blue.  That message was introduced into the Coalition net IRC at 1:17. The 
lack of an automated filter (e.g.  ISSE Guard ) for IRC extends the engagement timeline. 
 
2. TTP 
The TTP step where the shooter turns his block green to acknowledgement assignment of the 
mission was not executed. In addition the following TTP procedures were neglected for this 
mission: 
No TCT action 
No deconfliction action 
No georefinement action 
 
In the BLR ADOCS Mission History no actions were reported as executed by ANZAC. All those 
actions which should have been executed by ANZAC were carried out on the BLR (e.g. BLR 
JOC accepts mission for ANZAC at 1:13).  The IRC chat shows that the ANZAC was executing 
the required actions (see timeline at 1:07 and 1:10) but it appears that these events were not 
making it through Radiant mercury to the FBE net.  The ADOCS TTP promulgated on May 1 
(see Table 7) has the BLR putting into ADOCS the required ANZAC actions on receiving the 
IRC communications requesting those actions from the ANZAC.  It is presumed this TTP was 






Table B3.3  Final  state for Mission AB5027 from Different ADOCS sources 
 
Source TCT XPA E2X DDX ANZ ADC WRD FRD BDA
Mission History  G   G     G  
Mission Coordination: 
Fires display BLR 
  G       G G  
Mission Coordination: 
Fires display Newport 
  G        G  
 
The information provided by the ADOCS coordination blocks is sometimes inconsistent. The 
IRC communications between  1:05 and 1:07 indicates the ANZ block in ADOCS is green in 
Australia, green and/or yellow in Newport, white on the  BLR while the ADOCS Mission 
History indicates it should be yellow.    The end state of  the engagement also illustrates 
inconsistency in the  ADOCS data (Table B3.3).  The Mission History indicates that the final 
state of the XPA, ANZ and FRD blocks should be green, the Blue Ridge ADOCS display shows 
the XPA, WRD and FRD blocks green, the Newport ADOCS display shows XPA and FRD 
green.  Other ADOCS anomalies are alluded to in the IRC comments at 1:07 and 1:22-1:23. 
These inconsistencies make it impossible to determine what actually occurred and defeat the use 
of ADOCS as a Fires planning and coordination tool.  
 
Table B3.4 illustrates an inconsistent series of ANZ block actions.  The fact that two different 
agents changed the block white to yellow is not explicable unless the action by the first agent 
had not been received by the second agent.  A possible explanation for the  second JOC change 
from white is an intermediate yellow to white change not logged in the Mission History. 
 
Table 3.4 ANZAC Block Actions 
 
Agent Time Color Change 
ADOCS TECH 23:74 white to yellow 
JOC STATION 3 1:07 white to yellow 
JOC STATION 3 1:13  white to green 
 
 
4. Timeline Actions and Events 
April 29 GMT 
23:42. ADOCS Fires Mission History, Fires Targeting Tab. Mission received in ADOCS. The 
Mission History log’s first entry is 23:47.  
23:47 ADOCS Fires Mission History. WTP to ANZAC ERGM.  
23:47 ADOCS.  Fires Mission History. BLR sets ANZ block to yellow which is defined as 
mission assigned to ANZAC.    
23:50.  IRC FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> ALCON - we see WTP on 
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AB5027 - awaiting further processes 
 
April 30 GMT 
00:29. ADOCS Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns XPA block yellow indicating the mission 
is being worked. 
00:57. IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> FYI - we are still waiting for 
XP ANZ to say that they have turned ANZ Tab yellow (AB5027)  
[01:04] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> We are now working AB5027.  Does ANZAC 
acknowledge the mission.  I've so, please acknowledge via chat and I will change table color to 
blue. 
[01:05] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_ANZAC> ANZ green in AUS and NPT 
[01:05] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <CO_IKA_2> His ANZ tab is yellow on 
AB5027 
[01:06] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> ack AB5027 ANZ is yellow 
[01:06] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> ANZ is white on BLR. 
[01:07] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> Fires mission manager for ANZ tab resets to white 
for every RMG transmission.  The work around is for ADOCS operator BLR to edit tabs. 
01:07. ADOCS Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns ANZ block yellow.   
[01:07] IRC FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> will turn ANZ to blue 
[01:07] IRC FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> ANZ turned to blue 
[01:08] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> I'm turning ANZ tab green for AB5027. 
[01:09] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> ANZ tab is green for AB5027. 
[01:10] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> XP ack msn acceptance - turning XPA blue 
[01:10] IRC FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> ANZ tab green 
[01:11] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> XPA is blue. 
[01:12] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> XP auth engagement - turning XPA green. 
[01:12] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_ANZAC> rgr-will engage 
01:13. ADOCS Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns ANZ block green indicating mission 
accepted.. 
[01:14] IRC FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <CO_IKA_2> XP turning ANZ green for 
AB5027 
[01:14] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_ANZAC> Shot over.  WRD Green, FRD White 
[01:14] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> Rgr.  Changing FRD tab green. 
[01:15] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> FDR Green, BDA Yellow - Mission complete 
01:15. ADOCS Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns XPA block blue indicating 
acknowledement of mission acceptance. 
[01:16] IRC FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <CO_IKA_2> ANZ green from XP 
01:16. ADOCS Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns XPA block green - cleared to engage. 
[01:17] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <CO_IKA_2> XP turning XPA blue 
[01:17] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> why? 5 is XP turns ANZ 
blue 
[01:18] < IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). CO_IKA_2> XPA Green-you may engage 
[01:19] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> rgr engaging 
[01:19] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> shot – over 
[01:19] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> ab5027 wrd green frd white 
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01:19. ADOCS Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns FRD block green 
[01:21] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <CO_IKA_2> rgr.  XP shows MC 
[01:22] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> wrd white frd green here 
[01:22] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <DJS>  ANZAC_C2 rgr That was weird 
WRD GRN, FRD WHT, BDA GRY to WRD WHT, FRD GRN, BDA GLD 
[01:23] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <ADOCS_AS> we see the same here 
[01:23] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel). <DJS> rgr . possibly a hiccup due to BLR 
COMMS TU B4 
[01:27] IRC. GISRC_ISR (Coalition channel). <GISR-AS> watch for impact of ergm for bda 
assessment on convoy, tgt ab5027 
[01:28] IRC. GISRC_ISR (Coalition channel). <ANZAC_C2> splash out 
[01:30] IRC. GISRC_ISR (Coalition channel). <UAVContro> SPOTTER camera view of DEAD 
1xtruck TGT ab5027 --- COAL 
 
Annex B4 - Nomination GX 0321 
 
1.Timeline 
GX0321 was a May 1 nomination of a Field artillery target by the DDX GISRC.  The target was 
prosecuted with an ALAM by the ANZAC. Table B4.1 shows the critical timeline events.  All 
actions and IRC communications related to the GX0321 engagement are listed in Section 4. 
 





















Notes to Table: 
Event Time 
Nomination sent from DDX 2:00? 
Nomination received in ADOCS 2:43 
Nomination promoted to JTST 3:10 
Begin strike planning (TCT yellow) No done 
XP acknowledges mission 3:18 
WTP to ANZAC 3:34 
ANZ assigned mission 3:36 
ANZ acknowledges mission  3:36 (1) 
ADC initiates deconfliction 3:37 
Deconfliction completed Not done 
ANZ accepts mission 3:46 (1) 
XP acknowledges mission acceptance 3:46 
XP authorizes engagement 3:47 
ALAM Fired 3:50 
Impact 3:51 
Confirm as TST 4:32 (2) 
NLT time 4:46  
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(1) Action taken on BLR on behalf of ANZAC 
(2) Out of sequence. The target was confirmed as TST only after the engagement was 
completed. 
 
There is long interval between the presumed time of transmission of the mission from GISRC 
and its receipt by ADOCS and a substantial delay between receipt of the mission in ADOCS and 
WTP. Thereafter, the process proceeds relatively quickly.  The total interval between receipt of 
the nomination in ADOCS and the launch of the weapon is 67 minutes. 
 
The nomination was received in ADOCS with CE and LE values set to 1.  These values appear 
in the Mission History but do not appear in the Mission Coordination: Fires Targeting tab. The 
nomination was based on UAV imagery so this level of accuracy is unrealistic.  There is no 
indication that the UAV imagery was sent to PTW for georefinement although such an action 
would help account for the long delay in the receipt of the nomination at ADOCS.  If the shooter 
took the provided target position LE and CE at face value the accuracy of the coordinates was 
more than adequate to the needs of the ALAM precision munition.  However, at the time of fire 
the shooter announced (3:50) he didn’t know or care if the target had been georefined. 
 
The details of the timeline are blurred by the fact that system times are not synchronized.  A 
comparison of the same events in the FBE net IRC log and the ADOCS Mission History shows 
the events are 2-3 minutes later in ADOCS.  For example, IRC reports the ANZ tab is blue at 
3:38, the Mission History log reports it blue at 3:36.  There has been no attempt to synchronize 
the times derived from different sources in Table B4.1.  
 
The target nomination was promoted to the JTST Manager at 03:10.  Since the target was 
nominated and executed within the JFMCC, the appearance in the JTST was not required for 
execution but for cross-Component situational awareness.  The JTST Mission History files do 
not exist in FBE-K for May 1 and 2. 
 
2.TTP 
Because the FBE net IRC and Coalition net IRC are not connected communications are manually 
recreated in one from the other. The time lag is approximately seven minutes 
 
The deconfliction was never completed but the mission was nevertheless fired. 
The target was confirmed as TST only after the engagement was completed. 
A precision munition was fired without concern for georefinement. 
 
The required shooter (ANZAC) ADOCS actions were performed by the BLR presumably to 
circumvent problems with the ADOCS - Radiant Mercury interface 
 
3. ADOCS 
At 2:00 Dahlgren reported it would nominate GX0231 shortly.  The nomination was not received 
in ADOCS until 2:46. There are no communications relating  to the cause of this delay.  The 
facts that at  3:13 DDX reports it does not show  GX0231 in his ADOCS display and the 
Newport ADOCS log does not show GX0231 suggests ADOCS communications may be the 
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problem.  The absence of GISRC data does not permit the determination of the actual time of the 
nomination transmission.   
 
The ADOCS Mission History indicated the BLR turned the XPA block blue at 03:15. supposedly 
indicating  XP acknowledges the shooters acceptance of the mission.   This is erroneous as the 
chat indicates at this time that the shooter had not received the mission.   
 
There are multiple examples in the Mission History of blocks being changed from colors that 
they do not hold.  For example, at 3:15 XPA changed from white to blue (by BLR SPARE 4 
ADOCS workstation).  The next recorded action for that block show it being changed at 3:18 
from white to yellow (by the BLR JOC STATION 3).  Two possible explanations for this:  there 
is an event changing the block from blue to white missing from the Mission History log or the 
change at 3:15 was not received by the second workstation so in his context the block was still 
white .  
 
The table below illustrates inconsistencies in the final state of the mission display based on the 
three sources indicated. From IRC it is clear the mission was fired but in none of the ADOCS 
displays:  BLR Fires, BLR JTST and  Newport  Fires, or  in the Fires Mission History is it 
indicated the mission was fired. 
 
Table B4.2.  Final State of the GX0321 Mission from three sources 
 
 
Source TCT XPA ANZ ADC WRD FRD 
Mission History G G G R W W 
Mission Coordination: Fires display BLR G G W W G Y 
Mission Coordination: Fires display NPT Mission does not appear 
 
 
4. Timeline Actions and Events 
[01:51] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> when ready, pls surv artillery in vic of radars 
[01:51] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> BAK ok 
[01:53] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> FA site contact -- 6xTUBES, 1-C2, VIC 150356N 
1453655E DA 30 SP ARTY  
[01:54] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> FA site of all VEH(S) in current view 
[01:54] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> TGT #? 
[01:55] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> can you zoom over left lower quads 
[01:56] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> What are you looking for? 
[01:57] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> pls zoom to PID veh lower left quad? 
[01:57] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> The last tube or truck in current view? 
[01:58] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> just crossing  crosshair x axis now 
[01:59] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> got it. Thanks 
[01:59] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> FREEZE ON!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
[01:59] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> Releasing  
[01:59] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> TGT #? for FA site?????????????????????????? 
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[02:00] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> GX0321 - will send out nom shortly 
02:43. ADOCS. Fires targeting tab.  Mission recived in ADOCS.  Mission History gives a time 
of 2:46. 
[02:44] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> can we get overview of Batt with all 7 FAs? 
[02:45] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> on screen now 
[02:46] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> can you move away fm coast to get lower left 
quad but within overview? 
[02:46] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> will this work? 
02:46  ADOCS. Fires Mission History.  DDX GISRC nomination received in ADOCS. The 
Targeting tab reports the time received is 02:43 
[02:50] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> closer in pls 
[02:51] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <UAV2> is this close enough? 
[02:52] IRC. DDX_UAV_CNTRL <Dahlgren> good for overview - need lower left quad for PID 
on those 
03:10  ADOCS. Fires Mission History.  BLR JOC promotes nomination to JTST Manager. 
[03:13] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <XP_DDX> where did GX0321 come from? 
[03:15] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> XP... DDX does not show GX0321 in ADOCS. 
03:15. ADOCS. Fires Mission History.  BLR changes XPA block from white to blue.  This is an 
inappropriate action. 
03:18. ADOCS. Fires Mission History.  BLR JIC Air IPB changes XPA block from white to 
yellow indicating XP acknowledges and is processing the mission. 
[03:29] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> Stby - We have a TST.  GX0321.  Let's run this one 
to ground before DV's. 
[03:29] IRC. TECHNICAL_COORD <vDDXSHREK> BLR_DJ - do you have a tgt GX0321? 
[03:32] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> ANZAC - You have WTP ANZAC-ALAM on 
GX0321 at 0335z. 
[03:33] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> Msn asgn to ANZAC, XPA/ANZ is Green/Green. 
[03:33] IRC. TECHNICAL_COORD <BLR_DJ> i saw it come in but don’t see it now 
[03:34] IRC. TECHNICAL_COORD <BLR_DJ> ohh ok i c it now 
03:34 ADOCS. Fires Mission History.  BLR WTP GX0321 to ANZAC and ALAM 
[03:34] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> ADC rgr up red.  Continue with msn planning, 
expect deconflict by time of engagement. 
[03:34] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> VANZAC pls ack msn 
[03:36] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> GX0321 - Field Artillery.  Do you see it.  It's a TST. 
[03:36] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_ANZAC> Yes-we have GX0321 
03:36. ADOCS. Fires Mission History.   BLR JOC changes ANZ block from white to yellow 
indicating the mission is assigned to the ANZAC 
03:36. ADOCS. Fires Mission History.   BLR JOC changes XPA block from blue to yellow. 
Inconsistent action 
03:36. ADOCS. Fires Mission History.   BLR JOC turns ANZ block blue indicating the shooter 
has acknowledged the mission. 
03:37. ADOCS. Fires Mission History.   BLR changes ADC block to red  indicating 
deconfliction pending. 
[03:37] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> Rgr - awaiting your ack of msn. 
[03:38] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_IKA_1> Rgr, ANZAC ack msn 
 150 
 
[03:38] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> Rgr - ANZ tab is blue. 
[03:39] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <CO_IKA_1> XP is stating that you have 
WTP ANZAC-ALAM on GX0321 at 0335z 
[03:40] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <CO_IKA_1> XP states that msn asgn'd 
ANZAC, XPA/ANZ is Grn/Grn 
[03:40] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> XP awaiting ANZAC msn acceptance. 
[03:40] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_IKA_1> ANZAC accepts msn. 
[03:41] IRC. TECH_SIM (Coalition channel)<Coalition> UAVContro, what are coords for 
GZ0321 
[03:42] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> we just had that upgraded to 
WTP and XPA yellow 
[03:42] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_IKA_1> Interrogative step 1.  XP turns XPA Tab yellow? 
[03:43] < IRC. ANZAC_OPS XP_ANZAC> Rgr - Looks like we got a RMG blast.  We lost our 
colors.  I just reset. 
[03:43] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> XPA blue and ANZ green. 
[03:43] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> XP auth VANZAC engagement. 
[03:43] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <CO_IKA_1> do u ack msn? 
[03:44] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> yes - we ack the msn 
[03:44] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> what about step 3? 
[03:45] < IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) CO_IKA_1> XP shows ANZ blue 
[03:45] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_IKA_1> ALAM away GZ0321. 
[03:45] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CO_IKA_1> CONPT and ANZAC has wrd-grn, frd-gold 
03:46. ADOCS. Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns ANZ block green  indicates the ANZAC 
has accepted the mission. 
03:46. ADOCS. Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns APX yellow to blue indicating XP 
acknowledges mission acceptance. 
[03:46] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CoalMike> 1 ALAM away from ANZAC 
[03:46] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> ANZ tab green 
[03:46] IRC. TECH_SIM (Coalition channel)<ANZAC_C2> GX0321 is on SAIPAN ,.Stby co-
ords for GX0321 
[03:46] IRC. TECH_SIM (Coalition channel)<ADOCS_AS> coal-mike - next strike is GX0321 
- Field Arty - 1 X ALAM in posn 150400.68N 1453647.62E. Will advise when firing 
03:47. ADOCS. Fires Mission History. BLR JOC turns XPA block from yellow to green 
indicating the engagement is authorized. 
[03:49] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <CO_IKA_1> XP is showing XPA-blue, 
ANZ-grn 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> rgr XPA blue here, now green 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <CO_IKA_1> XP authorizes engagement 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <DJS> FIRE!!! 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> was tgt geo refined? 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <DJS> don't know, don't care/ 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> rgr engaging 
[03:50] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ANZAC_C2> ALAM away GX 0321 
[03:51] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> bird away 
[03:51] IRC. FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> wrd green frd gold 
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[03:51] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <CoalMike> splash – out 
 
4:32 ADOCS. Fires Mission History. BLR turns the TCT to green indicating the target is a 
confirmed TST 
4:46 ADOCS. NLT time 
 
 
Annex B5 - Nomination AA0368 
 
1.Timeline 
AA0368 is a May 1 GMT (May 2 experiment day) nomination of a CDCM site by the ANZAC 
ADOCS.  The target was prosecuted by the DDX firing a TLAM.  Table B5.1 shows the critical 
timeline events.  All actions and IRC communications related to the AA0368 engagement are 
listed in Section 4. 
Table B5.1 AA0368 Timeline 
 
Event Time 
Target acquired 21:52 
Nomination received in ADOCS 22:01 
Nomination promoted to JTST 22:01 
Begin strike planning 22:01 
WTP to ANZAC and ERGM 22:35 
Amend WTP to DDX and TLAM 22:38 
Target confirmed as TST 22:45 
XP acknowledges mission 22:46 
ANZAC reports unable to engage 22:48 (1) 
Deconfliction initiated 22:48 
DDX mission assignment  Not done (2) 
DDX ack of assignment Not  done (2) 
TLAM route request received at RPM 22:56 
TLAM route sent from RPM 22:58 
Deconfliction complete 23:12 
XP authorizes engagement 23:12 
DDX accepts mission  23:16 
XP ack  mission acceptance Not done 
 DDX sets fire when ready 23:18 
TLAM fired 23:18 
Detonation 23:24 
BDA report 23:28 
NLT time 03:59  
Notes to Table:  
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ADOCS action taken by BLR on behalf of ANZAC 
(1) See Section 2. 
The interval between the receipt of the target in ADOCS and the firing of the TLAM was one 
hour and 17 minutes. 
ADOCS time stamped events about 3 minutes after the events were reported in IRC. 
 
2.TTP 
The ADOCS DDX actions are confused. The ADOCS procedure defined in Table 8  indicates 
the shooters block should be turned yellow by XP when the mission is assigned.  In this case, 
there is no action on the DDX ADOCS block taken by the BLR and the first two actions by the 
DDX are not consistent with the TTP. 
 
Table 5.2 DDX Block Actions 
 
Agent Time Color Change 
DDX SHOOTER 1 22:48 white to blue 
DDX SHOOTER 1 23:01 blue to yellow 
DDX SHOOTER 1 23:16  yellow to green 
 
XP did not acknowledge  DDX acceptance of the mission.  This is probably a consequence of the 




Table 5.3.  Final State of the AA0368 Mission from three sources 
 
Source TCT XPA DDX ANZ ADC WRD FRD BDA
Mission History G G G R G G G G 
Mission Coordination: Fires 
display BLR 
G G G R G G G G 
Mission Coordination: Fires 
display Newport 
G G G R G G G G 
In this instance all three data sources agree on the final state of the engagement 
 
4.Timeline Actions and Events 
[21:46] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> New Contact -- Possible DECOY 
SS21 VIC 151057N 1454302E DA 21 – COAL 
[21:46] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> DARK Pattern on SS21 
[21:46] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> I still think DARK Pattern MEANS 
DECOY SS21 -- COAL 




[21:48] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> New contact -- 2nd POSSIBLE 
DECOY 1xSS21  VIC  151026N 1454257E DA 27 – COAL 
[21:48] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> Need TGT# for 1st DECOY SSS21  
[21:49] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <GISR-AS> 1st aa0366 
[21:49] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <GISR-AS> 2nd aa0367 
[21:49] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> 1st aa0366 for 151057N 1454302E, 
yes 
[21:50] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <GISR-AS> affirm 
[21:50] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> No other support veh(s) in area,  
AGAIN think these are DECOY(s) 
[21:50] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> Researching area for Support Veh(s) 
- standby 
[21:51] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <GISR-AS> 3rd vehicle? 
[21:51] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> New Contact -- 3rd DECOY SS21 -- 
VIC 151020N 1454256E DA 28 - -COAL 
[21:51] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> SPOTTER VIEW 
[21:52] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> See the DARK CAMO pattern? 
[21:52] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> Clouds coming in and out 
[21:52] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> Waiting for TGT# 
[21:52] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <GISR-AS> aa0368 
22:01 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. Nomination received in ADOCS from BLR JOCC. 
22:01 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR JOCC changes TCT block from white to yellow 
indicating the target is a possible TST target. 
22:01 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR JOCC.  Mission promoted to the JTST Manager. 
[22:03] IRC. ANZAC_OPS<XP_ISR> XP_AZAC:  request imagery for AA0366/67/68 to ID as 
a potential TST 
[22:03] IRC. #FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> AA0367/0368/0369 targeted 
[22:06] IRC. JTF_ISR_COORD <TST> JFN_J2_OP: WRT: AA0368 we're going to need 
imagery for PID as well as CDE support and post-strike BDA once target is PID and approved as 
TST. 
[22:09] IRC. #FIRES_COORD (Coalition channel) <ADOCS_AS> FYI - have now targeted 5 
targets via ADOCS, awaiting WTP by XP 
[22:15] IRC. ANZAC_OPS <XP_ANZAC> We see AA0358, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, and 73. 
[22:22] IRC. JTF_ISR_COORD <TST> MCC: AA0366, AA0367, AA0368 have been passed to 
you; awaiting your acknowledgement. 
22:35 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR JOC.  WTP to ANZAC and ERGM 
22:38 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR JOC.  WTP changed to DDX and TLAM. 
22:45 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR JOCC changes TCT from yellow to green 
indicating target is confirmed TST 
22:46  changes XPA block to yellow indicating XP acknowledges the mission 
[22:46] IRC. GISR_ISR (Coalition channel) <UAVContro> Update aa0368 DECOY SS21 still 
there -- lower part of view 
22:48 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR changes E2X block blue.  
22:48 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR changes ANZ block red indicating ANZAC is 
unable to engage. 
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22:48 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR changes ADC block red indicating deconfliction is 
underway. 
[22:48] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <XP_DDX> DDx TAO, can you strike AA0368 
[22:48] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <XP_DDX> IF so req box blue on DDX to tell us IAW with 1 
May process 
22:48 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. DDX turns DDX block blue to acknowledge.   
22:51 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR turns E2 block from blue to white 
[22:51] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> XP...  DDX req confirm AA0368. 
[22:51] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <XP_DDX> Also if assigned msn (WTP) go to yellow 
[22:51] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <XP_DDX> Confirm aa0368? What do you need to know 
22:56. RPM. TLAM route request received. 
22:58 RPM.  TLAM route sent. 
[22:58] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> XP...  DDX can accept AA0368. 
[22:58] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <XP_DDX> Block just changed to yellow DDX 
[22:58] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> XP..  request permission to engage AA0368 
23:01 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. DDX turns DDX block from blue to yellow to indicate 
acceptance? 
[23:02] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> rgr yellow block for AA0368 
23:12 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR turns ADC from red to green indicating 
deconfliction complete. 
23:12 ADOCS . Fires Mission History. BLR turns XPA yellow to green indicating engagement 
is authorized. 
[23:15] IRC. MARITIME_OPS <TAO_vDDX> XP...  DDX Greyhound away AA 00368 TOF 
8:30 
23:16 ADOCS . Fires Mission History.  DDX turns the DDX block yellow to green indicating 
meaning the mission is accepted 
23:18 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns the WRD block green. 
23:18 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns the FRD block green. 
23:23:46  SNN. Detonation report. 
23:28 ADOCS Fires Mission History.  DDX turns the BDA block green with the comment the 
target is destroyed. 


















Appendix C   FBE-K TECHNICAL AFTER-ACTION REVIEW 
 
This Appendix was provided by Wayne "Doc" Sweitzer of Titan Corporation 
 
Summary 
PURPOSE.  The use of the Joint Fires Network (JFN), and in particular its Tactical Exploitation 
System - Navy (TES-N) subsystem, to support Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) was a major 
focus of the Sea Strike Initiative in Tandem Thrust 2003 (TT03) / Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo 
(FBE-K).  This paper recounts the technical issues encountered during TT03/FBE-K, as well as 
functional issues that had a significant technical impact, and makes recommendations for future 
improvements. 
 
DEFINITIONS.  The following are definitions of systems terminology used in this paper: 
• JFN - Joint Fires Network:  a recent name change for NFN which is little more than a 
programmatic attempt to indicate that NFN is now a joint program -- which it is not. 
• NFN - Naval Fires Network:  as of FBE-K execution, NFN was still the official term for 
the “converged architecture” of three programs:  TES-N, JSIPS-N, GCCS-M.  
Unfortunately, the former TES-N program office (NAVSEA PMS-454) perpetuated the 
use of the term “NFN” to refer to TES-N only, thereby introducing great confusion in the 
Fleet and elsewhere -- confusion that was still painfully evident during TT03/FBE-K.  
• TES-N - Tactical Exploitation System - Navy:  TES-N is an immature integration (in 
systems development terms) of a number of complex, powerful software and hardware 
applications that overwhelmingly fall in the functional category of Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). 
• JSIPS-N - Joint Service Imagery Processing System - Navy:  aboard USS BLUE 
RIDGE (BLR), JSIPS-N included the Precision Targeting Workstation (PTW), NIMA’s 
Image Product Library (IPL), and the connectivity (via Challenge Athena III) with the 
Joint Concentrator Architecture (JCA) IPL located at the Office of Naval Intelligence 
(ONI) in Suitland, MD.  
• GCCS-M - Global Command and Control System - Maritime:  among many other 
things, GCCS-M is the “engine” for the Common Operational Picture (COP) shared 
force-wide.  TES-N is supposed to be an important contributor to the COP; it is not. 
• ADOCS - Army Deep Operations Coordination System:  ADOCS was the primary 
“intended target” of TES-N output, in the form of ATI.ATR target nomination messages. 
 While only sometimes included in even the loosest use of the term “JFN”, ADOCS 
(which is also known in Navy circles as “LAWS”) is the only real connection TES-N / 
JFN on BLR had to “fires”. 
• AFSERS-MUSE - Air Force Synthetic Environment for Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance-Multiple Unified Simulation Environment:  AFSERS-MUSE was a 
modeling and simulations (M&S) system that fed TES-N with simulated ISR video (e.g., 
from a simulated UAV or simulated P-3 AIP aircraft), and with simulated U-2 still 
imagery and platform/sensor telemetry.  Although “MUSE” and “AFSERS” are virtually 
synonymous, MUSE was commonly used during TT03/FBE-K execution and planning to 
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refer to just the simulated ISR video produced by M&S Central in Simms Hall, Newport, 
RI.  (The U-2 M&S “pieces” were referred to as “AFSERS-TENCAP” -- see below). 
• AFSERS-TENCAP - Air Force Synthetic Environment for Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance-Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities:  AFSERS-TENCAP was 
the term commonly used during TT03/FBE-K execution and planning to refer to the U-2 
M&S “pieces” (i.e., U-2 still imagery and platform/sensor telemetry), produced by the 
AFSERS system on board USS BLUE RIDGE (BLR) and sent to TES-N. 
• ISR UUV - Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicle:  “ISR UUV” is used herein to refer to the virtual SSN and its two simulated ISR 
UUVs that participated during the FBE-K FTX as ISR “collectors”.  The Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center (NUWC) provided sophisticated simulation of vSSN and ISR UUV 
platform behavior and ELINT/ESM collection and reporting, along with rudimentary 
COMINT and IMINT “proof-of-concept” simulation and reporting. 
 
Highlights 
• Remote M&S stimulation of TES-N / JFN was sufficient for familiarizing C7F Staff with 
the basic processes involved in using TES-N / JFN in support of TST. 
• Successful demonstration of TST Target Folder server concept as common repository for 
relevant TST target data. 
• Gained in-depth insights into many JFN systems issues, myths and realities. 
• All simulated Blue ISR assets displayed in COP simultaneously with appropriate labels 
by end of FTX. 
 
Technical Accomplishments & Issues 
A.  SYSTEMS.  
 
 1.  TES-N.   The TES-N suite used in TT03 / FBE-K was already “organic” to USS 
BLUE RIDGE (BLR) -- no major alternations or upgrades were done specifically for TT03 / 
FBE-K, although the system software had just recently (Jan or Feb 2003) been upgraded to TES-
N version 5.0.  Other systems/components used in conjunction with TES-N included: 
 2.  JSIPS-N / PTW (organic to BLR) 
 3.  IPL / JCA (organic to BLR) 
 4.  GCCS-M (organic to BLR) 
 5.  ADOCS (software installed on BLR organic IT-21 PCs) 
 6.  ISR-M (organic to PACAF AOC, Hickam AFB, HI) 
 7.  TES-N RTC (organic to USS ESSEX) 
 8.  M&S systems, including: 
  a.  JSAF (Newport M&S lab) 
  b.  AutoSIGS (Newport M&S lab) 
  c.  ASSET (Newport M&S lab) 
  d.  AFSERS-MUSE (Newport M&S lab) 
  e.  Video controller / video remote (Newport M&S lab / aboard BLR) 
  f.   AFSERS-TENCAP (aboard BLR) 




B.  M&S FEEDS INTO TES-N.   
 
 1.  Video:   
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  During both CPX and FTX, simulated ISR video 
was produced by AFSERS-MUSE, fed into the NWDC video controller in Newport, distributed 
as MPEG-4 to BLR via the FBE WAN (including KuBand SATCOM).  The MPEG-4 stream 
was converted and fed by the NWDC video remote server on BLR as analog video (RS-170) into 
TES-N’s video switch, which then presumably re-digitized the video for distribution to any 
GENSER-level TES-N Multi-Function Workstation (MFWS) [unable to confirm precise “inner 
workings” of TES-N internal video distribution]. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1)  Video Feed Stability.  The video feed into TES-N was stable and 
reliable during both CPX and FTX, aside from one very minor issue:  the BLR video remote 
server’s display properties had to be re-set by one of the NWDC Facilitators (Sweitzer or 
Meana) to 800x600 or higher approximately once a day, normally first thing in the morning BLR 
time (the display properties would somehow revert to 640x480 on occasion and then freeze the 
display). 
   (2)  Simulated ISR Video “Command and Control”.  The M&S “pilots” 
who were “flying” the simulated ISR video platforms were thoroughly supportive and 
professional.  Their flexibility, and the flexibility of their M&S systems, allowed NWDC 
Facilitators on BLR the latitude to respond rapidly to changes in circumstances and/or FBE 
participant requirements when needed.  On only a few occasions there was confusion introduced 
by other FBE participants (e.g., vDDX at Dahlgren) as to who had “command and control” over 
which simulated ISR video asset when.  While not a technical issue per se (and probably not an 
unrealistic situation in the “real world”) this underscored the importance of having (and 
participants adhering to) a well-established C2 structure for ISR operations, even in an 
experimental environment.  Also, the initial plan to coordinate with the “pilots” via voice-only 
proved to be unwieldy, primarily because the TES-N video screener(s) did not have exclusive 
access to an IP phone/headset at his/her workstation, and as such had to coordinate by voice 
across the room to someone (NWDC Facilitator in lieu of an ISR operations type) who was on 
the IP phone with the “pilot”.  By early in the CPX, the TES-N FSRs had configured TES-N’s 
IRC chat tool to allow screeners and “pilots” to interface directly via chat, which was a far 
superior arrangement from the screener’s perspective to going through the intermediary.   
   (3)  TES-N Video Application.  The TES-N video display and capture 
application was generally reliable, but has a strange software bug in that the user’s video control 
icons (e.g., start, stop, capture, etc.) do not display upon initially opening the window until the 
user moves the cursor over that area in the window (i.e., on the border between the video frame 
itself and the upper edge of the window). 
   (4)  Video Quality. 
    (a)  As viewed on TES-N MFWS:  By the time the video was 
displayed on the TES-N MFWS (an “A-to-D” conversion or two AFTER leaving the video 
remote server), the quality of the video simulation was barely useable for the purposes of having 
TES-N users “go through the motions” of Time Sensitive Target (TST) detection and 
identification.  For instance, the NWDC Facilitators on BLR would often have to go to another 
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space on BLR to read the latitude/longitude readout on the video remote server screen, as those 
same numbers were illegible on the TES-N screen. 
    (b)  Video capture:  The video image “chips” captured by TES-N 
were of significantly lower quality than those captured from the same source by the GISRC 
workstations used in the FTX in Newport and Dahlgren, as evidenced by comparing the captured 
images posted to the TST Target Folder Server by each of the systems. 
    (c)  Base image and model quality:  For future consideration, even 
with improved TES-N video handling, the quality of the simulated video used in FBE-K would 
not be sufficient for any type of analytic/targeting experimentation (beyond just “going through 
the process motions”) due primarily to the resolution and two-dimensional nature of the base 
imagery used. Three supporting points:   
     [1] For instance, when zoomed in close enough to support 
positive identification (PID) of the TST, the background of base imagery became so blurred as to 
appear solid, thereby losing all visual context, and making the 3-D model target look as if it were 
“free-floating” in air or water. 
     [2] Furthermore, the combination of the low resolution of 
the available base imagery, coupled with the lack of features that are easily identified at coarse 
image resolution (e.g., cross-roads, bridges, population centers) on the Northern Mariana Islands 
(e.g., Rota, Saipan, Tinian), was insufficient to support actual “visual point transfer” by PTW 
operators between the captured video images and the Digital Point Positioning Database 
(DPPDB). 
     [3] Finally, while the three-dimensional models of the TST 
vehicles and other equipment are good, they are too easy to pick out (initial detection), as they 
“lay on top” of the terrain instead of being part of it, thereby providing a false sense of the level 
of difficulty of initial TST detection with a video sensor (e.g., would provide false results in any 
attempt to quantify the TST timeline if measured from receipt of initial “tipper” indications or 
before).  
   (5)  Video Platform/Sensor Telemetry.  As in MC02/FBE-J, TES-N could 
not do any parsing or processing of the telemetry data provided by the ISR video platform M&S 
system other than display it, on-screen, “burned in” as part of the video images themselves.  This 
resulted in the manual entry of data, particularly latitude/longitude, into the TES-N target 
nomination creation template, significantly increasing both the time required, and the risk of data 
entry errors.  
 
 2.  Imagery via JCA: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  During both CPX and FTX, imagery from simulated 
national and other sources was produced in NITF format by the AutoSIGS system at M&S 
Central in Newport, and then transferred (FTP) to JCA’s Command IPL located at ONI in 
Suitland, MD.  JCA connectivity (via Challenge Athena III SHF SATCOM) allowed users 
aboard BLR to access the JCA IPL (via the web-based Quick Query or Q2 application), and pull 
the images down to the BLR IPL.  From there they could be accessed by either PTW or TES-N, 
the latter of which could pull the images over to its own system server, and process the NITF 
headers to register the images in its DBO (Database Organizer) application. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
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   (1)  JCA IPL Access and Country Codes.   There were two major hurdles 
to successful use of this method of image file transfer:  (a) the long and difficult process of 
getting procedures and permissions to access the “real world” JCA IPL (technically simple, but 
“culturally” complex); and, (b) modifying AutoSIGS software to allow production of NITF 
headers with a country code of something other than the default “CC” (in this case, “CQ” -- the 
NIMA country code for Northern Marianas), as the IPL software, both at JCA and on BLR, 
requires the use of actual, validated country codes in NITF file headers.  After much 
coordination, the AutoSIGS modifications were made, proper permissions were granted, and 
JCA IPL access procedures were developed in time to allow smooth operations by day four (17 
April 2003) of the CPX, after which there were no significant issues encountered.  
   (2)  AutoSIGS Image Quality.  As with the simulated video, the simulated 
imagery quality was sufficient for analysts to run through proper procedures for information and 
process flow in support of TST.  It would not, however, be sufficient for any experimentation 
involving actual imagery analysis, targeting, or battle damage assessment. 
 
 3.  U-2 Dragon Lady simulation (from AFSERS-TENCAP aboard BLR): 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  During both CPX and FTX, attempts were made to 
simulate the inputs into TES-N that would come from a U-2 Dragon Lady aircraft if it were 
downlinking directly to BLR as its ground/surface station.  These inputs fall into two categories: 
   (1)  Images.  Based on the collection tasking in the U-2 mission plan given 
to it (more on this in the “TES-N Outputs” section below), the AFSERS-TENCAP on BLR 
would FTP two images per collection “event” in NITF format to TES-N:  a low-resolution image 
to the TES-N Screener application, and a high-resolution image of that same area of coverage to 
the TES-N DBO application.   
   (2)  Telemetry.  AFSERS-TENCAP provides a data stream (UDP) to TES-
N that tells where the simulated U-2 is located at any given time, based upon the same mission 
plan referred to above (and in “TES-N Outputs” section below).  This capability worked only 
briefly during TT03/FBE-K (last two days of CPX) because of a number of complex issues 
including an initial lack of mission plans, an initial lack of a required software script, errors in 
subsequent mission plans, and suspected software problems in TES-N (addressed elsewhere in 
this paper). 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1)  Image Screener’s “Waterfall”.  Contrary to previous belief, there 
exists no capability in AFSERS-TENCAP to provide the “waterfall” type of display in the TES-
N Screener application that one would get from a live U-2 aircraft’s SAR or EO/IR imaging 
sensors in “search” (vs. “spot”) mode. 
   (2)  Image Quality.  The base imagery used by AFSERS-TENCAP of the 
Northern Marianas was a mix of 5-meter and 1-meter resolution imagery stitched together, 
providing significantly better resolution in some areas (where there was 1-meter coverage) than 
the base imagery used in AutoSIGS and AFSERS-MUSE. 
   (3)  Telemetry Processing Script.  To receive and process the telemetry 
data provided by AFSERS-TENCAP, TES-N needs to be running a script that is custom built for 
the task, and one that is apparently not part of the standard TES-N version 5.0 software build.  
The TES-N FSRs on BLR were unaware of any such script, but after several days of being 
convinced such a script existed, and then checking with the TES Operational Support Facility in 
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Baltimore, MD, they were able to install and run the script, and successfully receive and display 
the telemetry during the last two days of the CPX (19-20 April 2003).  
   (4) AFSERS-TENCAP simulated SAR imagery was illegible by TES-N.  
To simulate SAR imagery, AFSERS-TENCAP simply takes EO imagery and “degrades” its 
resolution using various techniques.  Unfortunately, when the sim-SAR imagery was received in 
the TES-N Screener application, it was so dark as to be totally useless to the imagery screener 
analyst.  Even when saved in TES-N’s DBO, the many imagery manipulation tools in TES-N 
could not enhance the image to retrieve any type of useful visual information.  The work-around 
was to have the simulated U-2 fly with an ASARS sensor (the only sensor type AFSERS-
TENCAP could reliably simulate), and yet produce EO images (NWDC Facilitators had to ask 
the players to “pretend” they were seeing SAR, and therefore could “see through” the cloud 
cover that “forced” them in the first place to not use UAV EO video, but to use U-2 SAR 
imagery instead).  
 
 4.  ELINT / ESM: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  During both CPX and FTX, attempts were made to 
send simulated ELINT/ESM from various M&S sources to the Tactical Data Dissemination 
System (TDDS) Network Management Center (TNMC) in Washington, DC, to be put onto the 
TDDS broadcast, with receipt of the broadcast on BLR being via organic means, and processing 
of exercise/experiment ELINT done using the GALE software in TES-N.  The various M&S 
ELINT/ESM sources and their success were: 
   (1)  JQUAD (Camp Smith, HI) -- intended for CPX only; received 
successfully aboard BLR on fourth day of CPX (17 April 2003); used for TES-N MSEL events 
for two days until JSAF-ASSET transmissions were successfully received on BLR (19 April). 
   (2)  JSAF-ASSET (NWDC Newport, RI) -- last two days of CPX, all of 
FTX. 
   (3)  ISR UUV-CSIM (NUWC Newport, RI) -- never successful going 
direct to TNMC (see below), but were able to email draft TACELINT to ASSET operator in 
Simms Hall who would ingest into ASSET and sent to TNMC.  
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1)  BLR/C7F internal ELINT flow.  For the first three days of the CPX, 
no exercise ELINT was received by any TT03/FBE-K afloat players.  This fact by itself (never 
mind the reasons for it) was difficult to identify because of major ELINT connectivity issues 
within the lifelines of BLR (e.g., bad connectors, wiring missing between TRE and TES-N) that 
took experts from ship, staff, and NWDC/SPAWAR (Meana) the better part of ten days prior to 
STARTEX, and into the first day of CPX, to troubleshoot and correct. 
   (2)  ASSET via TNMC.  TNMC would not accept simulated ELINT 
injects from JSAF-ASSET at Newport until the last two days of CPX (19 April 2003) [unable to 
verify reason for this delay].  In the meantime, the Newport ASSET operator coordinated with 
the Camp Smith JQUAD operator to provide ELINT injects for the TES-N TST MSELs, which 
worked successfully. 
   (3)  ISR UUV via TNMC.  The problem was with permissions from 
TNMC, apparently because COMPACFLT never forwarded the CESR to TNMC FORAC, and 
because TNMC  was comfortable with ASSET (having worked with it in many previous 
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exercises/experiments), but knew nothing of ISR UUV’s CSIM -- TNMC undoubtedly wanted to 
avoid taking any risks, due to the real world use (e.g., Gulf War II) of the TDDS broadcast. 
   (4)  GALE and ESM Lines-of-Bearing (LOBs).  One of the specific 
reasons for using the ISR UUV simulation in FBE-K FTX was to see how TES-N’s GALE 
software would process ESM LOBs of the sort most likely to be produced by an ISR UUV 
platform -- it apparently couldn’t.  Despite the presence of ELINT analytic/GALE operator 
expertise (both organic to C7F, and in the person of a Mobile Training Team {MTT} 
ELINT/GALE trainer), the TES-N GALE was unable to receive, process, and display 
TACELINT messages from ISR UUV that reported an LOB.  These messages were apparently 
being received and processed by GCCS-M, as a number of LOBs were seen on the GCCS-M 
COP with the simulated ISR UUVs as the origin of the LOB.  As a work-around, the NWDC 
Facilitators had the M&S operators in Newport send the TACELINTs as very thin, elongated 
ellipses -- so thin (semi-minor axis) that they would look like a single line on the display, with a 
center point around the simulated target producing the emission, and a length (semi-major axis) 
twice the length of the distance between the ISR UUV sensor and the simulated emitter, and 
oriented so that it looked like a line emanating from the ISR UUV’s location and passing through 
and beyond the target.  
 
 5.  COMINT: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
    (1)  CPX.  In the CPX, COMINT injects were to be crafted by scripters 
from Kunia Regional SIGINT Operations Center (KRSOC) who were resident in the TT03 
JECG at Camp Smith, HI.  These injects would then be sent via the SI broadcast to BLR, and 
received by a COMINT analyst using a TES-N MFWS.  What actually happened was the 
COMINT injects (once they got flowing) were received only on SCI GCCS-M, as that is the way 
the BLR SCI architecture was configured (see ISSUES/COMMENTS section below). 
   (2)  FTX.  In the FTX, the intention was to continue the participation of 
KRSOC scripters, and simply re-use their COMINT injects (with slight modifications as 
needed).  Unfortunately, the KRSOC scripters could not stay for the FTX, and as a result the 
COMINT injects during FTX boiled down to the NWDC Facilitator (Sweitzer) crafting a 
GESNSER-level COMINT spot report (roughly based on the gist of the MSEL injects) using MS 
Outlook on an IT-21 machine in the BLR JIC, and emailing the report to as the “initial tipper” to 
the appropriate MSEL events.   
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1)  CPX COMINT injects.  At CPX STARTEX, the KRSOC scripters 
were just arriving at the JECG, and it took several days to get set up, to work out procedures, and 
to have them provide enough detail for the COMINT injects to be of use as tippers to specific 
TST MSEL events.  The COMINT analyst at the SCI GCCS-M would receive the injects as 
emails, print them off, and walk them (about 20-25 feet) over to where the TST team was 
manning their TES-N terminals.  This only worked, without prompting from the NWDC 
Facilitators, on the last day of the CPX (20 April). 
   (2)  No COMINT analysis tools in TES-N.  The attempt to use the SCI 
side of TES-N was a total wash, as it turns out TES-N does not have any true COMINT analysis 
tools (as does SCI GCCS-M), other than allowing the viewing of SCI messages such as 
KLIEGLIGHTS or TACREPS, and the plotting of locational data on a map -- both of which SCI 
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GCCS-M already does (and in C7F cryptologists’ view, does better).  For this reason, C7F 
cryptologists (along with the rest of the Navy’s cryptologic community -- at least according to 
the C7F Fleet Cryptologist) have chosen to not use TES-N for COMINT analysis.  
Consequently, none of the required connectivity (other than JWICS Intelink web-browsing 
access, and SCI-level chat) for using SCI TES-N was not in place for use during TT03/FBE-K.  
While attempts were made to effect this connectivity during TT03/FBE-K, the effort was seen by 
NWDC Facilitators and C7F personnel as being low priority compared to other issues being 
dealt with simultaneously (both in TT03/FBE-K and in the “real world”), so it never got done. 
   (3)  TES-N ISSE Guard was non-functional on BLR.  Part of the concept 
of using SCI TES-N for the COMINT analyst member of the TST team was to exercise use of 
the Information Support Server Environment Guard (ISSE) Guard to move appropriate data from 
the SCI side of TES-N to the GENSER side of TES-N in support of TST processes.  
Unfortunately, no BLR/C7F personnel, TES-N FSRs, or JFN Mobile Training Team (MTT) 
members knew anything about configuring or operating the ISSE Guard. 
    
C.  TES-N OUTPUTS. 
 
 1.  Target nomination messages (ATI.ATRs) to ADOCS and to TST Target Folder 
Server: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  The objective was for the TST nomination analyst to 
use TES-N to create a target nomination message (in USMTF “ATI.ATR” format), and to send 
that nomination message (via SMTP) to the ADOCS server on BLR, and to the TST Target 
Folder server at NWDC in Newport, RI.  [ADOCS was set up so that it would not only receive 
the ATI.ATR from TES-N, but after parsing it would turn around another ATI.ATR to the TST 
Target Folder server -- so that the target folder for any given TES-N created TST nomination had 
both the ATI.ATR that come directly from TES-N, and the ATI.ATR that was “turned around” 
by ADOCS].  The first successful nomination output by TES-N as part of a TST MSEL event 
was accomplished on CPX day five (18 April 2003); the process worked for the last three days of 
CPX and the first day of FTX, was inoperative for three days, and then worked again for the last 
four days of the FTX. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1)  Nomination creation and sending.  It took four days to rectify issues 
with SMTP across the various networks and systems (TES-N LAN, ship’s LAN/Exchange 
server, FBE-K WAN and Exchange servers, ADOCS mail server) to first get TES-N’s ATI.ATR 
messages to be received by ADOCS and the TST Target Folder server.  In the case of the TST 
Target Folder server, access was impossible for the first three days of CPX TST MSEL events 
due to the FBE WAN being inoperable until CPX day four (17 April 2003).  Once set up 
properly, no problems were encountered until FTX day two (26 April 2003) when the 
nominations began getting “stuck” in the TES-N outgoing message queue, and by the next day 
TES-N would not even allow the analyst creating the ATI.ATR to save it to the TES-N database, 
a prerequisite to sending the target nomination message out.  The cause was determined by the 
FSRs to be corrupted files in the TES-N Cross-INT filter database (e.g., log files were over-
filled), a problem that took approximately three days to troubleshoot and correct, during which 
time all target nominations were manually entered into ADOCS (e.g., “yellow-sticky” transfer 
from TES-N analysts to Targeting Officer sitting at ADOCS workstation in BLR JIC).   
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   (2)  Problems with parsing/formatting.  Almost immediately after the first 
successful ATI.ATR output by TES-N, ADOCS users began complaining that the TES-N 
analysts were not giving the nominated targets a proper target identification (TGTD).  Two days 
later (i.e., on the last day of CPX), inconsistencies were noticed in how the target nominations 
were being handled by ADOCS and how they were showing up in the TST Target Folder server. 
 Not until late in the evening of FTX day five was controlled testing able to be done by the 
NWDC Facilitator (Sweitzer), during which fault was found in both TES-N and ADOCS.  Part 
of the confusion was because the TES-N target nomination creation template allows the analyst 
to give the target an identification (e.g., type, equipment name, etc.) using either the “TST” or 
the “TGTD” lines, but not both.  ADOCS, on the other hand, apparently only uses the “TGTD” 
line for target identification.  For instance, when the TES-N ATI.ATR message used the “TST” 
line, ADOCS would “turn around” to the TST Target Folder server an ATI.ATR with no “TST” 
line and a blank “TGTD” line (e.g., “TGTD/-//-//”); whereas, if the TES-N message used the 
“TGTD” line, ADOCS would “turn around” an ATI.ATR with both a “TGTD” line (whose fields 
were out of order and truncated compared to the original ATI.ATR) and at “TST” line 
(containing the same fields as “TGTD” line).  ADOCS also changed several other fields of other 
lines for no known reason, most notably the “DTG” line and field contents.     
 
 2.  Images related to target nominations to PTW for aimpoint refinement: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  The objective was for the TST nomination analyst to 
attach the image or several images (e.g., video “chips” showing the TST) to the outgoing target 
nomination, and send the nomination simultaneously to three places: 
   (1) to ADOCS to begin weapon-target paring and engagement processes; 
   (2) to the TST Target Folder server to either create a new target folder or 
update an existing target folder; and, 
   (3) to PTW to begin the aimpoint refinement process.  It was known long 
before STARTEX, however, that the version of PTW used on BLR for TT03/FBE-K could not 
receive and parse ATI.ATR messages (i.e., did not have the DTMS software used in MC02/FBE-
J).  The work-around was supposed to be that the PTW operator would open the target folder 
(after it had been created in the TST Target Folder server by step (2) above) and pull down the 
images from there. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1) TES-N does not allow images to be attached to outgoing ATI.ATRs.  
Even in TES-N version 5.0, analysts still cannot attach images to outgoing ATI.ATR messages.  
Consequently, all images captured, “chipped” and saved (as NITF) in TES-N had to be manually 
transferred (FTP) to PTW.  The PTW operator would then pull up the images and conduct 
aimpoint refinement (only sometimes, due to manning constraints and base image quality issues 
-- see “M&S FEEDS INTO TES-N” section above), and then save the images (as both JPEG and 
NITF) to a shared directory on the BLR IT-21 LAN. 
 
 
 3.  Images related to target nominations to TST Target Folder Server: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  The objective was for the TST nomination analyst to 
attach the image or several images (e.g., video “chips” showing the TST) to the outgoing target 
nomination so that the TST Target Folder server could add the image(s) to the target folder for 
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that TST.  Because even the new version 5.0 of TES-N software still cannot attach images to 
ATI.ATRs, the workaround for getting images into the TST target folders was for the NWDC 
Facilitator (Sweitzer), and later some of the players (once the were taught) would use MS 
Outlook on an IT-21 machine to manually create a one-line ATI.ATR email (using the “TNO” 
line only) with the subject line “Target”, pull the image(s) from the shared directory and attach 
to the email, and send to the TST Target Folder server.  The server would then parse the email, 
and use the “TNO” to update the correct target folder with both the ATI.ATR info and, more 
importantly, the images themselves. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1) TST Target Folder server worked great.  The NWDC TST Target 
Folder server application proved to be a simple but powerful prototype that was important to 
both the CPX and the FTX (though up until two weeks prior to STARTEX its role in CPX was 
still unknown).  Its importance became clear when, mid-way through FTX, there was one brief 
period where the parser script stopped working properly -- and while it was rapidly and easily re-
started, the level and swiftness of “protest” from the participants made clear it had become an 
important factor for them.  Despite so many process artificialities, the players were able to see 
the value of a common, web-accessible repository for information and images related to any 
given TST, thereby hopefully preparing those aboard BLR for the program of record target 
folder application (Joint Targeting Toolbox) that was to be installed later this Spring.  
 
 4.  TST location output to COP (i.e., Manual Contact to GCCS-M) for “tracking” and 
SA: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  The objective was for the TST nomination analyst to 
not only create an ATI.ATR as above, but to then use TES-N’s rudimentary interface to GCCS-
M to input the target into the COP as a track, for the situational awareness of ALCON, and to 
assist (theoretically) in the “tracking” of the TST while waiting for it to be engaged. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1) GCCS-M configuration on BLR was sub-optimal.  The GCCS-M 
configuration on BLR had a wide variety of serious issues (e.g., different software versions from 
machine to machine), some of which took the entire event to straighten out.  This effort impacted 
the TES-N to GCCS-M interface in that, even though  
   (2) TES-N output to GCCS-M was inoperative on BLR for CPX.  Even 
with the new TES-N version 5.0, there was no improvement in TES-N’s ability to output to 
GCCS-M from what was used in MC02/FBE-J.  In fact, the capability did not exist until the 
NWDC Facilitators came aboard and showed the C7F staff how the creation of a “Manual 
Contact” in TES-N at the same location as the nominated TST (which was already in TES-N’s 
Cross-INT database and was displayable using TES-N’s Integrated Tactical Display [ITD] 
application) could then be set up to be sent periodically as a formatted message (OTH-Gold or 
XCTC) to GCCS-M’s JOTS1.  It took the entire CPX to focus enough time and energy to 
troubleshoot this interface and get it working.  It worked for the first two days of FTX, and then 
suffered the same problem as the TES-N target nominations (i.e., nothing could be saved to the 
Cross-INT database) and was never able to be brought back up -- consequently, the GCCS-M 
“Red database analyst” was never able to become part of the process (e.g., changing the “hard-
wired” TES-N-assigned track name to reflect the Target Block Number assigned to that TST by 
TES-N during the target nomination creation process). 
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   (3) BOTTOM LINE:  the TES-N output to GCCS-M only worked for two 
days at the same rudimentary and suboptimal level at which it was working for MC02/FBE-J; for 
the remainder of TT03/FBE-K it was functionally inoperative. 
 
 5.  U-2 mission plan creation and output to AFSERS-TENCAP: 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  Because the Air Force (specifically JFACC Rear at 
Hickam AFB) was unable to create U-2 mission plans for TT03/FBE-K (citing real world 
commitments of their experts), and because the JFN Mobile Training Team members were 
delayed coming aboard (due to early BLR sortie from Guam for typhoon avoidance), NWDC 
Facilitator (Sweitzer) used a well-written help-tutorial on-line in TES-N’s EMPS application to 
create a mission plan to output to AFSERS-TENCAP for its use in providing a simulated feed of 
U-2 imagery and telemetry back to TES-N. [Note: a U-2 mission plan, or “OP” in EMPS 
terminology, consists of a navigation plan and a collection plan built using a specific set of 
collection requirements for a specific sensor type, associated with a specific aircraft tail number, 
flying a specific track, downlinking to a specific ground station]. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1) EMPS uses different maps than ITD.  One example of the 
“immaturity” of the internal integration between many of TES-N’s applications is the fact that 
EMPS (Enhanced Mission Planning System) uses completely different maps than does ITD 
(Integrated Tactical Display).  Not only does it load the maps from a different set of files, but the 
user interface (e.g., zoom, pan, etc.) is completely different (and very cumbersome).  This made 
the process of mission plan creation even more difficult to learn, and was just another element 
that added to the delay in getting the U-2 simulation to work properly.  
   (2) AFSERS-TENCAP can only reliably simulate ASARS sensors.  
AFSERS-TENCAP could not ingest the initial U-2 mission plans built for the EO sensor 
packages (SYERS and SYERS 2).  The AFSERS-TENCAP technician on board BLR said that, 
as far as he knew, AFSERS-TENCAP simulation only worked with the SAR sensors packages 
(ASARS, ASARS 2, and ASARS 2A).  Finally, on the second to last day of CPX (19 April 2003, 
Patriots Day in Massachusetts), a U-2 ASARS 2 mission plan was successfully built in EMPS, 
output to and ingested by AFSERS-TENCAP, and “played back” into TES-N, with both 
telemetry and images (albeit EO and not SAR) being received and displayed properly by TES-N.  
 
 6.  DIOP of U-2 imagery and telemetry to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC (FTX) 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  The objective in CPX was to have the U-2 
simulation coming into TES-N from AFSERS-TENCAP “turned around” to the ISRM 
(Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Manager -- which is in reality a TES RTC just re-
named by USAF) at Hickam AFB using the TES-N Data Input/Output Port (DIOP).  DIOP is a 
proprietary means of efficiently transferring the large amounts of data between “TES family” 
systems such as TES, TES-N, RTCs, and ISRM  (as the TES-N training manual says, “DIOP 
allows real-time screening and exploitation of direct downlink tactical imagery by users without 
direct sensor access.”).  Doing the same to the TES-N RTC aboard USS ESSEX (ESX) during 
FTX had been discussed early in FBE planning, but had been considered cancelled due to real-
world events -- in the end, ESX turned out to be available, and so DIOP was attempted (although 
somewhat “ex-scenario” as ESX had no other means of participation in the TST MSEL events).  
The DIOP connectivity between BLR, ISRM, and ESX RTC tested successfully before CPX 
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STARTEX using recorded mission tapes and demo files built from actual U-2 missions 
specifically to demonstrate and train the DIOP capability when no live U-2 was airborne and 
downlinking. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS:  AFSERS-TENCAP simulation stream cannot be 
“DIOP’d”.  On the last day of the CPX (20 April 2003), after a day of successful receipt into 
TES-N of simulated U-2 imagery and telemetry produced by AFSERS-TENCAP, the NWDC 
Facilitators asked the TES-N FSRs to attempt to DIOP the sim-U-2 feeds to ISRM at Hickam.  
This revealed that, because AFSERS-TENCAP uses different processes (FTP for imagery and 
UDP for telemetry) to provide the inputs to TES-N than a live U-2 (which would be sending it 
through the CDL-N and CIP), the AFSERS-TENCAP feeds could not be turned around using 
DIOP [unable to get further specifics as to why, but suspect it has to do with the custom script 
that had to be installed and run to receive AFSERS-TENCAP simulation in the first place -- see 
“M&S FEEDS TO TES-N” section above].  
 
 7.  File transfer to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC / RTC Lites (FTX) 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  Because “DIOP” is only for the transfer of U-2 
imagery that is being (or has just been) directly downlinked, other file types must be exchanged 
between TES-N and remotes like ISRM and RTCs using standard means such as FTP and 
SMTP.  During FTX only, three RTC Lites were employed, one aboard the vSSN (virtual 
submarine simulator at NUWC, Newport, RI), one aboard the E2XV (Experimental Hawkeye-
2003 surrogate van in the NWDC parking lot in Newport, RI), and one aboard the virtual DDX 
(at NSWC Dahlgren, VA).  
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1)  FTP and SMTP worked great.  With the exception of the very first day 
of CPX when the ISRM at Hickam was not yet manned, all attempts to transfer files between 
TES-N and ISRM (in CPX) and ESX RTC (in FTX) by FTP or SMTP were successful. 
   (2)  RTC Lites worked -- eventually.  The RTC Lite at NUWC had been 
used in previous FBEs, and was fairly easy to get up and going.  Configuring the other two RTC 
Lites was a difficult task to which little effort could be committed (due to their low priority 
relative to other issues that were consuming the FSRs’ attentions).  The vDDX RTC Lite began 
receiving exercise data on FTX day four (28 April 2003), and the E2XV RTC Lite on FTX day 
six (30 April 2003).  The actual utility of these RTC Lites to those “virtual shooter” nodes 
remains indeterminate. 
 
 8.  Cross-INT replication from TES-N to ISRM (CPX) and ESSEX RTC (FTX) 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  Replication of TES-N’s Cross-INT database was 
attempted to both ISRM (CPX) and the ESX RTC (FTX), but with very limited success. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS: 
   (1) During CPX, Cross-INT was not replicated to ISRM.  Due to higher 
priority issues, replication between BLR TES-N and the ISRM at Hickam (which is for all 
practical purposes a TES RTC) was only attempted CPX day six, but was unsuccessful due to 
instability problems with ISRM. 
   (2) During FTX, Cross-INT was replicated to ESX RTC -- worked too 
well!  Starting on FTX day two (not attempted on FTX day one), Cross-INT replication with 
ESX RTC was successful -- for two days.  In fact, according the preliminary evaluation by the 
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TES-N FSRs on BLR, the large amounts of data “pulled” [NFI] by ESX RTC was probably the 
major contributor to the corruption of TES-N’s Cross-INT filter database files that caused TES-
N to be NMC (non-mission capable) for TST support during FTX days three and four.  In order 
to assist with troubleshooting and ensure TES-N stability for the reminder of FTX, no further 
replication with ESX RTC was attempted.  [Instead, TES-N analysts from ESSEX flew over to 
BLR for the last two days of FTX so they could take advantage of the presence of the JFN MTT 
and the M&S flows into TES-N].      
   (3) Target Nominations created in TES-N are not replicated to ISRM / 
RTC.  This means Target Nominations created by TES-N have to be passed by some other 
means to ISRM / RTC.  During CPX, target nominations were passed to JFACC Rear (Hickam 
AFB, HI) via chat; during FTX, target nominations were not passed at all the ESX RTC, as they 
were not “players” per se in the TST MSEL events. 
 
D.  OTHER. 
 
 1.  GCCS-M COP Tracks into TES-N ITD. 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  In addition to TES-N’s rudimentary capability to 
send “Manual Contacts” to GCCS-M, COP tracks can also be sent from GCCS-M to TES-N.  
The objective of attempting to do so in TT03/FBE-K was to provide a richer context of contacts, 
tracks, Blue ISR asset locations, etc. in TES-N for the analysts trying to “find and fix” TSTs. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS:  
   (1)  TES-N receipt of GCCS-M tracks had problems.  During CPX, 
NWDC Facilitators were only able to make occasional, hasty checks (due to higher priority 
issues) on the status of GCCS-M tracks being received in TES-N.  During each check, TES-N’s 
incoming “Message and Data Log” showed a good number of incoming tracks from GCCS-M, 
but those tracks did not appear to be parsing into the TES-N ITD [unable to compare the number 
of tracks sent by GCCS-M to the number of those tracks successfully received by TES-N].  On 
the first day of the FTX, it was discovered that no GCCS-M tracks had been received in TES-N 
for the several day transition period between CPX and FTX.  After a few hours the problem was 
rectified, and the tracks flowed as before for a day (but unable to be displayed on ITD), but then 
TES-N experienced the Cross-INT filter database file corruption problem (see above).  After one 
more “down day,” receipt of tracks was again restored, but still no ITD display capability.  
Finally, with four days left in the FTX, the GCCS-M tracks coming into TES-N were able to be 
brought up on the ITD; however, it was discovered that TES-N ITD did not display any track 
labels (see issue (2) directly following). 
   (2)  TES-N ITD displayed GCCS-M track locations, but no labels.  When 
GCCS-M tracks were brought up in TES-N’s ITD, the tracks appeared in their proper locations 
(albeit using TES-N symbology which is based on MIL-STD-2525, and not with GCCS-M 
symbololgy) but the symbols do not have any labels associated with them (e.g., no track names), 
making them all but functionally useless to the TST team.   
 
 2.  M&S simulated ISR asset display in GCCS-M COP. 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  By the end of FTX, all of the simulated Blue ISR 
assets active in M&S were simultaneously displayed on BLR’s GCCS-M COP with appropriate 
labels (e.g., two ISR UUVs, two Predator UAVs, one U-2). 
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  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS:  This was the first time known to either NWDC 
Facilitator on BLR that this has happened in an FBE.  The key enablers were very closely 
coordinated troubleshooting between the NWDC Facilitator (Meana), the FBE-K ATO builder 
(Specht), the M&S Director (Dial), and the GCCS-M Tech on BLR (DeMarco).  
 
 3.  Live P-3C video downlink via CDL-N into TES-N [ex-scenario]. 
  a.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS:  During the two weeks prior to TT03/FBE-K (on 5 
April 2003), a VPU aircraft was able to spend the better part of a day within line-of-sight of 
BLR, specifically to test the live downlink of EO/IR video from the aircraft’s new TCDL into 
TES-N using the ship’s CDL-N antenna and CVIU (no NIU).  With assistance from NWDC 
Facilitators (Meana in particular), and with remote contractor support by phone, sailors from 
BLR ships company and C7F staff were able to employ the lessons learned from four previous 
unsuccessful attempts to make this event successful. 
  b.  ISSUES/COMMENTS:   While this event was ex-scenario with regards to 
TT03/FBE-K it did several things that positively impacted TT03/FBE-K, including: 
   (1)  testing the internal TES-N video path from video switch to MFWS; 
   (2)  familiarizing TES-N analysts with the TES-N video screening and 
frame capture tools (as well as the quality of live video, with which they could contrast 
simulated video); 
   (3)  helping to solidify the NWDC Facilitators as “part of the team”. 
    
Lessons Learned 
A.  “What would you have done differently with 20/20 hindsight?"  From the technical 
perspective, almost nothing -- almost all “lessons TO BE learned” are in the areas of FBE 
conduct, Fleet “ownership” and involvement, etc. 
 
B.  “What did we learn by employing this technology?”  
 
 1.  Learned once again that TES-N is a complex and developmentally immature system 
whose strength/weakness are directly related to the strengths/weaknesses of its interfaces with 
communications, with other JFN systems, and with ADOCS. 
 
 2.  Learned once again that getting TES-N and the rest of the JFN equipment and its 
many intricate interfaces to really “work” (fully mission capable) requires the regular (daily?) 
attention of a wide range of cooperating technicians and system operators, both on board and off 
board, using scripted scenarios (if not live downlink events) to force issues to surface that would 
never appear in mere system demonstrations or static testing. 
 
C.  “What did we learn from the issues that were encountered?”  The answer to this will not 
be truly known until the next such experimentation event involving TES-N / JFN.  
 
Recommendations 
A.  Continue to improve quality of M&S video and imagery (e.g., 1-meter base), and platform / 




B.  Thoroughly test TES-N to ADOCS target nomination interface prior to event STARTEX, 
including a close examination of how individual data fields are handled through the whole 
process. 
 
C.  Continue attempts to incorporate program-of-record digital target folder solution (e.g., Joint 
Targeting Toolbox, based on MIDB) into future ISR / TST experimentation events. 
 
D.  Clarify division of labor (and increase frequency of joint planning sessions) between: 
– Functional leads 
– IKA team 
– Technical team 
 
E.  Assign COP ownership and explicitly state roles and responsibilities (of above three, plus 
players) 
 
F.  Document Control (a la “TEP”) 
– publish schedule (“spirals”) for document inputs 
– larger issue than just tech team (should be FBE-wide -- IKA lead?) 
 





   
 
 









Appendix D FBE-K SEA-STRIKE OBSERVATIONS: ISR AND JFN 
 
This Appendix was provided by Wayne "Doc" Sweitzer of Titan Corporation 
 
1.  What follows are observations of the FBE-K ISR Planner made during the planning and 
execution of the Sea Strike portion of TT03/FBE-K. 
2.  DISCLAIMER:  This document may appear to “list” toward negative, as it is meant to be the 
author’s frank professional opinions and recommendations as to where future FBEs might be 
improved, and not a list of accomplishments.  These observations are based on direct, personal 
experience in FBE-K, and in numerous previous FBEs.  Nothing herein is intended to suggest 
fault or assign blame.  The observations are strictly those of the author, and should not be 
construed as the official position, in whole or in part, of the Navy Warfare Development 
Command or Titan Corporation. 
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Section 2:  FBE PLANNING, ORGANIZATION, AND EXECUTION OBSERVATIONS 
Section 3:  FBE TECHNICAL AND SYSTEMS OBSERVATIONS 
Attachment A:  CPX Constraints 
Attachment B:  ISR UUV Functional Flow Diagrams 
Attachment C:  TES-N Status Board 
Attachment D:  Technical AAR Paper 
SECTION 1:  BACKGROUND. 
 
1.1  Fleet Battle Experiment - Kilo (FBE-K) was conducted during April-May 2003 in concert 
with Exercise Tandem Thrust 2003 (TT03).  The Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) was 
Commander, United States Seventh Fleet (C7F), with Navy Warfare Development Command 
(NWDC) as the primary organization coordinating FBE-K, and the Joint Warfighting Center 
(JWFC) as the primary organization coordinating TT03. 
 
1.2  TT03/FBE-K took place in two major phases:  a Command Post Exercise (CPX), followed 
by a Field Training Exercise (FTX). 
 
 1.2.1  During CPX, the C7F Staff was being evaluated by JWFC for its ability to perform 
the role of an afloat Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF).  FBE-K Sea Strike ISR/JFN play was 
limited to connectivity and interface testing, and basic Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) process 
walk-throughs with essentially one full-time C7F Staff member. 
 
 1.2.2  During FTX, NWDC (the Sea Strike team in particular) was tasked to help C7F 
conduct basic Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) processes using the Joint Fires Network (JFN) 




1.3  During FBE-K, the Joint Fires Network (JFN) was considered by NWDC to be comprised of 
three major subsystems: 
 
 1.3.1  Tactical Exploitation System - Navy (TES-N), with applications / subsystems 
including (but not limited to): 
   - Geographic Area Limitation Environment (GALE); 
   - Enhanced Mission Planning System (EMPS); 
   - Integrated Tactical Display (ITD); 
   - Remote Terminal Capability (RTC); 
   - Remote Terminal Capability - Lite (RTC-Lite). 
  
 1.3.2  Global Command and Control System - Maritime (GCCS-M); 
 
 1.3.3   Joint Service Imagery Processing System - Navy (JSIPS-N), with applications / 
subsystems including (but not limited to): 
   - Precision Targeting Workstation (PTW); 
   - Image Product Library (IPL); 
   - Joint Concentrator Architecture (JCA). 
 
1.4  FBE-K events involving Sea Strike ISR and JFN were primarily conducted aboard USS 
BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) at sea off the Northern Mariana Islands (including Guam, Rota, Tinian, 
Saipan).  Other involved nodes included:  the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) laboratory at 
NWDC in Newport, RI, with a virtual E2X (E2XV) van parked just outside; the virtual SSN and 
ISR Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (ISR UUV) M&S at the Naval Undersea Warfare Command 
(NUWC), Newport, RI; the virtual DDX (vDDX) M&S at Dahlgren, VA; a virtual ANZAC ship 
at Fern Hill, Australia; a JFACC Rear (CPX only) at Hickam AFB, HI; and USS ESSEX (LHD-
2).     
 
  
SECTION 2:  FBE PLANNING, ORGANIZATION, AND EXECUTION OBSERVATIONS. 
 
2.1  Continuity Between Concept Development and Experiment Implementation. 
 
 Observation:  A lack of continuity existed between the development of FBE-K 
concepts/initiatives involving ISR/JFN, and the actual FBE-K planning/implementation.  Among 
other things, this discontinuity hampered the development of meaningful analytic questions, and 
the experimental techniques to help answer those questions. 
 
 Discussion:  By the time the FBE-K ISR Planner was brought aboard, there was no one 
available who could articulate the original thinking behind the general concepts and initiatives 
involving ISR and JFN that had been dictated for use during FBE-K (e.g.:  “Pervasive 
sensing...from large numbers of heterogeneous, widely distributed sensors”; “Dynamic 
management of a tiered UAV architecture”; etc.).  And because the FBE-K ISR Planner had not 
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been part of the original concept and initiative development process, the planning and 
implementation of an experiment (or more accurately, a component of a larger experiment 
inherently rife with its own constraints -- see Attachment A) that would meaningfully advance 
those concepts as originally intended was for all practical purposes impossible.  Development of 
“analysis questions” was particularly problematic, as the thinkers who came up with the concepts 
and initiatives were not there to help define the details of what it was they were intending to 
subject to experimentation. 
 
 Recommendation:  Those involved in the development of experimental concepts and 
initiatives must remain fully engaged throughout the FBE planning process, if not also during the 
execution and after-action analysis, to ensure the FBE is properly focused on addressing the 
original intent of those concepts and initiatives. 
 
2.2 Staff Participation; Fleet Training vs. Experimentation. 
 
 Observation:  From the ISR perspective, FBE-K degenerated almost completely into a 
JFN systems training event, largely because participation by C7F Staff and Fleet forces in the 
planning, preparation, and execution was constrained to such an extent as to preclude meaningful 
ISR and JFN-related experimentation. 
 
 Discussion:  Fleet Battle Experiments have been wedded to Numbered Fleet participation 
from their inception, sometimes more successfully than at other times.  FBE-K was clearly one 
of the “other times”, at least in the areas of ISR and JFN.  A major reason for this was the limited 
C7F Staff and Fleet participation evident during all of the major FBE planning conferences (and 
most TT03 planning meetings as well), where only one intelligence planner and no operations 
planners were available to participate in ISR and JFN-related working groups. 
 The lack of participation by Staff and Fleet operations personnel (N3) was particularly 
detrimental as, without operations, the intelligence (N2) portions of ISR and JFN are all but 
meaningless (i.e., the proverbial “self-licking ice cream cone”).  The limits of C7F staff 
participation were most obvious during FBE-K execution when the only non-N2 C7F staff 
“players” in ISR and JFN-related events were the civilian Science Advisor and two Navy 
Lieutenants (one of whom was for all practical purposes available only part-time).  Certainly the 
travel distances and time zones separating NWDC planners and C7F Staff exacerbated the 
difficulties during planning, as did concurrent C7F staff requirements to plan for both upcoming 
exercises and “real world” contingencies.  While the constraints were obvious and largely 
understandable, the fact remains that the limited C7F staff participation precluded any 
meaningful ISR and JFN-related experimentation during FBE-K. 
 In fact, the only thing in the ISR/JFN initiative that was truly “experimental” was the 
inclusion of the ISR UUV simulation in the FTX MSEL events.  The employment of the two 
simulated ISR UUVs from the vSSN at NUWC forced an initial level of interaction between the 
ASW and Sea Strike initiatives, and more importantly exposed some key Fleet players to this 
emerging technology.  
 Other than the ISR UUV experimentation, the event degenerated into what amounted to 
an extended JFN training opportunity for junior C7F N2 personnel (Navy Lieutenant and below). 
 The training was conducted aboard USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) by two “Facilitators” 
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supporting NWDC (specifically, a SPAWAR civilian and this author), backed by an extensive 
and expensive infrastructure of technical, modeling and simulation, and experiment control 
personnel and systems. 
 A JFN Mobile Training Team (MTT) was supposed to be available to help with TES-N 
training during  the FBE, but they did not make it aboard until FTX.  Once aboard, they did 
provide useful assistance, but by then most of the TES-N operators were proficient enough to not 
require further assistance to accomplish what was required during this FBE. 
 While the event was no doubt helpful to C7F, and even in certain ways to NWDC, it is 
highly questionable as to whether Fleet training is an appropriate role for NWDC, never mind 
consideration of the return on investment made. 
  
 Recommendation:  Ensure ISR and JFN related experimentation involving a Numbered 
Fleet has full buy-in and participation of that Numbered Fleet staff, particularly the operations 
(N3) staff.  Be prepared to postpone or cancel experimentation events that are dependent on 
Numbered Fleet staff participation as soon as it becomes obvious that the bulk of that staff’s 
focus will and should be elsewhere other than on experimentation.  And focus experiments on 
experimentation, and not on Fleet training / exercises.  
 
2.3  NWDC Division of Labor and FBE “Supporting Services”. 
 
 Observation:  FBE-K experienced some of the same difficulties with intra-NWDC 
organizational challenges and “division of labor” issues as past FBEs.  While these were 
decidedly not “showstoppers” in FBE-K, future FBE planning and execution could be 
significantly enhanced by their rectification. 
 
 Discussion:  The FBE planning and execution tasks of the Functional Leads, the IKA 
Team, and the Technical Team each have significant overlaps that need to be more clearly 
addressed and delineated.  While personal cooperation and teamwork ultimately “win the day” 
and make things work in the end, the road to getting there could stand some smoothing and 
straightening in a number of areas.  
 One of the more difficult FBE organizational challenges is the fact that the Technical 
Team does not work directly for the Maritime Battle Center, and so is only nominally under the 
control of the FBE Director.  This naturally leads to occasional difficulties in areas such as:  
prioritization of resources such as technical expertise and finances; “taskings” from the 
Technical Team (e.g., to cover meetings, to provide documentation by certain deadlines) that can 
be in conflict with where the Functional Leads are headed when; and other challenges that 
sometimes leave the impression that the technical “tail” is wagging the functional “dog” (and to 
be fair, often times the “tail” if forced to do so, because the functional “dogs” are not fully 
prepared to provide requirements in the detail needed on the technical side to make architectural 
and resource decisions required by fast-approaching deadlines/“lead times”).   
 A second challenge is the fact that IKA is viewed as a separate FBE functional initiative, 
akin to ISR/Fires, ASW, AADC, IO, etc., when in fact a great deal of what IKA should be 
involved in during FBEs is the information/knowledge management “layer” between the 
functional initiatives and the Technical Team’s network services.  It would be helpful in future 
FBEs to make a clear distinction between IKA functional initiatives, and the “I/KM services” 
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(e.g., websites, collaboration tools, document control, etc.) supporting the other functional 
initiatives -- and more importantly, who is responsible to whom for what. 
 Similarly, there are other FBE “supporting services” that too often get overlooked and/or 
taken for granted as “going to be there” (e.g., COP, intelligence/ISR, OPFOR, maps and charts, 
etc.), and as a result sometimes get less attention than needed, or sometimes fall through the 
cracks entirely.  For instance, who is responsible (between Functional Leads, IKA Team, and 
Technical Team) for obtaining the correct maps and charts (softcopy and otherwise) and 
ensuring distribution to, and installation for, all who need them?  Who is responsible for what 
aspects (e.g., obtaining, installing, maintaining) of underlying databases such as DPPDB and 
MIDB?  Who is the FBE Lead responsible for “OPFOR” and Red Cell? 
 Fortunately, because FBE-K was dramatically reduced from its original scope, many of 
these issues never reached their “full potential” as FBE challenges (although some still did).  
Without early clarification of these roles and responsibilities, future FBEs could be much more 
significantly impacted. 
 
 Recommendation:  Provide greater clarity on intra-NWDC “division of labor” for all the 
various aspects of FBE planning and execution.  Explicitly identify “supporting services” (such 
as information/knowledge management and COP/database maintenance) that are above the 
strictly technical level, but are distinct from any “supported” functional/experimental initiatives. 
 Assign appropriate roles, responsibilities, and resources to address each of these services.  
 
2.4   Document Control. 
 
 Observation:  Like most previous FBEs, FBE-K suffered from a lack of document control 
for most of the key coordinating documents. 
 
 Discussion:  FBE planning (and sometimes execution) is too often hampered by a lack of 
“command and control” over key planning and coordination documents.  These documents 
include (but are not limited to): 
  - the “official” FBE overview brief; 
  - manning spreadsheet; 
  - master SOE / MSEL list; 
  - participating live forces list; 
  - orders of battle (blue, red, white), both simulated and live; 
  - operational sequence diagrams (OSDs); 
  - the Conolidated Exercise Support Request (CESR). 
 FBEs by their nature involve personnel located all over the country, and sometimes 
literally around the globe, placing even greater importance on the need to keep all planners 
working from the same “sheets of music” (to adapt the well-worn analogy).  Symptoms caused 
by loose document control that have been experienced first hand (and otherwise) in past FBEs 
have included, but are not limited to: 
- confusion resulting from failure to identify key FBE documents, and assign 
explicit “ownership” responsibility for each document; 
- lack of participation by intended document contributors, often due to the 
document “owner” not making the roles & responsibilities of contributors clear; 
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- duplication of effort (e.g., two or three authors producing essentially the same 
documentation concurrently); 
- man-hours wasted editing old versions of documents, only to find out later the 
edits are O.B.E.; 
- limited accessibility to the “most current version” of key documents, and/or 
limited visibility into what the “most current version number” is at any given 
time. 
 The major notable exception during FBE-K (and FBE-J before it) was the Technical 
Engineering Plan (TEP), the “C2” of which should be used as a model for future control of all 
major FBE documents, with perhaps some improvement in visibility into the “most current 
version number” (for example, via a listing of “the latest” document version numbers posted on a 
well-maintained web site). 
 
 Recommendation:  Early in the FBE planning stages, identify key coordinating 
documents (and their owners), and implement an FBE-wide common methodology for the 
cooperative production, review, maintenance and accessibility of those documents -- while at the 
same time keeping this “FBE document control” methodology / system as accessible, flexible, 
and non-burdensome as possible.  
 
2.5   Live Forces, ISR Assets, OPFOR, Emitters, and Fires. 
 
 Observation:  As advanced as today’s M&S is, it is no substitute for the incorporation of 
live forces and live operations into Fleet Battle Experiments. 
 
 Discussion:  Despite the second half of TT03/FBE-K being called a “Field Training 
Exercise” (FTX), there were no live forces or emitters of any kind used for the FBE-K ISR/JFN 
TST events.  This was not by design, by any means, but rather became a forced constraint based 
on the realities of world events (such as “Gulf War II”) and other forces outside the control of 
NWDC planners. 
 With NWDC’s extensive M&S operations, FBE-K TST “players” were able to learn and 
exercise many of the basic processes and information flows involved in TST.  The simulation, 
however, would NOT have been sufficient to support any of the more complex TST and 
supporting intelligence processes had they been attempted, processes such as intelligence 
preparation of the battlespace (IPB), collateral damage estimation, targeting of precise weapons, 
and battle damage assessment (BDA). 
 In addition, current M&S state-of-the-art simply cannot simulate the myriad “devil’s-in-
the-details” type factors experienced in live-fly, live-OPFOR, and live-fire environments.  This 
is primarily due to the complexities of human interactions with other humans (e.g., the complex 
interactions it takes for something as “simple” as the aircrew of a P-3 conducting ISR collection 
to coordinate with the analysts aboard the ship receiving the direct downlink of their video), and 
with their environment (both physical, technical, cultural/morale, etc.). 
 While today’s M&S is good for many types of focused, limited objective experimentation 
(e.g., when controlling almost all variables and adjusting only a few to compare results), it 
generally by itself does not provide as good an environment as when live forces and operations 
are incorporated for experimenting with new military CONOPS and TTP where human 
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interactions (e.g., analysis, decision-making, and enemy actions and reactions) and 
environmental factors are significant determinants of whether those CONOPS and TTP are of 
value or not. 
 This is particularly true in the areas of ISR and targeting where so many of the processes 
are analytic in nature.  The “target” of the analysis has to be as complex (e.g., active/reactive 
OPFOR trying to remain ellusive) and as subjected to the environment (e.g., obscured by 
weather or terrain) as in “real life”.  The inverse relationship of “time to analyze” vs. “quality of 
analysis” is perhaps the single most difficult issue faced in ISR and targeting, particularly in 
support of activities such as time sensitive targeting; the only way to get at this relationship in a 
meaningful way is to provide the level of fidelity inherent in the use of live forces.  
 
 Recommendation:  Conduct all future ISR, targeting, and JFN-related experimentation 
with as many live forces (including live OPFOR) as possible to increase the fidelity of the 
experiment to a level that includes as many of the “truly hard” analytic processes as possible.  
 
SECTION 3:  FBE TECHNICAL AND SYSTEMS OBSERVATIONS. 
 
3.1   Operational Sequence Diagrams. 
 
 Observation:  Functional Flow Diagrams (FFDs) should be developed prior to (or in 
conjunction with) Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSDs). 
 
 Discussion:  One type of document that has been a key part of FBE planning is the 
Operational Sequence Diagram (OSD), a graphical depiction of what computer systems are 
supposed to have what data/message types flow between them over what 
communications/network paths in what order for any given event during the FBE.  While OSDs 
are extremely useful for showing the “what, where, when, and how” of FBE data and 
information flow, they do not adequately address the questions of “who” and “why” without 
which the OSDs are moot. 
 During FBE-K, the ISR UUV team at NUWC developed a series of what amounted to 
functional flow diagrams (see Attachment B) that gave the rationale behind the technical OSD 
that was in turn being developed to show how the vSSN / ISR UUV simulations would be 
connected to the rest of the NWDC M&S and C4I architecture.  Their functional flow diagrams 
(FFDs) not only laid out the “who” and “why” to help the FBE Technical Team, but they also 
greatly facilitated the development of MSEL events and related aspects of FBE-K planning. 
 Development of FFDs for all initiative areas would go a long way to ensuring that the 
supporting OSDs have a reasoned, functional underpinning.  This underpinning is important to 
ensuring the technical architecture optimally supports the experimental objectives, and because 
the OSDs inevitably translate into the expenditure of FBE resources (e.g.:  financial; technical 
expertise; systems, networks, and communications; OSD testing; training; etc.)  
 
 Recommendation:  For subsequent FBEs (and other experimentation events), FFDs 
should be institutionalized as required documents for all initiatives, to describe who at which 
functional nodes need (or will provide) what information from (to) whom and why.  The OSDs 
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should subsequently (or concurrently) be developed as the technical reflection of those FFDs.    
 
 
3.2   Common Operational Picture (COP). 
 
 Observation:  The COP in FBE-K did not have explicit “ownership” by any initiative, 
and was not maintained to a level required to support ISR and JFN in support of TST. 
 
 Discussion:  The COP was not made an explicit part of any FBE-K initiative, despite the 
fact that an accurate, stable COP is foundational to most (if not all) of them.  The COP 
“ownership” remained unclear in FBE-K (as it did in FBE-J), most likely because the COP is 
common to all initiatives, and because it inherently requires the relentless attention of a broad 
range of analysts and technicians, all operating at several different levels. 
 There are technicians who must establish and maintain the COP engine(s) and the CST 
services at major nodes.  There is a wide a variety of technical and analytic feeds into the COP, 
each of which has to be made explicitly responsible for providing quality, timely data (e.g., 
TDDS filters, Link inputs, Space/Missile events, weather, etc.).  There are COP analysts of 
varying disciplines (e.g., ISs, OSs, CTs, AGs) who must provide quality assurance (QA) for their 
particular “piece(s)” of the COP (e.g., red tracks, blue tracks, air tracks, subsurface tracks, 
filters/alerts, etc.), and the databases associated with/supporting the COP (maps/charts/overlays, 
EOB, MIDB, imagery catalogs).    
 Without the explicit involvement and coordination of all (or at least most) of these 
analysts and technicians, the COP will be of such a poor quality as to be largely ignored.  
Despite FBE-K being the first FBE to have a successful display of all Blue ISR assets in COP 
with appropriate labels, the COP in general was rudderless, and was all but useless to ISR and 
JFN in support of TST. 
 
 Recommendation:  Early in the FBE planning stages, identify who has responsibility for 
each of the many complex, interdependent functions that go into producing an accurate, stable 
COP from which players will be capable of “fighting the experiment” (instead of fighting with 
the COP).  Consider doing the same with other “foundational” FBE processes, depending on the 
nature of the experiment.  
 
3.3   Tactical Exploitation System - Navy. 
 
 Observation:  FBE-K reconfirmed that TES-N has a number of powerful tools (some of 
which are unique to TES-N) that potentially could be of great use to Naval forces involved in 
Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).  Unfortunately, FBE-K also reconfirmed that TES-N remains a 
very complex and developmentally immature system, with extremely limited interfaces to other 
C4I systems that are critical to TST, in particular GCCS-M and ADOCS.  
 
 Discussion:  TES-N was used in FBE-K to support TST events, along with the other two 
major components of the Joint Fires Network (JFN), namely GCCS-M and JSIPS-N.  The major 
inputs to TES-N during FBE-K were from a variety of M&S systems providing simulated 
ELINT, COMINT, ISR video, national imagery, and U-2 imagery and platform/sensor telemetry. 
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 TES-N was also supposed to receive track data from GCCS-M, but this capability was 
functionally unusable due to the fact that TES-N does not provide any on-screen labeling of the 
symbols/icons used to display GCCS-M tracks. 
 The TES-N video display and capture application was generally reliable, but has a 
strange software bug in that the user’s video control icons (e.g., start, stop, capture, etc.) do not 
display upon initially opening the window until the user moves the cursor over that area in the 
window (i.e., on the border between the video frame itself and the upper edge of the window).  
Also, the internal handling of video in TES-N degrades the signal such that, by the time the 
video was displayed on the TES-N Multi-Function Workstation (MFWS), the quality of the 
video simulation was barely useable for the purposes of having TES-N users “go through the 
motions” of Time Sensitive Target (TST) detection and identification.  For instance, the NWDC 
Facilitators on BLR would often have to go to another space on BLR to read the 
latitude/longitude readout on the video remote server screen, as those same numbers were 
illegible on the TES-N screen.  As in MC02/FBE-J, TES-N could not do any parsing or 
processing of the telemetry data provided by the ISR video platform M&S system other than 
display it, on-screen, “burned in” as part of the video images themselves.  This resulted in the 
manual entry of data, particularly latitude/longitude, into the TES-N target nomination creation 
template, significantly increasing both the time required, and the risk of data entry errors.  
 The attempt to use the SCI side of TES-N during FBE-K revealed that TES-N does not 
have any true COMINT analysis tools (as does SCI GCCS-M), other than allowing the viewing 
of SCI messages such as KLIEGLIGHTS or TACREPS, and the plotting of locational data on a 
map -- both of which SCI GCCS-M already does (and in C7F cryptologists’ view, does better).  
For this reason, C7F cryptologists (along with the rest of the Navy’s cryptologic community -- at 
least according to the C7F Fleet Cryptologist) have chosen to not use TES-N for COMINT 
analysis.  Consequently, none of the required connectivity (other than JWICS Intelink web-
browsing access, and SCI-level chat) for using SCI TES-N was not in place for use during 
TT03/FBE-K.  While attempts were made to effect this connectivity during TT03/FBE-K, the 
effort was seen by NWDC Facilitators and C7F personnel as being low priority compared to 
other issues being dealt with simultaneously (both in TT03/FBE-K and in the “real world”), so it 
never got done.  Furthermore, a key part of the concept of using SCI TES-N for the COMINT 
analyst member of the TST team was to exercise use of the Information Support Server 
Environment Guard (ISSE) Guard to move appropriate data from the SCI side of TES-N to the 
GENSER side of TES-N in support of TST processes.  Unfortunately, no BLR/C7F personnel, 
TES-N FSRs, or JFN Mobile Training Team (MTT) members knew anything about configuring 
or operating the ISSE Guard. 
 TES-N’s primary output was supposed to be automated TST target nominations (USMTF 
messages in ATI.ATR format) to four places:  (1) to GCCS-M to update the situational 
awareness (SA); (2) to JSIPS-N’s PTW, with relevant imagery attached, for image analysis and 
aimpoint generation; (3) to a prototype web-based TST Target Folder server (set up for the FBE 
at NWDC) again with relevant imagery attached; and, (4) to ADOCS to begin engagement 
processes such as weapon-target pairing. 
 Almost immediately after the first successful ATI.ATR output by TES-N (four days into 
the FBE’s CPX), ADOCS users began complaining that the TES-N analysts were not giving the 
nominated targets a proper target identification (TGTD).  Two days later (i.e., on the last day of 
CPX), inconsistencies were noticed in how the target nominations were being handled by 
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ADOCS and how they were showing up in the TST Target Folder server.  Not until late in the 
evening of FTX day five was controlled testing able to be done by the NWDC Facilitator, during 
which fault was found in both TES-N and ADOCS.  Part of the confusion was because the TES-
N target nomination creation template allows the analyst to give the target an identification (e.g., 
type, equipment name, etc.) using either the “TST” or the “TGTD” lines, but not both.  ADOCS, 
on the other hand, apparently only uses the “TGTD” line for target identification.  For instance, 
when the TES-N ATI.ATR message used the “TST” line, ADOCS would “turn around” to the 
TST Target Folder server an ATI.ATR with no “TST” line and a blank “TGTD” line (e.g., 
“TGTD/-//-//”); whereas, if the TES-N message used the “TGTD” line, ADOCS would “turn 
around” an ATI.ATR with both a “TGTD” line (whose fields were out of order and truncated 
compared to the original ATI.ATR) and at “TST” line (containing the same fields as “TGTD” 
line).  ADOCS also changed several other fields of other lines for no known reason, most 
notably the “DTG” line and field contents. 
 Even in TES-N version 5.0 (the version used in FBE-K), analysts faced the same problem 
encountered in FBE-J in that they could not attach images to outgoing ATI.ATR messages.  
Consequently, all images captured, “chipped” and saved (as NITF) in TES-N had to be manually 
transferred (FTP) to PTW.  The PTW operator would then pull up the images and conduct 
aimpoint refinement (only sometimes, due to manning constraints and base image quality issues 
-- see “M&S FEEDS INTO TES-N” section above), and then save the images (as both JPEG and 
NITF) to a shared directory on the BLR IT-21 LAN.  The workaround for getting images into the 
TST target folders was for the NWDC Facilitator, and later some of the players (once the were 
taught) to use MS Outlook on an IT-21 machine to manually create a one-line ATI.ATR email 
(using the “TNO” line only) with the subject line “Target”, pull the image(s) from the shared 
directory and attach to the email, and then send the email and attached images to the TST Target 
Folder server.  The server would then parse the email, and use the “TNO” to update the correct 
target folder with both the ATI.ATR info and, more importantly, the images themselves. 
 Similarly, TES-N version 5.0 brought no improvement in TES-N’s ability to output to 
GCCS-M from what was used in MC02/FBE-J.  In fact, the capability did not exist on BLR until 
the NWDC Facilitators came aboard and showed the C7F staff how the creation of a “Manual 
Contact” in TES-N at the same location as the nominated TST (which was already in TES-N’s 
Cross-INT database and was displayable using TES-N’s Integrated Tactical Display [ITD] 
application) could be set up to be sent periodically as a formatted message (OTH-Gold or 
XCTC) to GCCS-M’s JOTS1.  It took the entire CPX to focus enough time and energy to 
troubleshoot this interface and get it working.  It worked for the first two days of FTX, and then 
suffered the same problem as the TES-N target nominations when TES-N “crashed” for a few 
days (i.e., nothing could be saved to the Cross-INT database) and was never able to be brought 
back up -- consequently, the GCCS-M “Red database analyst” was never able to become part of 
the TST process (e.g., changing the “hard-wired” TES-N-assigned track name to reflect the 
Target Block Number assigned to that TST by TES-N during the target nomination creation 
process).  Bottom line:  the TES-N output to GCCS-M only worked for two days at the same 
rudimentary and suboptimal level at which it was working for MC02/FBE-J; for the remainder of 
TT03/FBE-K it was functionally inoperative. 
 See Attachments C and D for a more detailed treatment, and for additional issues.     
 
 Recommendation:  Don’t use TES-N in any further TST-related experimentation until 
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major advances are made to at least the following: (1) interface with ADOCS; (2) interface with 
GCCS-M; (3) interface to PTW and any external target folder applications (e.g., attachment of 
image chips to ATI.ATR messages); (4) handling of ISR video and platform/sensor telemetry; 


















Appendix E FBE-Kilo OBSERVATIONS - FIRES PLANNER 
 
This Appendix was provided by Steve Wood of Booze, Allen, Hamilton Corporation 
 
SECTION 1: FBE KILO AND FBE KILO SEA STRIKE OPERATIONAL PLANNING OBSERVATIONS. 
 
1.1 Planning Directive 
Observation:  No experiment directive was published for this FBE.   
 
Discussion:  In the past, experiment directives (in message format) have been used to codify and 
document the responsibilities of various NWDC, the numbered fleet, and the various DON 
agencies (both operational forces and shore establishment).  Published by CCFC in coordination 
with NWDC and the numbered fleet participating in the FBE, its is a rosseta stone of information 
that outlines responsibilities, functions, and path toward execution of the experiment event.  The 
lack of this document can cloud fleet numbered responsibilities and makes “arrangements” for 
support non-binding and unofficial.   
  
Recommendation:  Use this instrument in every FBE and LOE that is conducted. 
 
1.2 Forward FBEs and NWDC Fleet Presence 
Observation:  Forward presence by the NWDC staff and key planners was lacking.  
 
Discussion:  Forward fleets require constant attention during the FBE planning process.  During 
FBE Kilo, uniformed initiative leads were present at the forward fleet toward the end of the 
planning process, but many of the other key planners did not interact with the fleet on a 
substantial basis until they arrived for execution of the experiment.  One way to foster this is 
through conduct of the FPC at the hosting numbered fleet location.  
 
Recommendation:  Attempt to get key planners forward often in the planning process and 
ALWAYS hold the Final Planning Conference at the forward numbered fleet home location.  
This will leverage fleet interaction and participation. 
 
1.3 Fleet Interface and Fleet Initiative Sponsors 
Observation:  No uniformed numbered fleet sponsor (uniformed warfighter) for the Sea Strike 
Initiatives was identified or utilized.   
 
Discussion:  The Sea Strike Initiatives did not have substantive uniformed numbered fleet 
representation throughout FBE Kilo (planning and execution).  Not having warfighter 
sponsorship at the numbered fleet level for FBE initiatives that focus on the application of 
sensors and weapons on high value emergent targets is unacceptable.    
 
Recommendation:  Use the experiment directive to outline the fleet sponsorship requirement and 




1.4 Technical versus Operational Initiatives 
Observation:  Many modeling and simulation (DDX ANGUSS, DISCOVERY MACHINE, 
WALTS) initiatives that were never part of the overall experiment plan (integrated, briefed or 
otherwise) impacted experiment execution.   
 
Discussion:  While many of these diversions could have been worked into the operational 
experiment plan, they were not.  This caused friction during execution was not supporting of the 
Sea Strike Initiatives as briefed and approved by the FBE director.  
 
Recommendation:  Identify ALL initiatives up front and make sure they are part of the 
experiment plan.  Include the TEP (Technical Engineering Plan) as a supporting potion 
experiment plan rather than as a standalone document.  The Explan needs to codify ALL 
initiatives that are being undertaken and work to integrate those efforts. 
 
SECTION 2: FBE KILO AND FBE KILO SEA STRIKE OPERATIONAL EXECUTION OBSERVATIONS. 
  
2.1 Training 
Observation:  No window for training users (fleet or reserve force) on the experimental C4I 
(xC4I) systems used in the FBE. 
 
Discussion:  In the last couple of FBEs, this was accomplished in spiral events.  There was no 
such event in FBE Kilo.  This lead to several days of training during experiment execution, 
resulting in the loss of experiment process analysis time. 
 
Recommendation:  Build spiral events or dedicated FBE training windows into the schedule.  
Publish that schedule and those placeholders in the experiment directive. 
 
2.2 IKA Support 
Observation:  IKA support to the FBE was minimized due to MBC participation in the 2nd Fleet 
LOE.  There was no coordinated IKA support for FBE execution.  (A web portal that participants 
can post to in NOT IKA.) 
 
Discussion:  No IKA lead planning or execution support for the FBE was responsible for many 
delays and training problems.  Adhoc  / initiative level IKA measures had to be implemented on 
the fly to support FBE execution.  To exacerbate this matter, no clear level of IKA support was 
ever articulated to the planners in light of this during the planning process. 
 
Recommendation:  Identify IKA (or other initiative area) participation level in FBE and ensure 
that it is maintained. 
 
2.3 Reserve Support Utilization 
Observation:  Many reservists were utilized in FBE Kilo to facilitate execution. 
 
Discussion:  This was a bright spot.  Reserve personnel were plentiful, well coordinated and 
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quite supportive to the FBE effort.  This was the best coordinated reserve support effort in an 
FBE to date. 
 
Recommendation:  Continue to work with the reserve forces at the level reached in FBE kilo to 
support future FBEs 
 
2.4 Fleet Execution Support 
Observation:  Numbered fleet staff support was abysmal for the Sea Strike Initiatives.  Support 
was limited to a civilian science adviser and two junior officers.  This extended to JIC support 
for JFN manning during the CPX. (1 E-6).  The promised JFACC support was also minimal (3 
junior officers) and not what had been planned for.      
 
Discussion:  This lack of support in all these area was the largest single factor in not realizing the 
experimental potential of the Sea Strike efforts in FBE Kilo.  This could be seen during the 
planning process but was not corrected by the MBC uniformed staff. 
 
Recommendation:  Early and frequent interaction with the UNIFORMED staff at the ACOS 
level is required for ALL initiatives in an FBE, especially one held within a forward numbered 
fleet. 
 
2.5 Execution Timeline 
Observation:  The Sea Strike initiatives covered to long a period. (24 days) 
 
Discussion:  It is impossible to coop a numbered fleet staff for this period of time to conduct an 
experiment and still get a proper level of focus from that staff.  Executing FBE events over a 
period this long leads to complacency and lack of desire to continue on the part of the 
participants.  This lesson had already been learned in FBE Juliet.  
 
Recommendation:  Limit initiative efforts to a 5-8 day period with adequate training on the front 
end to support the desired efforts. 
 
 
SECTION 3: FBE KILO AND FBE KILO SEA STRIKE BACKDROP / SCENARIO OBSERVATIONS. 
  
3.1 FBE overlay on Exercise Construct 
Observation:  FBE Kilo construct only loosely fit the Tandem Thrust 03 construct.   
 
Discussion: The overall FBE construct that was layered over the exercise construct was adequate 
for execution had the exercise construct been completed.  Database testing for the event was 
woefully lacking and joint force (JFACC) participation was almost nonexistent.  This resulted in 
errant databases (MIDB, AODB, BSCMs), that did not function properly.  Initiative and 
technology reliance on this information suffered through execution because of this.   While this 
may have been out of the NWDC purview for the FBE, it highlighted that even for a tier 1 level 




Recommendation:  Planner and technologies must participate in any exercise database testing 
events that are integrated into the FBE construct. 
 
3.2 Exercise Augmentees 
Observation:  C7F only received a small percentage (+/- 30%) of the planned staff augmentation 
and component augmentation that was required to carry out the Sea Strike initiatives. 
 
Discussion:  Events beyond the control of both the MBC and the numbered fleet resulted 
manpower shortages that greatly hindered the FBE effort.  While these may have been 
unavoidable, they were foreseen.  At some point prior to execution, manning go/no criteria need 
to be established and utilized to prevent execution of events just for the sake of “doing 
something.”  This position must be reached in concurrence with the numbered fleet staff and the 
decision to execute/not execute made as the result of this prior agreement. 
 
Recommendation:  Institute manning go / no go levels during the planning process.  Do this in 
concurrence with the numbered fleet.  Be prepared to not execute portions of an FBE if these 
criteria are not reached. 
 
3.3 Scenario 
Observation:  FTX scenario did not match (very closely), the FBE Sea Strike live force scenario. 
 
Discussion:  This problem was due in most parts to the CJTF (C7F) fighting the sim and live 
scenarios together when they were designed to be separate.  While it may be out of the MBC’s 
control to drive this during execution, there is room to avoid this by properly planning prior.  
Many FBE have used this detached live / sim event construct successfully, but only when the full 
staff and the fleet commander himself is intimately familiar with the scenario / events.  This was 
not the case in FBE Kilo.  This problem is directly related to lack of numbered fleet involvement 
in the planning cycle. 
 
Recommendation:  Force a higher level of fleet experiment / exercise integration familiarization 
early and often in the planning process. 
 
3.4 Assumptions and Required Products 
Observation:  Am assumption was made by the FBE planning staff that certain products required 
for FBE execution (AODB, MIDB, BSCMs, etc…) would be available. 
 
Discussion:  Even though this was a tier 1, JWFC coordinated and congressionally mandated 
event, the database test was inadequate.  This resulted in errant information for use in the XC4I 
systems used during the FBE.  This caused many problems throughout the execution cycle. 
 
Recommendation:  NWDC must participate with both planners and technologies in the database 
test process.  If products required are substandard, then they must be identified and corrected 
prior to execution 
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SECTION 4: FBE KILO AND FBE KILO SEA STRIKE TECHNICAL/ XC4I OBSERVATIONS. 
 
4.1 Shipboard System Specifications 
Observation:  USS Blue Ridge has a 10 mb switch backbone that is connected via 155 mb links.  
This, along with inconsistent network card setting hindered ADOCS use during the FBE. 
 
Discussion:  Standard, shipboard LAN configurations that support ADOCS usage need to be 
established.  This applies to switch, link, and network card settings on these machines.  
Hardware limitations may require platforms to set up multi-server configurations to reduce the 
effect of less modern network backbones. 
 
Recommendation:  Set ISNS ADOCS standards prior to install and configure accordingly. 
 
4.2 Recommended Shipboard System Configurations 
Observation:  USS Blue Ridge’s LAN will require specific ADOCS configurations to support 
usage on that platform. 
 
Discussion:  To reduce the effect of a less modern backbone, placement of ADOCS servers in a 
multiserver configuration is required.  Also standardization of network interfaces is required. 
 
Recommendation:  Place ADOCS servers in the following spaces:  JIC, JOC (master), JAOC.   
Configure these machines so they are all pointed at the same switches as the clients they support 
reside.    
 
4.3 ADOCS recommend software / hardware changes 
Observation:  Many recommended changes to ADOCS were compiled during the FBE. 
 
Discussion:  ADOCS changes are indicative of command and control capability requirements 




1.  Ability to pair a target to an ITO mission via a button 
2.  Ability to highlights targets in Fires and JSTM managers when changes have 
occurred…alert? 
3.  A configurable Fires Manager (within the ADOCS GUI). 
4.  Add “hour glass” icon to ADOCS to display system working. 
5.  TST supported CDR indicator in JTSTM. 
6.  Hot link to ROE url. 
7.  Hot link to TST priorities url. 
8.  Creation of a Combat Assessment manager and removal of that function from the Fires/JTST 
managers. 
9.  Hot link to target folder url.  
 Hardware 
1.  Two (2) displays for ADOCS users that are doing target development and coordination 
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4.4 JFN interaction with ADOCS 
Observation:  ATI.ATR target nomination from JFN was incomplete. 
 
Discussion:  ATI.ATR target nomination to JFN was incomplete and not really viable for usage. 
 This problem needs to be fixed.  It was identified over 2 years ago and is still a problem. 
 
Recommendation:  Detailed ADOCS – JFN testing to fix this problem.  This should be 
completed in a lab setting vice waiting for another FBE. 
 
 
SECTION 5: OPERATIONAL ROAD AHEAD AND OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 ADOCS Road Ahead for C7F / COMPACFLT / USPACOM 
Observation:  ADOCS will be integrated into the PACOM C2 structure.  FBE Kilo was a major 
event in this transition. 
 
Discussion:  ADOCS use in FBE Kilo was the first in a series of event that will proliferate 
ADOCS across the PACOM AOR (it is already in the USFK AOR).  Lesson learned for this 
effort (FBE Kilo) should be passed on to facilitate a higher level of functionality in future 
PACOM events (IPD, TF04, CG04). 
 
Recommendation:  Pass detailed ADOCS report to PACOM via C7F and COMPACFLT to help 
this effort along.  Report should be a NWDC/JPSD collaborative effort. 
 
5.2 Time Critical Targeting Functionality Afloat (TCTF Afloat) 
Observation:  The Xray Papa cell was an excellent test case for familiarization of the TCTF 
concept to the fleet. 
 
Discussion:  TCTF is a USAF program that outlines the C2 requirements and systems for 
conducting time critical targeting operations.  In support of JCC and JCC (Afloat), the USN 
needs to further refine this concept to support both joint and maritime forces from a flag 
configured platform. 
 
Recommendation:  Use TCTF Afloat a starting point for Sea Strike initiatives in future FBEs. 
 
5.3 Coalition Fires Experimentation 
Observation:  Coalition shooter information requirements where not met by the RMG 
technology. 
 
Discussion:  The RMG technology and its approved rulesets did not allow the coalition forces to 
fully integrate with the other shooter platforms.  This problem resulted in SA deficiencies on 
both sides of the guard. 
 
Recommendation:  Develop two paths for future coalition experimentation, one based on full 
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network integration and the other based on LNO supported by US releasable C2 systems and 
backbone.  Both are viable and critical to continued integration of coalition forces. 
 
5.4  Xray Papa and Maritime Component Time Sensitive Targeting  
Observation:  The Xray  Papa cell identified a time sensitive targeting gap at the maritime 
component level that needs to be addressed.  
 
Discussion:  The JFMCC’s conduct of broad scale time sensitive targeting operations that are 
integrated with other components is beyond the traditional role of the Bravo Papa in most 
instances.  A staff function at the operational level (JFMCC) that supports TST prosecution is 
required. 
 
Recommendation:  Integrate this effort with the TCTF effort described above to help identify 
maritime TST command and control requirements of the future. 
 
 
SECTION 6: OTHER KEY INSIGHTS FROM EXPERIMENT PARTICIPANTS 
 
The following are observations from FBE participants during the FTX portion of the FBE.  They 
are a source of information for how people felt about what was happening, including system 
performance.   
XP Cell Lessons Learned and questions from 26 April 2003 
ADOCS:  
-Though the speed was significantly better than the previous day, there is still a significant time 
lag from mouse click to display response.  This is frustrating to the user and detrimental to 
timely response to TST. 
-The color codes for target coordination need to be defined.  There is probably an official 
standard from real world operations that can answer this question.  (Note: Colors legend is 
available in JTST coordination window, which would be useful on all other windows where 
color selections are possible.) 
-ADOCS/COP - was not updating through the network.  Sometimes took several minutes for 
display change to show up on someone else's computer.  Current thought is it is due to the 
limited backbone capability of the system on board LCC-19. 
-Administrative - commonality between systems.  Right now everything is wide open, anyone 
can change anything.  Need database manager in loop.  Example, if XP is rogering up for 
something, then he should be the only one that can control that function. 
-At various times during day, all machines locked up.  We need some help from the technicians 
to identify the reason for these occurrences. 
-Zoom feature reaches a point that causes the problem where Zoom box and system launches out 
to never-never land. 
-Question for technicians:  Would system be any faster if we use fewer ADOCS stations?   
- PROCESSES:   
-On the 27th we will attempt to run one target completely through the system - from Nomination, 
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through JIC/TST Cell/XP/shooter.  While running this end-to-end thread, we will record steps to 
establish a baseline set of procedures.  In order to make this most useful, we need technicians on 
station looking over our shoulders as we go through the whole process to ensure we are 
executing in the most efficient manner. 
-Where are target folders set up and how will we be made aware that they are available? 
-Computer setup - (for future) configurations of set up should be standardized.   
-Was not obvious that JIC was pushing targets up to XP. And if they did, how would we know 
that they did? 
-Who can push targets to a TST? 
-Only people that can push target should be the ones that can do it on the system. 
 
ORGANIZATION:   
-Chatrooms - no idea of who is on what/why/where.  Each individual watchstander needs to 
know what rooms to monitor. (Note: Fleet commanders publish OPTASKs to specify the 
procedures for using Chat.  This is where this is defined.) 
-How does XP maintain situational awareness of ISR assets using ADOCS? 
-There is currently no one managing ISR assets.  Is there a plan for JTF to do this? For this 
experiment is the ISR manager assigned to someone in the JIC, TST Cell or the XP cell?   
 
C&C: 
-Though there is a UAV TTP, handoff guidance and procedures for dynamic retasking of UAVs 
is not clear.  Who will control the UAV or will it be timeshared?  If something needs to be 
checked, who makes the decision and takes control of UAV? 
 
OTHER: 
-JFN terminals in the TST Cell are not being used.  It was also noted that the USAF personnel 
manning the TST Cell are under direct orders to not use or even look at JFN.   
-There was confusion on what Chat was to be used. The direction from the NWDC FBE team is 
IRC Chat.  The procedures for setting up mIRC Chat was drafted by LT Powell and will be 
distributed to all participants.   
 
XP Lessons Learned 27 APR 03 
ADOCS:  
-Speed of response to operator input was so slow it was unusable.  By mid afternoon, ADOCS 
had slowed to a crawl.  It was taking 2-3 minutes wait time for system response after each key 
entry. 
 
PROCESSES:   
-Initial position of TB0037 plotted position in water west of island.  JFACC pushed target to 
JFMCC (XP).  The TBMCS position was ok.  JIC had to go in system and manually re-enter 
coordinates.  Total time to correct entry was well over an hour. 
-DDx listed CDCM as a Cruise Missile Submarine in target folder.  This was never corrected 
even after bringing to attention via chat and telephone. 
-Control of UAV.  Not as many assets available - was not communicated to XP.  No priority in 
 192 
 
tasking limited assets.  XP can establish priorities, but there was a lack of coordination.  DDx 
had control and when it was finished, it did not give a positive hand-off to the higher authority or 
to the next unit for control.  So UAV just flew around aimlessly for some time. 
-Still some lack of positive feedback in chat.  Example is TB0037 -when we requested a position 
confirmation, we did not get an feedback that they were working the issue. 
 
XP Lessons Learned 28 APR 03 
ADOCS: 
-Speed of response to operator input improved significantly.  Operators felt it was still slow but 
usable. 
-BDA -initially there was no way to change color on that tab.  This was corrected prior to endex. 
-ADOCS locked up with system fault error. 
-Restrike issue.  Confusion over what the restrike function does.  Recommend ADOCS be 
modified to have restrike field show old mission number as well as target type. 
 
PROCESS: 
-Unless testing is short fused due to malfunctions in system, please let everyone know ahead of 
time that test tracks are going to be entered into system.  This will preclude spinning wheels on 
test tracks. 
-Target Positions:  Initial position has been incorrectly entered two days in a row.  Believe this is 
due to recording wrong lat/long off of imagery?  This was noticed due to targets being plotted in 
water on ADOCS.  If by chance they were wrong, yet plotting on land, there would not be an 
easy way for someone to catch the error. 
-Overall process is becoming clearer, but from XP_ISR viewpoint, still unsure of role and 
information flow. 
-E2 process of nominating a target - they are in freeplay mentality.  We were able to get them to 
push a target into ADOCS, but no amplifying information (imagery, etc.)  E2's guidance is to 
attack targets that meet ROE.  They were in ROTA today, which was not in operational area.  
They need to get out of sim mode and support the exercise. 
-E2 guys need to review days ATO and work within confines of ATO.   
-DDx was not given control of UAV today, so they were unable to id targets. 
-TST cell does not have a fires manager, so they don't have situational awareness.  Recommend 
they be given option to look at Fires manager to know when mission has been fired by the ship.   
-Command and control of process much improved today, thanks to ADOCS Tab color reference 
chart. 
XP Lessons Learned for 29 APR 2003 
ADOCS: 
-Time lag between here and DDX.  Example, we will change a block to green and one time it as 
long as 5 minutes for it to show up at DDX. 
-Recommend system permissions be put in place for ADOCS, as it seemed that blocks were 
being changed quite often by the wrong team. 
-Fires manager often would not update automatically, requiring the operator to close and reopen 
to get changes to show. 
-Deliberate targets were interfering somewhat with the TST processes.  Too many targets were 
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in the queue to adequately evaluate and take action.  We can hide the ones that we don’t want to 
see.   
-Confusion on who was submitting TST.  Recommend adding something in ADOCS so everyone 
knows who is nominating to TST.  You actually can by using the history function. 
-According to Coalitions Fires in NPT, if VANZAC edits ANZ tab (Missions Coordination 
Manager) it fires the mission.  They aren’t editing the ANZ tab.  ? 
-FDR Block (Missions Coordination Manager) stayed yellow on BLR ADOCS side.  Coalition Fires 
side of ADOCS after weapons release was showing green.  Target was TB0041. 
-VANZAC requested guidance on number of ERGM rounds to fire.  Cannot specify number of 
rounds in ADOCS.  Does unit or XP determinate the number of rounds to fire.  Actually can 
specify number of rounds under engagement tab. 
-VANZAC was unclear on tab protocol.  XP developed and disseminated tab protocol during the 
exercise, but tab protocol/documentation required prior to STARTEX to clarify requirements for 
exercise participants.  I recommended this to Chris Vogt and also stated that in order to properly 
operate the system for real world operations, people need to train and operate the system in 
numerous scenarios for 30-45 days. 
-Multiple ADOCS system down times hindered play.  Chat successful in engineering work 
around during ADOCS outages.  
-A single monitor workstation is inadequate for an ADOCS operator.  It is our opinion that the 
proper set up for an ADOCS operator would be a three monitor work station, VoIP, and a phone. 
 
PROCESS: 
-CHAT protocol.  Confusion on chat - due to large numbers of people on ISR-COORD, 
sometimes questions were not responded to.  Or unanswered for long periods of time.  
Recommend all players leave their chat windows open so they can go back and review periods 
they might have missed.  Other channels seemed to be better.   
-Need to have clearly defined chat protocols for all, with the right players monitoring the right 
chat windows. 
-UAV assets were often not available to support PID.  ANZAC's use of UAV not as real time as 
DDx's due to requirement to go through email to JIC. 
-Problem with target folders not being available or updated for a period of time in afternoon.  
This was corrected. 
-Confusion between XP and DDx during lunch hour.   Recommend everyone break at same time 
formally.  UAV schedule for DDx included our lunch hour, so they effectively lost an hour of 
UAV time. 
- E2 wanted to control options for WTP of airborne assets.  XP does WTP for airborne assets.  
-When target is TST and fired, who fills in block on Fires for BDA tab?  Recommend in Fires 
page, firing unit inputs to XP via chat, XP update BDA block on Fires and then JIC turn BDA 
box on TST page. 
-Air gap latency didn’t appear to hinder VANZAC response to chat. 
-VANZAC achieved chipped image electronic transfer into FBE-K target folders at NPT for web 
dissemination.  
 




1. Couldn’t get target noms from TES-N most of both days due to system issues.  Work 
around was to put nominations in manually. (see Process) 
2. Also had shut down of conduit which passes imagery (with metadata) to PTW from TES-
N resulting in inability to generate aimpoints/mensurate targets. 
3. Recommend for future experiments with ADOCS tool being used by novice players that 
practical training be provide for all users with respect to the role they will play. 
 
PROCESS: 
1. Need to more fully define process requirements for manual target nominations 
particularly with respect to those noms which should be coming from TES-N (TB- 
designated target numbers) but don’t because of system down problems.  There needs to 
be a fully flushed process for down system situations. 
2. When tasking ISR assets, direction needs to be provided on releasing the asset from the 
request once collection requirement has been satisfied. 
3. Need to establish process for mapping BHA/BDA IRS back to original TST. In real-
world environment data flowing in from multiple sources could potentially be too 
voluminous for an imagery screener or analyst to randomly pick up on as the follow-on 
tasked BHA/BDA ISR input for a particular target, particularly if multiple targets are 
being serviced simultaneously. 
4. (In conjunction with #3) Need to determine whether follow-on imagery, for example, for 
BHA/BDA after a target has been serviced should be nominated as a new target or just 
mapped to original target nomination. 
5. One cause of today (4/27) TES-N issues had to do with database log files filling up and 
saturating the server.  Sys/DB Admin process needs to be in place to clear log files 
periodically or provide warning to Sys/DB Admin contact in the event a critical quantity 
has been reached before a set clear time point. 
 
ORGANIZATION SETUP: 
1. For experiment purposes it would be beneficial to have an organizational setup flushed 
that mimics real-world hierarchy with clearly defined roles and responsibilities.  
Organizational setup for the experiment should be documented for next experiment with 
brief explanation of role intentions/responsibilities.  Would be particularly helpful for 
manning for the experiment and for flushing out true requirements in real-world scenario. 
2. Who is responsible for tasking ISR assets for BHA/BDA imagery/assessment. 
3. Who is responsible for assessing effectiveness of strike with regards to a serviced target? 
 And for updating the blocks in ADOCS. 
  
COMMAND & CONTROL: 
1. Need to clearly define who can task ISR assets and whether there are any restrictions on 
directed tasking. 
 
JIC Daily Summary for 28 APR 03 
ADOCS: 
4. TES-N still experiencing problems. Unable to obtain stateside support through the night 
(Guam time.) Used work-around all day for manually submitting target noms and passing 
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imagery to ETFs (electronic target folders).  Documented procedures. 
5. How would someone know in ADOCS that multiple target noms/tst in either (or split 
between both) the Fires Manager or Joint Time Sensitive Targets Manager are associated 
with one another? Or is this relevant? 
6. How would someone know from looking at a target nom in the Fires Manager in ADOCS 
that it has been elevated to a tst already? Or is this relevant? 
7. No one could change status color of BDA block.  Should be resolved by 4/29 session. 
8. ADOCS training should include an example of requesting re-strike for a TST and how 
the system processes this input. 
9. ADOCS started up much quicker after the fix for the BDA color block not being editable. 
 
PROCESS: 
1. Need to resolve process with regards to performing a re-strike on a serviced tst.  How 
should the target nom be handled? Issue resolved during hot wash with clarification of 
how ADOCS system handles re-strikes; i.e., a new TST is created with ‘-RESTRIKE’ 
appended to original target nom’s description (SA-06-RESTRIKE in today’s event). 
2. (Regarding 1) To clarify for others what a new TST with a “- Restrike” descriptor was 
generated from, the controlling component who recommends the original TST for a re-
strike (AB0024 in today’s event) can (this worked once but needs validating): 
a. call up the new re-strike TST in the JTST Manager (AB0027 in today’s event)  
b. click EDIT on the TARGET DATA tab, and 
c. modify the DESCRIPTION to include the original TST target number (AB0024): 
      New Descriptor for AB0027:  SA-06-RESTR AB0024 
  Note: There is a 18-character limit on the number of characters that will display. 
3. Did not know how to contact U2 POC for afternoon event. Didn’t have chat handle or 
other contact info. 
4. JIC is struggling with providing accurate geo-coordinates on target nominations due to 
the poor quality of the simulated video feed blurring the geo-coord data. This can be 
correct with better video. 
 
ORGANIZATION SETUP: 
1. Organization structure and responsibility seemed smoother today. 
 
 COMMAND & CONTROL: 
1. Still struggling with defining who controls which blocks in ADOCS for coordination and 
planning purposes.  Chart provided in afternoon should resolve much of this confusion. 
 
OTHER: 
1. U2 imagery initially off geographically from planned event, but was resolved. 
2. U2 simulation problem caused an extreme slow down in exercising the afternoon event. 
 
JIC Daily Summary for 29 APR 03 
ADOCS: 
10. TES-N feed working much better today!  Be advised when the target nominations are 
submitted directly from TES-N to ADOCS, players will notice approximately a 10-min 
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lag before the associated image will appear in the ETF. 
11. Can ADOCS not be designed to store the images within its own database to provide 
ready access to individuals managing the target process using ADOCS? 
12. Limitation of TES-N nomination screen does not allow operator enough target TYPE 
choices to select the correct one in most instances (for e.g.: SA-15 from this morning’s 
event was initially entered as a Heavy Vehicle).  This requires modification of the target 
nomination’s target TYPE once it appears in ADOCS. Could be confusing to individuals 
closely monitoring the Fires Manager. 
13. In the afternoon the ETF server experienced some technical difficulties which resulted in 
ETFs not being created and imagery not appearing in ETFs for E2 submissions from 
GISR-C. 
14. Acquired date/time group not populating the Target Data tab of the Fires Manager. 
15. For target nominations submitted from BLR JIC TES-N stations, the NLT dtg is being 
populated incorrectly.  The JIC will add one hour to this dtg in their noms. 
 
PROCESS: 
5. To keep responsible parties informed, add the Time-on-Target data to the Remarks block 
of the Collection Request tab (available after double-clicking the target in the JTST 
Manager.) 
6. The JIC Target Officer or JFN Operations Officer can make an initial recommendation 
for a target nomination to be raised to a TST.  The controlling component should then 
validate this target to be a TST.  If controlling component disagrees, annotate decision in 
appropriate block.   Then move the target from the JTST Manager back to the Fires 
Manager by highlighting the target and selecting from the menu Tools > Target to Fires 
Manager…. 
7. Wondering if the images submitted by GISR-C operators are being properly attached to 
the nomination?  If so, need to research why the images are not showing up in the ETF 
folder.  This deficiency is causing confusion in the process with regards to issues like 
PID.  Note: Have not been able to find an image in an ETF except one processed by JIC. 
 
ORGANIZATION SETUP: 
2. Due to the artificiality of the experiment, the technical setup (what systems are doing 
what and what their capabilities are) is causing some confusion with who should be 
contacted in certain situations; For e.g.: to see streaming video feed of UAV #2 and for 
posting a missing image to an ETF for a target nomination not submitted by through BLR 
JIC TES-N. 
 
COMMAND & CONTROL: 
2. Some confusion with who controlled what equipment for providing tactical data for 
targeting. Resolved in hot wash meeting. 
3. Some confusion also about where ISR assets should be allocated.  Determination was 
ISR assets should not leave assigned area per ISR Sync Matrix. 





3. Problems with telemetry data passing from the U2 in morning disabled ability for 
imagery screener to get an image for better imagery and overview shot of area to enhance 
PID capabilities and improve target accuracy. Could not run this scenario concept. 
4. A problem with the server script which creates the ETFs resulted in several ETFs not 
being created for about 30 minutes until the issue was resolved. 
 
JIC Daily Summary for 30 APR 03  
ADOCS: 
16. Still some confusion as to who controls BDA blocks and how to set the MSN blocks to 
provide specific status of a target being prosecuted. 
17. Updates to JTST Manager are not appearing without closing and re-opening the manager. 
18. TB0041 showed up as two separate TSTs in the JTST Manager during the morning event. 
 The system is not suppose to allow multiple submissions of a target nom to TST 
Manager. 
19. If DTG must be entered with a 4-digit year, ADOCS Fires Manager > Add screen should 
not allow the target nomination to be entered. 
 
PROCESS: 
1. Confusion regarding JIC ADOCS target nominations. Need to put one in. JIC thought 
these were only being filtered for convenience and informed others of new ABxxxx nom 
but it still confused everyone. 
2. JIC needs clarification on what everyone expects from them as relates to the JIC tab. 
 
ORGANIZATION SETUP: 
1. Need to have clarification on BDA input responsibilities.  Who is tasking assets to do the 
collection, who is collecting and assessing imagery for it, who is managing the color 
block? 
 
COMMAND & CONTROL: 
5. Needs to re-fine control block chart for ADOCS coordination tabs.  Need to include most 
common data codes which appear in color coordination blocks. E.g.: EXE in Yellow 
MSN block in JTST Manager. 
6. Working on better situational awareness among JFN group. 
 
OTHER: 




JIC Daily Summary for 2 MAY 03 
ADOCS: 
20. If data in a TST coordination tab is updated and saved and then another TST is selected, 
the data from the first TST’s coordination tab is appearing.  This is confusing when 
working similar targets. One thinks the data has been updated but when close Modify 
window, the changes do not appear (b/c they weren’t made b/c it looked like it was 
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updated in the window.) 
 
PROCESS: 
3. If BHA/BDA is requested, need to consistently have some documentation in ADOCS of 
TOT either on the Target Data tab or the Collection Request tab before a strike is 
launched. Recommend always setting TOT in Target Data tab because time shows up in 
the main JTST Manager window to the left of the PRI column. 




2. JFN/JIC was confused about if collection assets were needed on FDB for post-strike 
BHA/BDA for AA0366-AA0368. BDA assessment was provided after strike in Fires 

















Appendix F.  JFMCC XP TST CELL FOR FBE - KIL0 
 
The following is a Draft document describing the JFMCC XP Cell TST operations.  
 
Position Titles and Job Descriptions 
 
Duty positions and functions that play a major role in prosecuting time critical/time sensitive 
targets for FBE-Kilo are listed below.  These duty positions are identified as the focal points for 
each specialty supporting the TST Team.   
 
The XP Actual may call JFMCC TST team members into a huddle physically or virtually as 
required.  The minimum number of personnel required for Force-level command and control 
(C2) and intelligence support for prosecuting time sensitive targets within the JFMCC is 





























XP ANZAC XP E2X
XP DDXXP OPS XP
 
Figure 1 JFMCC XP TST Cell Position Titles and Job Descriptions 
 
 
Duty positions and functions:  
 
XP Actual (position XP) 
• Responsible to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) for the 
execution of the TST mission within the JFMCC’s designated area of TST responsibility. 




• Directs TST operations to include all aspects of the TST operations to include target 
nomination, validation, approval, pairing, coordination and execution.  
• Authorize, through ISR Operations Officer, redirection, and reallocation of JFMCC ISR 
assets to include all aspects of the TST ISR operations to include approval, pairing, 
coordination and execution. 
• Briefs JFMCC as required for TST Ops. 
• Coordinates with the TST mission elements on at least a daily basis if not more 
frequently. 
• Coordinates with all the component mission commanders on TST operations issues via 
daily virtual coordination meetings. 
• Reports to: Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)  
• Specialty:  Aviator with operational strike/targeting experience and/or Field Grade 
Officer with extensive operational strike experience and/or command and control 
expertise 
• Workstation:  ADOCS, SIPRNET and Collaboration Application (e.g. mIRC) 
• Links:  Secure telephone (STU-III) link to JFMCC, ADOCS connectivity to JFACC 
• Engagement Sequence and Notional Data Flow: TBD 
 
XP Current Operations Cell Chief (position XP OPS) 
• Responsible to XP for the execution of his routine and additional duties as required. 
• Responsible to the XP for monitoring the execution of the TST mission within the 
JFMCC’s designated area of TST responsibility, and advising XP on any problems. 
• Coordinate with various operational control agencies/commands to synchronize and de-
conflict TST operations. 
• Prepares and coordinates responses to, and daily debrief for JFMCC. 
• Coordinates with the mission elements on at least a daily basis if not more frequently. 
• Reports to: XP  
• Specialty:  Field Grade Officer with extensive operational strike experience and/or 
command and control expertise 
• Workstation: ADOCS, SIPRNET and Collaboration Application (e.g. IWS) 
• Links:  TBD  
• Engagement Sequence and Notional Data Flow: TBD 
 
XP ISR Operations Officer  (position XP ISR) 
• Directs ISR assets (UAV, U2) toward emerging potential TST for collection. 
• Provides dynamic tasking requests, for assets under direct control, through the 
appropriate platform LNO if that asset can prosecute the target without impacting the 
current collection plan. 
• Coordinates with the UAV and other ISR assets to optimize sensor collection and 
reposition allocated ISR assets’ collection capabilities to obtain best quality image for 
TST. 
• Maintains liaison with JTF/JFACC ISR Operations Officer(s) for dynamic re-tasking 
requests of ISR assets not under direct control. 
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• Develops and submits inputs to collection management plan to support TST objectives. 
• Coordinates on IMINT precision geolocational points, collateral damage estimates, no-
strike de-confliction, and weaponeering solutions with the targeting officer 
• Provides predictive TST analysis to in support of current and future ISR management of 
sensors. 
• Provides support to the MOC TST Ops for visualization of TST event-related activity to 
include predicted enemy courses of action for TST support 
• Reports to:  XP OPS. 
• Specialty:  Intelligence Officer (O4) or Air Battle Manager with recent and extensive 
C2ISR background 
• Workstation:  ADOCS, SIPRNET and Collaboration Application (e.g. mIRC) 
• Links:  ADOCS, SIPRNET and secure telephone (STU-III); connectivity to onboard and 
off-board intelligence support.   
• Engagement Sequence and Notional Data Flow: TBD 
 
XP Air Operations Officer (position XP E2X) 
• Facilitates TST execution of air (Navy and Air Force) Strike Assets. 
• Coordinates with CVW Strike Operations and Joint ISR Officer 
• Coordinates with Air Force Strike LNO and Joint / Collation Strike Officers (if 
embarked) 
• Liaison with JFACC CAOC for coordination and de-confliction of air assets.  
• Coordinates with JFN ISR Operations for TST Target Data Refinement and Battle 
Damage Assessment (BDA) and Bomb Hit Assessment (BHA) 
• Coordinates TST sensor-to-shooter operations 
• Facilitates TST execution of ground (e.g. Marine, Army) Strike Assets. 
• Coordinates with Air and Surface/Submarine Anchors 
Coordinates ground TST sensor-to-shooter operations 
• Reports to: XP OPS. 
• Specialty:  CVW experience, senior strike aircrew (O4/5) 
• Workstation:  ADOCS workstation on SIPRNET with Collaboration Application (e.g. 
IWS) application  
• Links:  ADOCS, SIPRNET and secure telephone (IP) 
• Engagement Sequence and Notional Data Flow: TBD 
 
XP Surface Operations Officer (position XP DDX) 
• Facilitates TST execution of surface strike assets. 
• Coordinates air and land operations with JFMCC and JFACC.  
• Coordinates with JFMCC and JFACC for current air and surface operations. 
• Coordinates Surface TST sensor-to-shooter operations. 
• Facilitates TST execution of ground (e.g. Marine, Army) Strike Assets. 
• Coordinates ground TST sensor-to-shooter operations. 
• Reports to: XP OPS 
• Specialty:  tactical strike weapons experience, senior tactically qualified officer 
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• Workstation: ADOCS workstation on SIPRNET with Collaboration Application (e.g. 
IWS) application.  
• Links:  Access to ADOCS, SIPRNET and secure telephone (STU-III) 
• Engagement Sequence and Notional Data Flow: TBD 
 
XP Coalition Surface Operations Officer (position XP ANZAC) 
• Facilitates TST execution of coalitions surface strike assets. 
• Coordinates coalition air and land operations with JFMCC and JFACC.  
• Coordinates with JFMCC and JFACC for current air and surface operations. 
• Coordinates coalition surface TST sensor-to-shooter operations. 
• Facilitates TST execution of coalition ground (e.g. Marine, Army) strike assets. 
• Coordinates coalition ground TST sensor-to-shooter operations. 
• Reports to: XP OPS 
• Specialty:  tactical strike weapons experience, senior tactically qualified officer 
• Workstation: ADOCS workstation on SIPRNET with Collaboration Application (e.g. 
IWS) application.  
• Links:  Access to ADOCS, SIPRNET and secure telephone (STU-III) 
• Engagement Sequence and Notional Data Flow: TBD 
 
Targeting Officer (position TGT OFF) 
• Determines which available ISR asset is best suited to address the emerging or “pop-up" 
potential TST. 
• Coordinates dynamic tasking requests with ISR Ops Officer in support of JTF and 
JFACC TST collection opportunities and priorities. 
• Maintains liaison with JTF/JFACC ISR Operations Officer(s) for dynamic re-tasking 
requests of ISR assets not under direct control. 
• Accesses available IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT and other ISR raw data to determine 
potential TST’s “detection”. 
• Provide targeting guidance to Imagery Screener concerning which threat/s to screen for 
based on available intelligence within guidelines of JTF and JFACC TST targeting 
requirements. 
• Inputs target nominations manually into ADOCS if TES-N feed inoperable. 
• Forwards target nomination imagery to electronic target folders (ETFs) for purposes of 
experiment. 
• Reviews raw and finished target nomination data and provides TST target predictive 
analysis to TST Ops based on the JTF TST Targeting requirements in daily intentions 
and guidance as well component commanders’ TST guidance.  If so elevates target to 
TST. 
• Coordinates with JAOC LNO and XP ISR contacts to keep informed of potential TSTs 
and developing details. 




• Assesses BHA/BDA and will control BDA block in ADOCS for BHA/BDA imagery 
processed by or provided to the JIC. 
• Provide support for developing SOP/TTP to manage and direct 7F JIC JFN operations. 
• Reports to:  JFN Operations Officer. 
• Specialty:  Intelligence Officer (O3) or Targeting Officer experience 
• Workstation:  ADOCS, SIPRNET and Collaboration Application (e.g. mIRC) 
Links:  ADOCS, SIPRNET and secure telephone (IP); connectivity to onboard  





















Appendix G PROGRAM OFFICE SURVEY  
 
The JFN Program Office conducted a parallel examination of JFN performance during FGE-
Kilo.  Part of that study was a survey of participants.  The following is a summary of the results 
of that survey and the survey form.  This information was provided by the program office 
participants.   
 
High-level Analytical Objective: 
 




How do TES products contribute to the IPB process?  




This analytical objective focused on the process and configuration of TES, GCCS-M and 
ADOCS as they relate to the IPB process in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).  Doctrinally, IPB 
provides a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific 
geographic area.  It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision-making.  
Applying the IPB process helps commanders selectively apply and maximize his combat power 
at critical points and times in the battle space. 
 
The JIC intelligence staff was surveyed on whether the JFN enhanced the IPB process and TST 
operations.   The specific focus of JFN enhancements was TES.  There were certain constraints 
to the experiment that may have influenced their opinion.  These constraints include manning, 
training, and scenario relevancy.  While the sample was small; there were some insights that 
emerged. 
 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents indicated that TES aided in 
identifying gaps in the commands knowledge of the threat and the current threat situation. 
 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion that TES products 
were used to portray threat models that included doctrinal templates.  Additionally, the same 
percentages were reflected in the respondents’ perception of TES products usefulness in 
developing models that depicts threat courses of action. 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion on ADOCS 
usefulness in providing TST operations situational awareness. 
 
25% of the respondents disagreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion that ADOCS 
provided useful information to continuously update the enemy situation template. 
 
All respondents agreed or strongly agreed that there was effective coordination between the TES 
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imagery screener, the ELINT screener, and the video screener. 
 
All respondents agreed that the imagery analyst processed imagery accurately and timely. 
 
50% of the respondents agreed and 50% of the respondents had no opinion that the configuration 
of the JFN systems in the JIC was sufficient to ensure fusion of intelligence was accurate and 
timely for targeting. 
 
25% of the respondents agreed and 75% of the respondents had no opinion that JFN provided the 
tools to fuse products that would answer the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. 
 
All respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the configuration of  the JFN systems in the JIC 
was sufficient to facilitate collaboration between different functions.   
 
50% of the respondents disagreed and 50% of the respondents had no opinion that track elements 
on the TES Integrated Tactical Display (ITD) were the same as the GCCS-M COP. 
 
66.66% of the respondents disagreed and 33.33% of the respondents had no opinion that 
ADOCS and JFN systems provided situational awareness of theater wide ISR operations. 
 
75% of the respondents agreed and 25% of the respondents had no opinion that the JIC provided 
targeting data to the JAOC and XP to support TST operations. 
 




Several constraints to the data collection and analysis efforts preclude making definitive 
conclusions.  These constraints include:  small sample size; technical difficulties; control of the 
experimental design; and adequate manning.  However, there are several insights that can be 
extracted form the data. 
 
TES capabilities has the potential to contribute to the IPB process.  Noteworthy was TES 
contribution to portray threat models that included doctrinal templates, and their usefulness in 
developing models that depicts threat courses of action. 
 
There was not any data to support confidence in that TES and GCCS-M had a common picture 
of the friendly and enemy situation.   
 
There were indications  that the configuration of the JIC was sufficient to ensure that capabilities 
of different systems could be applied to fusion of intelligence products. 
 
Technical performance was a significant factor the limited optimal operational capabilities. 
Questionnaire on Joint Fires Network Enhancement to IPB and 




1.  TES aided in identifying gaps in the command's knowledge of the threat and the current threat 
situation.  








2.  TES products were used to portray threat models that included doctrinal templates (which 
depict how the threat operates when unconstrained by the effects of the battlefield environment). 








3.   TES products were helpful in developing enemy COA models that depict the threat's 
available COAs. 








4.  ADOCS capability to provide TST operations situational awareness was useful during the 
IPB process. 








5.  ADOCS capability provided me sufficient information to continuously update the enemy 
situation template. 










6.  There was effective coordination between the TES imagery screener, the ELINT screener, 
and the video screener. 








7.  The track elements of the TES Integrated Tactical Display were the same as GCCS.M COP. 







8.  ISR planning supported TST operations. 







9.  The TES Mission Planner was useful in planning and synchronizing theater and national ISR 
assets for TST operations. 





















2. The imagery analyst processed imagery accurately and timely. 
 








3. The JIC provided targeting data to the JAOC and XP to support TST operations. 
 








4. The JISE chief was able to timely fuse information from the targeting officer and collection 
manager in order to make re-strike recommendations to the JAOC. 
 








5. The electronic target folders (ETF) were useful to the IPB process. 










6. The senior intelligence officer in the JAOC had the same enemy COP as the JIC. 








7. JFN including ADOCS provided the capability to distribute intelligence information that was 
accurate and timely. 








8. The JIC, JAOC and subordinate units had a common picture of the enemy. 







9. Configuration of the JFN systems in the JIC was sufficient to facilitate collaboration between 
different functions. 
 







10. Configuration of the JFN systems in the JIC was sufficient to ensure fusion of intelligence 
was timely and accurate for targeting. 








11. JFN provided the tools to fuse products that would answer the commander’s priority 
intelligence requirements. 






12. JFN gave provided the capability to better synchronize theater and tactical ISR plans to 
support targeting. 






13. JFN provide the capability to better dynamically re-task sensors to support targeting and IPB. 






14. JFN systems and ADOCS were generally reliable (i.e., outages, network problems, data base 
access, etc). 





15. Collaborative tools were sufficient to coordinate events. 




















Appendix H CPX PRINCIPAL RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This Appendix contains the Recommendations and Principal Results from the Command Post 
Exercise (CPX) portion of FBE-Kilo.  Many of these results and recommendations also apply to 
FTX.  Those that do directly apply are also included in Section 6.2, Principal Conclusions and 






















This initiative was to test JFN support for TST, and the associated SOP, for operations in the 
three roles for which it will be employed by C7F:   
as an embarked CJTF with other supported staff(s) embarked,  
as an embarked JFMCC/NAVFOR, and  
as the Fleet JFN/JFN supporting deployed RTCs and RTC Lites. 
 
Key equipment components were an afloat JFN (supporting the JTF staff and a JFACC forward) 
and an ISR-M supporting the JFACC Main.   
 
Key participants include the entire CJTF command structure and Component Commanders.  
JFACC participation was essential to meet the majority of objectives in addition to supporting 
examination of USAF ISR Manager (ISRM) to JFN operations. 
 
The CPX was the only time during TT03 that full CJTF manning was to be in place, which is 
necessary to validate the CONOPS and associated standing procedures.   
 
Not having a manned JFACC Afloat eliminated a major component of SOP testing that was to be 
accomplished.  JAOC personnel shortage also had a detrimental effect on exercising the SOP. 
 
With one exception, personnel in the JIC had no experience with TES-N.  The result was that a 
major portion of CPX was devoted to training rather than initiative experimentation.  
 
Equipment difficulties also played a major role in reducing the ability to obtain results for this 
initiative (see PR #2).   
 
The basic objectives of this initiative could not be met.  Indications of needed SOP development 
for a JIC, if it is to participate in TST, were determined.  
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PR #1 - Achievement of SOP Testing Objective 
 
• Experimentation difficulties prevented an adequate determination.  
 
o No manning of JFACC Afloat.   
 
o Lack of JAOC manning.  
 
o TES-N operators lack of training.  
 
• CPX was modified to be mostly training for FTX. 
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PR #2 - Achievement of JFN Contributions to TST Objective 
 
 




















The stated JFN objective was to determine the contribution of JFN to TST prosecution.  In order 
to determine JFN-unique contributions, or synergistic JFN effects, a baseline of performance 
without JFN is needed.  Such a baseline requires using the same C2 structure and information 
processes as were used in the experiment.  Baseline information is not available.    
 
Equipment problems prevented testing end-to-end JFN performance.  Target nominations could 
not be passed directly from TES-N to ADOCS, or directly to ISRM.  FBEnet was not operational 
due to Ku Band switching problems in Hawaii.  The result was that many information paths that 
are crucial for realizing JFN potential were not operational.   
 
Because of the collection of equipment and manning problems the only comprehensive test of 
JFN that could be made was of the TES-N component in the JIC.   
 
The basic objectives of this initiative could not be met.  Results that could be derived are 






















Image analysis and processing worked well, essentially creating/producing an efficient assembly 
line.  Operators, with little training, were able to explore images and make both analysis and 
processing decisions fairly quickly.  (Difficulties encountered because of the simulation are 
covered in a subsequent Principal Result.)   
 
An important capability was for the image analyst to be able to direct tactical sensors.  The 
analyst worked through a sensor manager and the process worked moderately well.  There were 
difficulties with this sensor control, as implemented, in that there was no direct provision for 
sensor control at the analyst's terminal.  A direct link that the analyst can use without 
interrupting, nor losing sight of, imagery is needed.   
 
There were problems with imagery information content.  Transmission of aim points and Lat-
Long needs to be improved.  This was done verbally or by notes, which slowed the process.  
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PR #3 - TES-N Capabilities    
 
 
• Works well for IMINT exploitation.   
 
o Video screener a major factor in closing TST timeline.  
 
o Directing tactical imagery assets.   
 
• Inability to drop validated aim points a major drawback.  
 

























The TES-N team leader in the JIC was an IS1 who had 9 months of intensive experience with the 
system.  He was the trainer for a team of three Sailors who had no experience or training on the 
system.  On-the-job training was performed during the experiment.  It is to be expected that the 
performance of well-trained operators would be better than those in the midst of training and that 
this had an impact on TST processes.  It was not possible to determine which process 
performance difficulties were the result of an operator lacking proficiency or due to JFN 
capability difficulties.   
 
It was surprising how fast the new operators learned how to use TES-N.  They were performing 
image analysis and TST nominations within a few hours of developing familiarity with the 
system.  This speaks well for the performance to be expected with JFN.   
 
Operator performance was hindered by their learning only that portion of the TST process they 
were performing.  Performance will improve when operators understand the full process and 
how the functions at the node they are working fits into the overall process.  
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PR #4 - TES-N Personnel Issues 
 
• Only the team leader was an experienced operator.  
 
o Lack of operator training hindered TST operations.  
 
• New operators learned very fast.  
 
o Performed quite well with minimal training.  
 
o Could determine whether performance difficulties were due to     
equipment or training.  
 





















With the exception of the team leader, the TES-N operators were totally unfamiliar with the 
system and with TST processes.  Their training was on IPB processes.  Thus, they were being 
introduced to both a new system and a new process.  In spite of this they were enthusiastic about 
TES-N.   
 
They felt the system was easy to learn and that the graphical user interface (GUI) layout and 
methods of use were fairly intuitive.   
 
The system layout was such that a terminal could be used for image screening, image analysis, or 
nomination.  This allowed those operations to be exchanged or shared.  Having multiple 
functions resident within one machine produced manpower savings as a result of increased work 
efficiency and direct sharing of information between operators.  
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PR #5 - Operator’s Acceptance of TES-N 
 
 
• In spite of lack of familiarity, operators recognized the system’s potential 
for improving performance and efficiency 
 
• User-friendly and easy to learn.  
 






















CPX was used to provide TES-N operator training in an operational context.  But, the simulation 
used for the experiment presented unrealistic renderings of battlefield objects.  This lack of 
realism interfered with operator performance and therefore with their training.  In addition to low 
fidelity, the presentation of the battlefield was such that image analysts could not distinguish 
different instances of the same object type.  This produced a situation where operators were 
moving back and forth between objects to figure out which was which, interfering with training. 
  
 
A realistic simulation designed specifically for TES-N training is needed.  
 
Operators did not have an understanding of the TST process.  Training on the TST process was 
being conducted at the same time as how to do it.  Training on the full TST process is needed as 
a prerequisite to system "knobology" training.   
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PR #6 - TES-N Training Issues 
 
 
• Current simulation hinders training. 
 
o Lack of reality interfered with all aspects of training and performance.  
 
o Simulation designed specifically for TES-N training needed.  
 























The exercise proceeded through the MSEL events in good fashion.  Due to a number of factors 
mentioned earlier it was not possible for the experiment to proceed in the same fashion.  The 
result was that the two became decoupled.  It was not clear that it was planned for the exercise to 
depend on information coming out of TES-N in the JIC, but in execution it did not.  Thus, the 
experiment became one that could have been performed anywhere.  A shipboard operation and a 
real operational environment were not needed nor used.   
 
This brings into question the wisdom of having operational field experiments be a principal 
information collection means.  Savings could be realized if Navy experimentation were to 
concentrate on learning spirals and having operational field experimentation done only when 
necessary to validate results in an operational environment.  
 
CPX suffered significantly from not having equipment operate properly.  A process is needed 
where an experiment is not undertaken until equipment has been fully tested, determined to be 
functioning properly, and warranted to be ready to fully support the experiment's objectives.   
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PR #7 - Experimentation Issues 
 
 
• Experiment and Exercise were decoupled.  
 
• Greater emphasis needed on learning spirals prior to operational field 
experimentation. 
 
• Complete exercising of equipment and validation of functions required 
prior to operational field experimentation.  


























The pace of FBEs formerly has been such that the planning for the next experiment is underway 
before the current one is concluded, certainly before analysis is completed.  This has prevented 
lessons-learned from being carried forward to the next experiment.  It has also precluded 
investing the effort needed to follow up with the Fleet on system and process improvements.  
Much of the possible immediate value of FBE results has not been realized.  
 
FBE-K, even the CPX portion, present opportunities for Fleet follow-up.  Areas that have been 
identified as fruitful for doing this are:  
Development of TST SOP for an afloat CJTF  
Design of the processes for a Fleet Flagship to function as a JFN TST hub.  
Developing TST processes and SOP for less well-equipped ships/units. 
 
Undertaking these suggested Fleet follow-up items will require a shift of funds and manpower to 
this activity.   
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PR #8 - Fleet Follow-Up 
 
 
• Little Fleet follow-up has occurred after former FBEs.   
 
o Operational improvements have been lost.  
 
o Fleet recommendations for program improvement have not occurred.  
 
• FBE-K opportunities.  
 
o TST SOP  
 
o Design of Fleet Flagship as a JFN TST hub.  
 




H.2 CPX RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
H.2.1 FLEET FOLLOW-UP 
 
Fleet Battle Experiments have two purposes:  (1) to advance and improve the capabilities of 
systems and processes, and (2) to move new operational capabilities to Navy operating units.  
Part of the reason for doing number one with operational units is that, at some point, capabilities 
testing must be done in a realistic, human-in-the-loop environment.  Part of the reason for a Fleet 
participating in an experiment is to improve capabilities and the ensuing "leave-behinds" that can 
occur.  Leave-behinds are not only equipment but also new or improved processes.   
 
To date, most leave-behinds have been transitory rather than permanent improvements.  A telling 
example was a comment made by VADM Metzger, then C7F, during an FBE presentation:  
"What happened to the processes we put in place following Delta?"  The answer was that they 
had disappeared due to staff changes.  The basic problem was that there was no process or 
program to make the changes permanent.     
 
It is recommended that NWDC institute a process with Seventh Fleet to take the results from 
FBE-K and develop TST CONOPS and TTPs, in partnership with the Fleet, that will be adopted 
by the Fleet.  Results from CPX indicate that follow-on development would most profitably be in 
the following areas: 
 1.  Development of TST CONOPS and TTPs for a BLUE RIDGE CJTF. 
 2.  Develop a concept for BLUE RIDGE as a hub for TST information. 
 3.  Following the hub concept, specify what systems are needed for the range  
     of users included in the network, including "disadvantaged" users.   
4.  Develop procedures and guidelines for TST operations for all users,  
     including situations when full JFN capabilities are not available,  
     or completely unavailable.  
 
Adopting this recommendation will entail a significant shift in the way NWDC does business.  
To date, personnel have ceased involvement with an FBE once it is completed, moving on to the 
next event.  Following this recommendation means that personnel would continue to work on the 
initiatives associated with an experiment for some time after it is physically completed.  This 
requires a shift of resources to the follow-up aspect of an experiment.  It is believed that doing so 
will produce a significant improvement in NWDC productivity as well as produce an overall cost 
savings to the Navy.   
 
 
H.2.2 EXPERIMENTATION STRUCTURE  
 
Operational field experiments are expensive, both in terms of real fund expenditures and in terms 
of the use of platforms and their personnel.  Field experimentation as the primary data 
acquisition means is not cost effective.  Also, experience has shown that it is not possible to 
produce quality results when there is an overlap between analysis for one experiment and 
planning for the next.  With such overlap, lessons learned do not carry over into improvements 
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for the next event.   
 
Another problem involved the mechanics of having a "learning" experiment overlaid on a Fleet 
exercise.  There is a basic incompatibility.  Instead, one should have preliminary learning occur 
before going into the field then an exercise used for human-in-the-loop and operational testing to 
ensure validity.  Using this approach will allow for tighter coupling between experiment and 
exercise objectives.  The goals of the exercise will always be primary and one can adapt the 
experiment to those goals and produce high quality results that are directly applicable to the 
Fleet.   
 
It is recommended that a series of appropriate studies be performed to meet learning objectives, 
including workshops and even laboratory experiments.  Going into the field would occur only 
when needed for validation.  Hence, FBEs would not be events that occur on a regular schedule, 
and perhaps not exist in their current form.  Rather, when a particular study area progressed to 
the point of needing to do so, an appropriate venue for operational field-testing would be sought. 
 This could be identified as an LOE, a culmination event, or whatever would be appropriate.   
 
 
H.2.3 EXPERIMENTATION HARDWARE  
 
The experience in past Fleet Battle Experiments has been that there were always some 
equipment problems.  Perhaps this is to be expected, but it should be on a minor scale and the 
type of problem that can be quickly remedied.  FBE-K CPX was perhaps the worst situation 
encountered over the FBE series, with major equipment problems significantly disrupting the 
Fires Initiative.   
 
A policy is needed where equipment and interfaces must be fully tested and functionality 
ensured prior to an experiment.  A limited objective experiment (LOE) devoted to equipment 
testing is recommended.  This may be costly, but not be as costly as losing large portions of the 
desired results during a Fleet Battle Experiment.   
 
 
H.2.4 EXPERIMENTATION DATA 
 
Three types of data are typically obtained during an operational field experiment:  (1) subjective 
opinions about the performance of systems and processes, (2) subject matter experts logging 
event observations, and (3) electronic data logged within and between hardware systems.  The 
latter type includes simulation data.   
 
Planning an experiment requires close coupling between the detailed goals of an initiative and 
data elements to be captured.  Analysis of an experiment requires complete sets of all three types 
of data so that event chains can be reconstructed and the context within which events occurred 
can be fully understood.  A missing data element, or link, in the event chain breaks it and 
detracts from the ability to fully understand what occurred and why.  Absent context means 





To date it has not been possible to obtain all of the needed electronic data.  Part of the reason for 
this is that doing so is expensive and funds have not been made available.  The recommendation 
is made that the lists of electronic data requirements that have been provided be prioritized, 
decisions made as to which data will be obtained, system owners directed to obtain the data and 
make it available for analysis, and that adequate funding be provided for the purpose.  In 
addition, impact statements should be developed for those cases where the data will not be 
available and deficiencies be taken into account in experiment planning.    
 
 
H.2.5  EXPERIMENT PLANNING STABILITY 
 
CPX was an unusual situation in that there were major changes in the experiment structure (e.g. 
lack of a JFACC Forward) shortly before the experiment, and then personnel shortfalls due to 
BLUE RIDGE departing early for the typhoon.  However, it is not unusual in FBEs to have 
equipment and process changes occur right up to the beginning of an experiment.  Such changes 
disrupt data capture and analysis plans and can even make it impossible to capture data required 
to meet Initiative objectives.    
 
It is recommended that an experiment be "locked down" four months prior to its start.  An 
exception would be when there is a series of events that includes an equipment testing LOE prior 
to the field experiment.  In this case, the LOE should occur six weeks prior to the operational 
experiment and the lock-down occur within one week after the LOE.   
 
 
H.2.6 SIMULATION AND TRAINING  
 
CPX was different from previous FBEs in that it had a definite training aspect associated with 
JFN and SOP evaluation.  The stated purpose of the evaluations was that they be conducted for a 
particular C2 configuration and operational situation.  Training was to be conducted using TES-
N to prosecute TSTs.  The operational situation was to be created by simulation.  Training and 
evaluation were significantly negatively affected by the simulation's lack of fidelity.   
 
It is recommended that realistic training modules be developed for TES-N and JFN.  This could 
be done with pre-recorded real imagery and preset scenarios as is done for other systems. 
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